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STUDIES IN THE AṄGUTTARA NIKĀYA OF THE SUTTAPIṬAKA

By DR. B. C. LAW[1]

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is the fourth book of the Suttapiṭaka. It is also called the *Ekuttara nikāya* as mentioned in the *Milinda-pañho*[2], which is an important extra-canonical Pali work. It is a collection characterised by numerical groupings of the *Dhammas* arranged serially in an ascending order. Winternitz is right in saying that this text is a collection of sermons arranged in ascending numerical order.

Introductions

The Pali Text Society of London has brought out an edition of this text in Roman character in six volumes including the Index volume. The parts I (1885) and II (1888) are edited by Rev. Richard Morris and parts III—V (1896—1899) are edited by Prof. Hardy. The Index volume which forms the sixth part (1910) has been prepared by Miss Mabel Hunt and edited and revised by Mrs. Rhys Davids. The Pali Text Society (London) has published an English translation of the *Aṅguttara* in their translation series under the name of *the Book of the Gradual sayings*. First there

Different editions

[1] 43, Kailas Bose Street, Calcutta—6.

[2] p. 352

nipātas or sections of this text have also been translated into English by E. R. J. Gooneratna.[1] Some portions have also been translated into English by A. D. Jayasundera and edited by F. L. Woodword known as the *Book of the Numerical Sayings.* A German translation called *Die Reden des Buddha* by Nāṇatiloka has been published. The Sinhalese edition of the *Aṅguttara* by Devamitta[2] is worth mentioning. There is a mention of the Chinese *Aṅguttara Ekottarāgama sūtra* in the Bunyiu Nanyio's *Catalogue of the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka.*[3] The Chinese *Aṅguttara*[4] has no close resemblance to the *Pali Aṅguttara.* The Burmese editions of this work are also available.

Contents

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* consists of the following nipātas or sections :

1. *Ekanipāta* consisting of 21 Chapts.—*Aṅg.*, I, 1—46
2. *Dukanipāta* consisting of 16 Chapts.—*Aṅg.*, I, 47—100
3. *Tikanipāta* consisting of 16 Chapts. *Aṅg.*, I, 101—304.
4. *Catukkanipāta* consisting of 26 Chapts. *Aṅg.*, II, 1—257
5. *Pañcakanipāta* consisting of 26 Chapts. *Aṅg.*, III, 1—278
6. *Chakkanipāta* consisting of 12 Chapts. *Aṅg.*, III, 279—452
7. *Sattakanipāta* consisting of 9 Chapts. *Aṅg.* IV, 1—149
8. *Aṭṭhakanipāta* consisting of 9 Chapts. *Aṅg.* IV, 150—350

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[1] Ceylon, 1913
[2] Colombo, 1893.
[3] p. 134
[4] No. 543.

9. *Navakanipāta* consisting of 9 Chapts.—*Aṅg.*, IV, 351—466

10. *Dasakanipāta* consisting of 22 Chapts.—*Aṅg.*, V, 1—310.

11. *Ekādasakanipāta* consisting of 3 Chapts.—*Aṅg.*, V, 311—361

Importance and Style

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is really very important in the history of Pali Literature. This Nikāya applies on a comprehensive scale to the numerical scheme of mnemonics as enunciated in the *Kumāra Pañha* or the Novice's Questions. The same scheme has been followed also in the *Saṅgīti* and *Dasuttara Suttantas* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, as well as in the *Thera* and *the Therīgāthās*. The art has been tried, though not very systematically, in the *Atharvavedasaṁhitā*. Thus at the first sight this *Nikāya* is far from presenting a connected exposition of the doctrine. But a closer examination shows that it works out a definite scheme of its own. All the *suttas* or discourses grouped in the successive numerical sections have bearings on a twofold *Vinaya*, namely, the *Bhikkhuvinaya* and the *Gahapativinaya*. Although the groupings or enumerations of doctrines or principles are in many instances similar to those in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the distinction of the *Aṅguttara* lies in the fact that its bearing is, on the whole, practical. The time may come when it will be satisfactorily proved that the origin of the materials of the *Vinaya Suttavibhaṅga* are derived mainly from this *Nikāya*. Its importance lies, also in the fact that the contents of the *Puggalapaññatti*, which is one of the earliest of the *Abhidhamma* books, are nothing but extracts from it.

Comparing the individual passages it becomes increasingly clear that the lengthy discourses in the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas* have been emphasised separately in

smaller groupings. Thus it may be shown that the purpose of this *Nikāya* is to sufficiently emphasise certain doctrinal points by repeatedly dinning them into the ears of the hearers. But it cannot be said that the *Aṅguttara* has no originality of its own as regards its contents. There are indeed many discourses or passages which are peculiarly its own and these passages throw much light on the development of Buddhism and its history.[1]

Attention may be drawn, for instance, to the *Etadaggavagga* in the *Ekanipāta*. It furnishes us with a list of prominent Buddhist personalities among the monks and nuns and also among the male and female lay disciples, who are declared by the Buddha to be the foremost in rank in certain attainments or qualities. The elder Mahākaccāna was declared to be the foremost amongst those immediate disciples of the Buddha, who had the capacity to set forth in detail the meaning of the truth briefly enunciated by the Master and the elder Vaṅgīsa amongst those who excelled in the art of improvisation. All this goes to prove that the Buddhist Order as organised by the Buddha left sufficient scope for the development of individualism and initiative. The *Appamattakavagga* in the same *nipāta* is highly significant as emphasising the need of philanthropic work and having as such a direct bearing on Aśoka's *Dhamma*. We also find in this *vagga* that only a few are selected out of many, which will be lost by way of analogy with nature in the spiritual world.[2]

In the *Dukanipāta* we may draw attention to the *Kammakaraṇavagga*[3] throwing a flood of light on the brutal methods

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[1] I *Ang. Nikāya*, I., pp. 11, 33, 55, etc.

[2] *Ibid*., V, Appendix I, p. 373

[3] It contains 10 *suttas* dealing with worldly and spiritual striving, what is tormenting to mass and what is not, enjoyment of and dislike of things involving attachment, two dark and two bright things, what should be avoided here and hereafter, etc.

of punishment and criminal justice, the rigour of which was sought to be modified by King Aśoka.

In the same *nipāta* we have a *Vinaya* tract *Atthavasavagga*, which may even be identified with the passage, *Vinaya-samukase*, recommended by Aśoka in his Bhabru Edict. Its interest centres round a scheme which it lays down, presenting a plan for the whole of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. Attention may be drawn to the *Parisāvagga* in the *Dukanipāta*, the tract on *Ariyavaṁsa* in the *Catukkanipāta*, and the tract on *Anāgatabhayāni*, future dangers of the faith, as well as the Rājavagga in the Pañcakanipāta, all of them has a close bearing on the edicts and teachings of Aśoka.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II, 230) mentions four classes of poets : *Cintākavi* (poet of imagination), *Sutakavi* (poet of tradition), *Atthakavi* (poet of set purpose) and *Paṭibhānakavi* (improvisatore). The whole of a Piṭaka literature was handed orally from teacher to teacher (*ācariya paramparāya piṭakasampadāya*).[1] The *Rājavagga* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* contains a list of topics concerning kings, thieves, robbers, bandits, plunderers, ministers, high officials, army, war, drinks, clothes, beds, articles of luxury, friends, relations, villages, towns, cities, countries, men, women, etc.

Sanity and lucidity characterise the style of this *Nikāya*. In a purely prosaic and mechanical scheme there are to be seen matters that bristle with interest. The variety of contents assigns a very important place to this *Nikāya*, especially in regard to the subsequent development of the Buddhist texts belonging to all the three *Piṭakas*. A careful study of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* will help us to understand many difficult and intricate problems of Buddhism, some of which may be stated here : the power of cultivation of the seven elements of supreme knowledge

[1] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 189; Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 520.

(*satta sambojjhangas*), the causes of the origin of good and evil, righteous and unrighteous companies, two faults; one having result in this life and the other having result in some future life, the influence of self, world and religion, three failures or misfortunes : failure in morality, mind and view, three moral perfections in body, speech, and mind, three attainments of faith, morality and wisdom, attainments of the Buddha, ten fetters, qualities essentially necessary for the attainment of perfect beatitude (*nibbāna*), stages of meditation, trained and untrained mind as explained in its different aspects; ten modes of establishing the good law by true statements of the monks; the thirty commands given by the *Tathāgata* in respect of two matters; the conditions under which the *Tathāgata* was freed, three equally enervating doctrines on the actual individual experiences of men as propounded by some ascetics and brahmins, being refuted by the Buddha; pride, vanity and indecision being obstacles to complete salvation; origin and end of pleasure and pain; five obstructions to reasoning; five modes of appropriating wealth; reasons of non-endurance of the good law after Buddha's passing away, six conditions under which a monk is able or unable to realise the highest calmness of mind; diligence, eight kinds of emancipation, destruction of passion ; eight advantages to be expected from the practice of benevolence; eight reasons and causes strengthenig elementary wisdom; eight qualities making a monk unpleasant or pleasant to his fellow-students; some brahmanical statements about Gotama put in a true light; how women were permitted to enter the order; seven kinds of wives; the ten conditions under which the *Tathāgata* is released or emancipated, and the consequences following the circumstance that an individual is possessed of right or wrong views.

The *Anguttara Nikāya* furnishes us with some interesting and instructive data for the reconstruction

of historical, geographical, religious, social and literary aspects of our ancient history. The Kuru country appears to have been favoured by the discourses of the Buddha.[1] Sūrasena is mentioned as one of the great countries, which were prosperous and had an abundance of wealth.[2] Ceti or Cedi was one of the 16 great countries.[3] On several occasions Mahācunda, an eminent disciple of the Buddha, lived in the town of Sahajāti among the Cedis.[4] Anuruddha, the first cousin and the disciple of the Buddha, lived among the Cedis in the Deer-Park of the village of Pācīnavaṁsa.[5] This Deer-Park lay to the east of Vatsa close to the village of Bālakaloṇakāra.[6]

Historical, Geographical, religious, Social and Literary aspects.

The kingdom of Kāśī was a wealthy and prosperous country having an abundance of the seven gems.[7] Mention is made of *Kāśīcandana* (sandalwood of Benares).[8] Many incidents connected with the Buddha are mentioned in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.[9] The Buddha delivered many sermons at Benares.[10] Pasenadi of Kosala was consoled by the Buddha in his grief after the death of his wife Mallikā.[11]

Venāgapura was a brahmin village at Kosala visited by the Buddha. The brahmin householders went to pay their respects to the Buddha and had a talk with him.[12]

Sāriputta was associated with the Kosalan capital, Sāvatthī.[13] The Buddha gave a discourse to Ānanda at

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, V., pp. 29-30.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 213; IV, 252, 256 and 260.
[3] *Ibid.*, IV, 252, 256 and 260; Cf. *Jaina Bhagavatī Sūtra*.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 355-356; V, 41 ff.; 157—161.
[5] *Aṅguttara*, IV, 228 ff.
[6] *Ibid.*, IV, 228 ff.
[7] *Ibid.*, I, 213; IV, 252, 256 and 260; *Dīgha*, II, 75.
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 391.
[9] III, 392, 399 ff.; I, 110 ff.; 279-280.
[10] *Ibid.*, I, 110, 279 ff.; III, 392 ff. 399 ff.
[11] *Ibid.*, III, 57.
[12] *Ibid.*, I, 180 ff.
[13] *Ibid.*, I, 63 ff. 118 ff.

Daṇḍakappa.[1] The Buddha visited Pánkadhā and gave instruction to Kassapagotta, a monk, who was dwelling there.[2]

The *Aṅguttara* speaks of the land of the Vatsas as a country full of seven kinds of gems, rich and prosperous.[3]

Muṇḍa, king of Magadha, was overwhelmed with grief at the death of his queen Bhaddā and asked his treasurer to embalm her body in an oil-pot so that he might continue to look at her. The treasurer besought Muṇḍa to go to Nanda who was dwelling at Kukkuṭārāma (later Pāṭaliputra) and listen to his doctrine. Muṇḍa went to the sage Nanda who instructed him and brought him solace. The king then asked his treasurer to burn the dead body of his queen and thereafter attended to his duties.[4]

The Pali texts contain many references to the Buddha's experiences and converts in Magadha and especially at Rajagaha.[5]

Magadha was rich and prosperous and full of seven kinds of gem. It was one of the sixteen great countries of Ancient India.[6]

The *Aṅguttara*[7] tells us that some famous Licchavis went to see the Buddha when he was at Vesālī. The Master was worshipped by five hundred Licchavis who favoured different colours.

The Licchavis decorated themselves with various coloured garments, ornaments and trappings.[8] The *Aṅguttara* speaks of a Licchavi named Mahāli at whose request the Buddha expounded the causes of merit and demerit.[9]

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1 *Ibid.*, III, 402 ff.

2 *Ibid.*, I, 236.

3 IV, 252, 256 and 260.

4 *Ibid.*, III, 57 ff.

5 *Aṅguttara*, II, pp. 29-30; 181-182, 366 ff.; 374 ff.; 383 ff.

6 *Ibid.*, I, p. 213; IV, 252, 256 & 260.

7 III. p. 239

8 *Ibid.*, IV, p. 133.

9 *Ibid.*, V, pp. 86-87.

For other discussions between the Licchavis and the Buddha or his chief disciples—see *Aṅguttara*.[1]

The Licchavis loved fine arts and built many beautiful shrines.[2] The Licchavi youths were rude and rough, threw dust at respectable people and girls of good families. They were now silent and demure and were doing obeisance with joined palms to the Lord.[3] A Licchavi named Bhaddiya paid a visit to the Buddha while staying at the Kūṭāgārasālā in the Mahāvana. The Buddha explained to him the doctrine of good and bad *dhamma*. Bhaddiya delighted with the exposition declared himself a follower of the Buddha.[4] Five hundred Licchavis met the Buddha at Vesālī and they had a discussion about five kinds of rare gems and asked the Buddha's opinion.

Prince Bodhi, son of king Udena of the Vatsas or Vaṁsas, built a grand palace called Kokanada at Suṁsumāragiri.[5] The Mahāvana was an extensive forest near Uruvelakappa, a Malla town.[6] There was a Bamboo-grove at the town of Kajaṅgala.[7] The Sappinī (modern Pañcāna) was a small stream at Rājagaha.[8] The *Aṅguttara* states that trifling in number were the parks, groves, lakes at Jambūdvīpa, while more numerous were the steep precipitious places, unfordable rivers, inaccessible mountains etc.[9] The Gaṅgā, Jamunā, Aciravatī, Sarabhū and Mahī were honoured as great rivers out of ten rivers.[10] Each of the seven great Himalayan lakes is 50 leagues in depth, length and breadth.[11]

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[1] I, 220-222; II, 190-194, 200-202.

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 309.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, p. 76.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 190–94

[5] Ibid., II, 61.

[6] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 438.

[7] *Ibid.*, V, pp. 54 ff.

[8] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 29.

[9] *Ibid.*, I p. 35.

[10] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 101.

[11] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 101.

The Matsya country and the country of the Mallas are mentioned in the *Aṅguttara* as *mahājanapadas*.[1]

When Ānanda was at Uruvelakappa, a householder named Tapussa came to him and Ānanda took him to the Buddha whose teachings cured Tapussa of his desire for sensual pleasures.[2] Among the members of the Kālāma clan Bharaṇḍu Kālāma was one who was once a co-disciple of the Buddha as Bodhisatta.[3] The Buddha preached a famous sermon when on a visit to Kesaputta.[4]

Among the townships of the Kaliṅgas visited by the Buddha may be mentioned Sajjanela, residence of Suppavāsā.[5]

The Ājīvikas divided human beings into six main types according to six dispositions. The *Aṅguttara*[6] refers to *haliddābhijāti* (of a yellow disposition) in connection with the Ājīvikas. The author of the *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas* is wrong in translating *halidda* as green.[7] The same mistake occurs in the author's same book.[8] *Halidda* means yellow and not green.

Makkhali Gosāla was a foolish person, as he was called in the *Aṅguttara*,[9] and not a stupid man as he was wrongly called by the author of the book entitled *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*.[10] He should consult *Childers' Pali Dictionary*. *Moghapuriso* means a foolish person. The Ājīvikas were abused by the Buddha as they committed sins.[11]

Two inhabitants of Ukkala (Utkala) named Vassa and Bhañña did not believe in causation, action on reality

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 213; IV, 252, 256 & 260.

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 438—48.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 277 ff.

[4] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 188 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, p. 62.

[6] III, p. 384

[7] p. 139.

[8] p. 243

[9] I, p. 33.

[10] 1951.

[11] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 276.

(*ahetuvādā, akiriyāvādā, natthikavādā*).[1] Avantī claimed Mahākaccāyana as its inhabitant.[2]

Among the disciples of the Buddha Moggalāna occupied the foremost place in respect of the possession of psychic power.[3] The Ājīvikas claimed their third Tīrthaṅkara Gosāla as one of the three greatest *avadhūtas* in history.[4]

The *Aśvamedha* (horse sacrifice) and *Vājapeya* (soma sacrifice) associated with secular Brahmanism were the two forms of sacrifice having political significance.[5]

Early Pali texts mention an aboriginal custom of burying the dead and washing the bones (*aṭṭhidhopana*) with drunkenness and revelry prevalent in south India.[6] *Sattavāṇijjā* (or trade in human beings) is explained by Buddhaghoṣa as traffic in human beings (*manussa-vikkaya*). This traffic may be taken to imply traffic in women and slave trade.[7]

The conception of *dharma* was elaborated in early Buddhism. The Buddhist *dharma* is no mere law but something more than law. It is the principle of the righteousness in conformity with which a reigning king is to shape his conduct and guide the course of administration.[8]

The real urge to the higher and progressive life comes from *śraddhā* meaning faith, belief, confidence as well as aspiration.[9]

We have bodily action, vocal action and mental action. Having willed one acts by body, speech and thought.[10] In the *Aṅguttara* the Buddha is represented as saying "I declare monks, that there can be no annulment

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 3; Cf. *Saṁyutta*, III, p. 73; *Majjhima*, III, 78; *Kathāvatthu*, I, p. 141.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, p. 23; V, p. 46. [3] *Ibid*, I, p. 23. [4] *Ibid.*, III, 384.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, p. 42. [6] *Ibid.*, V, p. 216. [7] *Ibid.*, III, p. 208.

[8] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 149-50. [9] *Ibid.*, II, p. 149.

[10] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 415.

of voluntary deeds (*sañcetanika*) without the experience of the results thereof.[1] The Master is said to have repeated, "I declare, monks, volition to be action."[2]

The regular offering of gifts in honour and for the sake of the dead ancestors is enjoined as a duty of the cultured householder who is the inheritor of ancestral property.[3] The five duties of an Ariyan householder consist in the fulfilment of one's obligations to one's relatives, to the guests, to the dead ancestors and kinsmen, to the king, and to the gods and godly men.[4] The gradation of beings is set forth in the following words : purgatories, animal births, pretas and asuras (spirits and demons), average human beings and gods and angels.[5]

The Buddha says in the spirit of Brahmanism that the parents normally desire to have sons in the expectation that they will make offerings to them when they become spirits.[6]

People commit sins in the world and they are punished in consequence thereof.[7]

A monk who is wicked and is an evil doer, who does unholy deeds and who commits sin secretly, goes to hell after death.[8]

The *Aṅguttara* mentions two classes of *paribbājakas*. The *brāhmaṇa paribbājakas* were in the habit of discussing matters relating to the phenomenal world. The *Añña-titthiya paribbājakas* were generally interested in the question of self-realisation in thought and in conduct, that is to say, in solemn judgments about human life and the whole of things.[9] The wanderers discussed the topics of pleasure and pain,[10] and the five hundred states of consci-

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, V, pp. 292 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, p. 415.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, p. 43.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 45; IV, 244-5.
[5] *Ibid.*, I, 37; V, 269-70.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, 43.
[7] *Ibid.*, I, 142.
[8] *Ibid.*, III, p. 3; IV, 129-130.
[9] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 35; I, p. 157.
[10] *Ibid.*, V, pp. 120-21.

ousness.[1] The value of Buddha's teachings,[2] four points relating to the Buddha's doctrine,[3] soul and body being the same or different,[4] the phenomena which present themselves to our consciousness[5] and the individual who did not blame the blameworthy, nor praised the praiseworthy,[6] were some of the topics discussed by the wanderers with Sāriputta and the Buddha.

The Nigaṇṭhas are the Jainas. They are known as recluses of the red class (*lohitābhijāti*) wearing one garment (ekasāṭakā).[7]

The brahmin position in the Indo-Aryan society of the 6th century B.C. may be drawn on the basis of the Buddha's classification of the *brāhmaṇas* in five types. The Brahmins falling under the last category adopted with impunity all manner of pursuits, agriculture, trade, cattle-breeding, fighting as soldiers, government service and the rest as a means of livelihood (*Sabbakammehi jīvitaṁ kappeti*).[8]

In the following pages a critical discussion of each section of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is given.

The *Eka Nipāta*[9] deals with the obstacles, the mind concentrated or unconcentrated, the mind trained or untrained, the mind cultivated or uncultivated, amity, exertion, diligence, sloth, improper attention of the mind and the *Tathāgata*—the only person who does good to mankind. It further deals with the foremost disciples of the Buddha, male and female e.g., Aññakondañña, Sāriputta, Mahā-Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, Anuruddha, Piṇḍola-Bhāradvāja and other

Different sections

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[1] *Ibid.*, V., p. 230.
[2] *Ibid.*, ., p. 185.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, 29 & 176.
[4] *Ibid.*, V, 193 & 196.
[5] *Ibid.*, III, p. 356.
[6] *Ibid.*, II, p. 100.
[7] *Ibid.*, III, p. 383.
[8] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 223ff.
[9] A. N., I, pp. 1—46.

eminent monks, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, Khemā, Uppalavaṇṇā, Paṭācārā, Dhammadinnā, Nandā, Soṇā, Sakulā[1] and other eminent nuns and the lay followers, men and women; the wrong view and the right view, wrong concentration and right concentration. It is certain that a monk with a well-directed mind will remove ignorance, acquire knowledge and realise *nibbāna*. It is an account of the purity of mind that some beings in this world are reborn in heaven on the dissolution of the body. Mind is luminous but it is defiled by adventitious taints or defilements; that mind is luminous which is free from adventitious taints. In this *nipāta* (section) the chapter on meditation (*jhānavagga*) should be studied carefully. One is called a monk whose meditation is fruitful. He adheres to the Master's bidding. Whoever practises mindfulness relating to body, all good states having part in wisdom, exist in him.

The Buddha says that indolence, negligence, much desire, little desire, discontentment, improper attention, friendship with bad person, devotion to bad things, and non-devotion to good things, all these lead to destruction. Earnestness and making energetic effort lead to great gain. The *Akammīya sutta*[2] states that nothing is found so untrained and unworkable as the uncultivated mind.

The *Duka Nipāta*[3] treats of two kinds of sins (*vajjāni*) which should be avoided—sins which bear evil fruits even in this birth, and sins which lead one to rebirth in hell, two kinds of *balas* or powers or potentialities—the power of seeing with close observation the evil effects of sinful acts through body, speech, and mind, and the power of cultivation of the seven elements of supreme

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[1] Vide Law, *Women in Buddhist Literature*, Ch. VIII.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 5.

[3] *A. N.*, I, pp. 47-100.

knowledge (*satta sambojjhaṅgas*),[1] the causes of the origin of the good and evil, different kinds of hopes or desires—desire for gain and longevity, two kinds of gifts—gift of material objects and gift of *dhamma* (norm) and different kinds of assemblies of the monks.

There are two companies : the shallow and the deep. In the company of the shallow the monks are frivolous and empty-headed. They use harsh speech, they are loose in talk, wanting in concentration, unsteady, uncomposed, having unsteady-mind with senses uncontrolled. In the latter company we find the reverse of what is stated above. As regards the two companies of the discordant and the harmonious, the monks carry on quarrelsome and wrangling disputations, wounding each other with the weapons of the tongue in the former company. In the latter company we find the reverse. In the two campanies of the noble and the ignoble, in the association of the ignoble the monks are luxurious, not strict in discipline or morals, taking the lead in backsliding, shirking the burden of the secluded life, make no effort to reach the unattained, to win the goal not won, and to realise the unrealised. We find the opposite in the companay of the distinguished. There are the companies of the Ariyan and non-Ariyan. In the latter company the monks do not understand the real meaning of ill, and the real meanings of the arising, ending and the practice leading to the ending of ill. In the former company we find the reverse.

There are two companies of the dregs[2] and the cream,[3] in the former company the monks pursue the wrong path

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[1] Seven requisites for attaining the supreme knowledge of a Buddha—recollection (*sati*), investigation regarding norm (*Dhammavicaya*), energy (*viriya*), joy (*pīti*), calmness or tranquillity (*passaddhi*), contemplation (*samādhi*), equanimity (*upekkhā*).

[2] According to the *Commentary*, *Kasuto=palāpaparisā*, kacavara means sweepings, dust, rubbish.

[3] *Maṇḍa=sāraparisā*.

of impulse, malice, delusion, and fear. In the latter company we find the perverse of the above. There are two companies of monks trained in bluster, not in discussion by investigation, and of monks trained in discussion by investigation, not in bluster. In the first company monks do not listen to the discourses uttered by the Buddha, discourses deep in meaning, transcendental, dealing with the void. They do not lend a ready ear to them; they do not apply their mind to them, which is bent on understanding; they do not consider those discourses to be learnt by heart and mastered. In the last company we find the opposite of the above.

As regards the company that honours carnal things and not true norm and the company that honours the true norm and not carnal things, in the former company monks in the presence of the whiterobed householders sing each other's praises thus: such a d such a monk is freed both ways, such and such a monk is freed by insight, such and such a monk lives in accordance with the norm and faith etc. The exact opposite of the above is found in the latter company.

There are two companies of the crooked and the straight. A company is called crooked where the lawless deeds prevail over the lawful deeds, unrestrained deeds over restrained deeds, where lawless and unrestrained deeds are conspicuous. The opposite prevails in the latter company.

There are righteous and unrighteous companies. There are two companies of unrighteous speech and of righteous speech. In the former company the monks take up a quarrel, they do not meet together for investigation, do not conciliate each other nor take steps to do so, then by persisting more and more in their refusal to inform and conciliate each other and give up their quarrel, they make it more stubborn by strongly adhering to their respective

views saying this is the truth and the rest is folly. The reverse of the above is found in the latter company.[1]

The Buddha spoke to the monks about two faults : one having result in this life and the other having result in some future life. Evil in the future life is the fruit of bodily offence. Evil is the fruit of offence by word, deed and thought in a future life. If somebody offends in deed, word and thought, should he not be reborn in purgatory when body breaks up after death ? Thus scared at the thought of a fault to be atoned for in a future life, he abandons immorality in bodily deeds and practises morality in them; he abandons immorality in the practice of speech and thought and cultivates morality therein and conducts himself with utter purity. This is called a fault with future retribution. The monks should fear faults with immediate and future retribution. The Master also spoke to the monks about the two struggles which are hard to undergo in this world. They were also instructed by him not to shrink back from the struggle.

The Master then asked the monks to train themselves thus : "We will not decline the contest but will struggle on. One should look with satisfaction on things which are like fetters leading to re-birth, and one should look with disgust thereon. Two states are dark, namely, shamelessness and recklessness. There are two states that are bright, namely, sense of shame and fear of shame. There are two bright states that protect the world, namely, sense of shame and fear of blame."[2]

The *Adhikaraṇavagga* of the *Aṅguttara*[3] mentions the subjects of discussion. Some *suttas* of this vagga deal with the power of reflection or contemplation, earnest

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 70—76.

[2] I, pp. 52—58.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 47-51.

consideration and attainment of supreme knowledge. *Bojjhaṅga* and *Sambojjhaṅga* are identical in meaning.

In the Tika Nipāta[1] the Blessed One says that they are fools who commit sinful acts through body, speech, and mind, and they are wise who do not do so. He praises gifts, renunciation of the worldly life, and supporting one's own parents. He recommends exertion for checking the growth of the evils which have not arisen, for developing the *dhammas* which have not arisen, and for removing the evils which have already arisen. He refutes some heretical views and gives a clear exposition of the fundamental teachings of the *dhamma* propounded by him. He says that there are some *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who hold that the pleasant or painful and neither pleasant nor painful experiences are due to previous action; others who hold that these are providential, others again who opine that these are due to no cause whatsoever. The Blessed One condemns these heretical views and gives a clear exposition of the chain of causation and the four noble truths. He also speaks of the duties of a monk. He then speaks on the subject of *maṅgala* or well-being. According to him he who commits sinful acts through body, speech and mind is thrown into purgatory. But he who is restrained in his body, speech and mind and does meritorious acts through these goes to heaven and enjoys heavenly joys. Monks possessed of three qualities by abandoning three impurities, go to heaven.[2]

The *Tathāgata*, the *arahat*, keeps constant watch over acts of body, speech and thought, keeps rolling the unsurpassed wheel of Norm in accordance with *dhamma* or norm. The wheel of righteousness is not to be turned back by any recluse or brahmin or by any god or Māra

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[1] *A. N.*, I, pp. 101—304.

[2] *Tikanipāta*, sec. 10; *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 105.

or Brahmā.[1] There are three forms of pride (*vayomadā*)—pride of youth, pride of health and pride of life. The uneducated people who cherish the pride of youth practise sins in deed, word and thought. So doing when body breaks up, after death, such a person is reborn in purgatory. A monk intoxicated with the pride of youth gives up the training and falls back to the low life. So likewise does the one who is intoxicated with the pride of health and life.[2] The three duties of the wise and good are the following :—charity, renunciation of household life, service to parents.[3]

The *Ādhipateyya sutta* deals with the influence of self, influence of the world and the influence of religion.[4]

Where the virtuous monks live in the village or country, there men beget much merit in body, speech and mind.[5] On three occasions exertion is to be made to prevent the arising of evil and demeritorious states not yet arisen, to cause the arising of good and meritorious states not yet arisen, to endure the bodily feelings that have arisen, feelings which are painful and sharp, bitter, acute, distressing, and unwelcome, which drain the life away. When a monk exerts himself on these three occasions, he is called strenuous, shrewd and mindful for making an end of suffering.[6]

A brāhmin named Vacchagotta, who was a wanderer, met the Buddha who replied to him thus, "Sitting cross-legged I hold my body straight and set mindfulness in front of me. Thus aloof from sense-desires, from unprofitable states of mind I enter on the first stage of

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[1] *Ibid.*, sec. 14; *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 109-110.

[2] *Tikanipāta* sec. 39; *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 146-47.

[3] *Ibid.*, sec. 45; *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 151.

[4] *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 147-50.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 151-52.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, p. 153.

meditation which is accompanied by thought directed and sustained, born of seclusion, zestful, easeful and abide therein. By calming down thought directed and sustained, I enter on that inward calmness born of mental balance, zestful and easeful, which is the second stage of meditation and abide therein. Then by the fading out of zest, I become balanced and remain mindful and composed. I enter on the third stage of meditation and abide therein. Then by rejecting pleasure and pain and coming to an end of the joy and sorrow which I had before, I enter and abide in the fourth stage of meditation, free from pleasure and pain, a state of perfect purity of balance and equanimity. When I have reached such a state, if I walk up and down, at such time my walking is to me celestial and so with regard to standing and lying down. The whole world do I abide suffusing with a heart possessed of friendliness that is widespread, great and boundless. When I live setting mindfulness in front of me I know this for certain: passion is destroyed by me. It is cut off at the root and is unable to sprout again in future. Malice and delusion are destroyed by me.[1]

The Buddha spoke to the wanderer Sarabha thus : "It is by me that the *dhamma* of the Sakyas' sons has been revealed. How is it that you have understood the *dhamma* of the recluses who are Sakyas' sons ?" Sarabha remained silent. The wanderers of Rājagaha spoke to Sarabha thus : "Gotama has given you the opportunity of asking him whatever you may have to ask him. It is better for you to speak. If your knowledge is incomplete, Gotama will complete it for you. If it is complete, he will receive it gladly." Sarabha did not speak anything. Really the subject discussed was the value of Buddha's teachings.[2] The three duties of a monk are to be carried out by a monk : the undertaking of the training in higher morality,

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, I. pp. 180—85. [2] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 185 ff.

in the higher thought, and in the higher wisdom. The monks should train themselves thus.[1]

Adhicitta is *samādhi* (meditation), lofty thought or contemplation. It is grasping, striving, and energy.[2]

Avarice, hatred and delusion are the causes of the origin of actions. An action done in avarice, caused by avarice, and originated by avarice, is not profitable. It is blameworthy. It leads to sorrow and conduces to the arising of further action. So also with regard to actions done under the influence of hatred and delusion. These are the three causes of action.[3] Absence of avarice, absence of hatred, and absence of delusion are the causes of actions. An action done without avarice is profitable. It is praiseworthy. It leads to happiness and conduces to the ending of the further action. So also with regard to actions done without hatred and delusion.[4] There are three failures or misfortunes : failure in morality, in mind and in view. A person takes life, steals,and is a liar, slanderer, and a wrong-doer in sensual pleasures. This is called failure in morality. A person is covetous and he is of malevolent spirit. This is called failure in mind. A certain person holds false and perverse view that there is no virtue in almsgiving, in sacrifice and in offerings; that there is no fruit, no consequence of good and bad deeds etc. This is called failure in view.[5]

There are three forms of purity : purity of body, purity of speech and purity of mind. A certain person abstains from taking life, stealing and wrong doing in sensual pleasure. This is called purity of body. A certain person abstains from falsehood, and from back-

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 229-230.

[2] See *Adhicitta sutta*, *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 256.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 263.

[4] *Ibid.*, I, p. 263.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 268 ff.

biting. This is called purity of speech. A certain person is not covetous or malevolent in spirit and has right view. This is called purity of mind.[1]

There are three moral perfections : perfection in body, speech and mind. A monk by destroying sins, realising in this life and knowing it thoroughly the emancipation of the mind and the emancipation of wisdom which is free from sins, having attained it, abides therein. This is called moral perfection in mind. As regards moral perfection in body and speech a monk abstains himself from life-slaughter, stealing and wrong-doing in sensual pleasures. He abstains himself from falsehood, back-biting and rought speech.[2]

There are three attainments : attainment of faith, attainment of morality and attainment of wisdom.[3] For knowledge of passion three conditions should be considered : concentration on void, that on 'unconditioned' that is, freedom from marks or attributes as rendered by Max Muller; and that on freedom from longing or desire.[4] For full knowledge of passion, for its destruction, cessation, and abandonment these three conditions should be thought of. For full knowledge of hatred, for full comprehension and for destruction of pride, hypocrisy, hatred, delusion, anger, etc., these three conditions should be considered.[5]

In the *Catukka Nipāta*[6] the Buddha says, "He who is not possessed of four things (holy conduct, holy concentration, holy wisdom, and holy emancipation) is said to be fallen away from this Norm and Discipline (*Dhamma-Vinayā papatīto tivuccati*). An ignorant man who praises

[1] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 271.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 273. [3] *Ibid*., I, p. 287.

[4] It does not seem to be correct if *appaṇihito* is translated as aimless, as some have done.

[5] *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 299. [6] A. N., II, pp. 1-257.

one who does not deserve praise, blames one who is worthy of praise, rejoices wherein one should not rejoice, and does not rejoice where one should rejoice, stores up much demerit. A wise man who does the right thing in these respects stores much merit."[1] There are to be seen existing in the world four beings :—

(a) he who is ill-versed but does not lead a virtuous life,

(b) he who is ill-versed but leads a virtuous life,

(c) he who is well-versed but leads not a virtuous life, and

(d) he who is well-versed and also leads a virtuous life.

The Blessed One also speaks of sloth and energy as evils and recommends exertion. He deals with the subject of wrong behaviour and right behaviour. He says that there are four trifling things which are easily procurable and also faultless. They are clothes made of rags taken from a dust heap, eating a morsel of food, dwelling at the foot of a tree, strong-smelling urine (usually urine of cattle) used as medicine.[2] He speaks of the four ancient, age-long, and traditional noble lineages and says that a monk should rest content with whatsoever robe, alms, dwelling place, and medicine he gets. He deals with the four kinds of blessings (e.g., *paṭirūpa-desavāso*, dwelling in a suitable region; *sappurisupassayo*, taking refuge in good men; *attasammāpaṇidhi*, right realisation of self; and *pubbe ca katapuññatā*, good deeds done in former existences), the four kinds of kindly feelings, the four qualities which make one a great personage, the

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, p. 3.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, II, pp. 26-27-*pamsukula-cīvara*, *piṇḍiyālopabbhojanaṃ* *rukkhamūla-senāsana*, and *putimuttabhesajja*.

four qualities which guard a monk against his falling away and qualify him to be close to *nirvāṇa*. Such a monk should observe the moral precepts, control the portals of senses, be moderate in eating, and be ever watchful in the day time and at night in its three *yāmas* (watches)—*patlaama* (first), *majjhima* (middle) and *pacchima* (last). The Lord deals with the question as to who is a real monk. He speaks highly of oblations which are performed without cruelty. He mentions the four ways of self-concentration,[1] the four persons existing in the world and foster hatred, hypocrisy, gains, honours and not the Norm, the four hallucinations,[2] and the four faults of recluses and brahmins.[3] He deals with the four yields in merit[4] and virtue which bring about happiness, the four yields in merit which bring about heavenly bliss, and the four ways of living together.[5] He says that the Ariyan disciple who offers food gives to the recipient four things, long life, personal beauty, happiness, and physical strength. The Master further speaks of the duty of a layman, of blessings and happiness, gratitude to parents, the lures

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[1] They are as follows :—*diggbadbammasukbavibārāya* (for happy condition in this world), *nanadassanapaṭilābhāya* (for obtaining knowledge and insight), *satisampajaññaya* (for mindfulness and self-possession), and *āsavānaṁ khayāya* (for the destruction of sins).

[2] (a) taking what is *anicca* (impermanent) as *nicca* (permanent), (b) taking what is *adukkha* (non-suffering) as *dukkha* (suffering), (c) taking what is *anatta* (non-self) as *atta* (self) and (d) taking what is *asubha* (bad) as *subha* (good).

[3] (a) monks drinking fermented liquor, (b) monks addicted to sensual pleasures, (c) monks accepting gold and silver, and (d) monks earning their livelihood by falsehood.

[4] (a) rightly believing that the Buddha is all-knowing, etc., (b) rightly believing that the *Dhamma* has been well-propounded by the Buddha, (c) rightly believing that the *Saṅgha* founded by the Buddha is well-established, and (d) the *Ariyasāvaka* (disciple of the Noble) is free from all impurities, etc.

[5] (a) the vile living with the vile, (b) the vile living with the good, (c) the good living with the vile, and (d) the good living with the good.

to hell, the four kinds of sinful persons, the four kinds of snakes, to whom thoughts of loving-kindness should be sent forth, the fall of Devadatta, the four exertions, and of righteousness and unrighteousness. According to him a brother who is virtuous, well-versed, strenuous, and possessed of insight, follows the perfect way of conduct and his knowledge is directed to destroying the intoxicants. A brother who is endowed with thoughts of renunciation, of benevolence, of love, and of right views, follows the perfect way and his knowledge is directed to destroying the intoxicants. The Lord also speaks of the qualities by which a wicked man is to be known, of the qualities by which a good man is to be known, of the four excellences of the highest things, of the question of removal of doubts, of the four unthinkables (*acinteyyāni*) which should not be pondered over, and of the four purities of gift.[1] He speaks of heaven and hell,[2] of persons in darkness (*tamaparāyano*) and light (*jotiparāyano*),[3] of persons of low state and high state,[4] of titans and gods,[5] of peace and insight, and of the persons who are praiseworthy and blameworthy. He speaks of the four kinds of rain clouds,[6] the four kinds of jars, the four kinds of pools of water,[7] the four kinds of mangoes,[8] the four kinds of mice,[9] the four kinds of oxen (*balivaddā*), the four kinds of trees, and the four kinds of snakes (*āsivīsā*). The Buddha points out how he trains

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[1] *Catasso imā dakkhiṇā visuddhiyā*—*Aṅg.*, II, p. 80.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, p. 83. [3]. *Ibid.* ,II, p. 85. [4]. *Ibid.*, II, p. 86.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, p. 91.

[6] *Cattāro ime valāhakā : gajjitā no vassitā vassitā no gajjitā neva gajjitā no vassitā gajjitā ca vassitā ca*—*Aṅg.*, II, p. 102.

[7] *Aṅg.*, II, p. 105—*uttāno gambhīrobhāso gambhīrouttānobhāso uttānouttānobhāso gambhīrogambhīrobhāso*—*Ime cattāro udakarahadā.*

[8] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 106. [9]. *Ibid.*, II, p. 107.

men.[1] He speaks of four things :[2] a thing which is unpleasant to be done, and when done, it results in loss; a thing which is unpleasant to be done but when done, it results in gain; a thing which is pleasant to be done, but when done, it results in loss; a thing which is pleasant to be done, and when done, it results in gain. He speaks of earnestness and mindfulness, of the four holy places which should be visited by the faithful clansman—the place of the Buddha's birth, the place of his enlightenment, the place of his rolling the supreme wheel of righteousness, and the place of his *mahāparinibbāna*.[3] The Buddha speaks of the fetters, of understanding, of sinful and sinless men, of morality, concentration, and insight. He speaks of men subdued or unsubdued in mind, in body, and in mind and body together. There are four lustres of moon, sun, fire and wisdom.[4] Of these the lustre of wisdom is the most excellent. There are four radiances of which the radiance of wisdom is the most excellent. There are four lights, of which the light of wisdom is the most excellent. There are four effulgences, of which the effulgence of wisdom is the most excellent. There are four lamps, of which the lamp of wisdom is the most excellent. There are four kinds of misconduct by word, viz., *musāvādo* (falsehood), *pisunāvācā* (back-biting), *pharusāvācā* (harsh speech), and—*samphappallāpa* (frivolous talk).[5] There are four kinds of good conduct by word, viz., *saccāvācā* (truthful words), *apisuṇāvācā* (no back-biting), *saṇhāvācā* (gentle speech), and *mantābhāsā* (thoughtful speech). There are four essences (*sārā*), viz., *sīla* (moral conduct), *samādhi* (meditation), *paññā* (wisdom), and *vimutti* (emancipation). There are four faculties and four

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, 112-13.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 118-19.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, p. 120.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, p. 140.
[5] *Ibid.*, II, p. 141.

powers, viz., *saddhā* (faith), *viriya* (energy), *sati* (recollection), and *samādhi* (meditation).[1] The Lord speaks of the four things which lead to the decay and disappearance of the Norm,[2] and of the four things which lead to the preservation of the Norm. The Lord says that the monks should aspire to become like Sāriputta and Moggallāna. He speaks of the elements and of the annihilation of personality. Just as a warrior possessed of four qualities becomes worthy of offerings. The Exalted One speaks of conduct, integrity, firmness, and wisdom. He replies to the charge that he is a charmer and knows a trick of glamour, whereby he entices the followers of other sects. He also speaks of the *āsavas* or sins and says that it is not possible to cross the flood by self-mortifying austerities. He explains to the monks about the wicked and good men and speaks of the sinful and the virtuous, the man of evil nature and the man of good nature. He says that the four blessings should be expected as regards *sīla* (conduct), *samādhi* (meditation), *paññā* (wisdom), and *vimutti* (emancipation). Love originates from love, hatred originates from love, love originates from hatred and hatred originates from hatred.[3]

A monk who does not observe the *sīlas* (moral precepts), who entertains wrong views, who lives on falsehood, and who hankers after glory and fame, rejoices in the breaking of an order. The holy life is lived for higher wisdom, for the sake of realisation of emancipation and

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 141.

[2] Causes of the disappearance of the Norm are the following:—(a) if the monks learn the *suttantas* which are not well considered, (b) if the monks are wrong in speech, (c) if the learned monks do not proclaim the *suttantas* rightly, and (d) if the learned monks are not serious about *nibbāna*. The opposites of these causes lead to the preservation of the Norm.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 213—*Pemā pemaṁ jāyati, pemā doso jāyati* dosā *pemaṁ jāyati dosā doso jāyati.*

for the mastery of mindfulness. The Buddha says that there are four persons worthy of monuments, *Tathāgata*,[1] *Paccekabuddha*,[2] *Tathāgatasāvaka*,[3] and *Rājacakkavattī*.[4] He speaks of the four *balas* or potentialities, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom and says that the monk who is given to lust, malice, and envy and who is a fool and has no common sense at all, should not take to forest life. According to him, he who kills living beings, who incites others to kill, who is an expert in killing, and who praises the killer of lives, is sure to go to hell and suffer there.[5]

The *Abhiññāvagga* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[6] mentions the five constituent elements of attachment. Of the ten *suttas* embodied in this *vagga*, the first one deals with transcendent or supernatural knowledge or faculty. Some have translated *abhiñña* as intuitive knowledge.[7] The *Abhiññāsutta*[8] treats of supernatural knowledge by which five elements of attachment are to be known such as form, sensation, perception, confection and consciousness. The *Abhayasutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[9] deals with the subject of fearlessness. The Buddha admits that there are some beings who are subject to death and who are not afraid of the thought of death. The Master

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[1] An epithet of the Buddha, lit. meaning one who has trodd the right path.

[2] Individual Buddha, one enlightened by oneself, i.e., one who has attained to the supreme and perfect insight but dies without proclaiming the truth to the world.

[3] A disciple of the *Tathāgata*.

[4] Un iversal mon arch. Vide an interesting article on *Cakkavattī* by T. W. Rhys Davids (*R. G. Bhandarkar Comm. Vol.* pp. 125—131).

[5] *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 253.

[6] II pp. 247 ff,

[7] *Encyclopædia of Buddhism*, published by the Govt. of Ceylon, Facicule A, pp. 102-103.

[8] *Aṅguttara*, II, pp. 246 ff. [9] II, p. 184.

further points out that there are four classes of beings who fear death and there are four classes of beings who do not fear it.

The *Aṅguttara*[1] states that there are four topics not to be considered : (a) the subject of the enlightened, (b) trance, (c) consequence of action and (d) the thought concerning the world.

Shamelessness combined with wickedness, recklessness and absence of faith is discussed in the *Aṅguttara*.[2]

The *Pañcaka Nipāta*[3] deals with the five *sekhabalas* or the strength of the learner or disciple (*saddhā* or faith, *hiri* or bashfulness, *ottappo* or shrinking back from committing sin, *viriya* or energy and *paññā* or wisdom), the five *balas* of the *Tathāgata* (*saddhā*, *viriya*, *hiri*, *ottappo* and *paññā*), the five *upakkilesas* or sins of the body (*ayo* or iron, *loham* or copper, *tipu* or tin, *sisam* or lead, and *sajjham* or silver), the five *nīvaraṇās* or obstacles (*kāmacchando* or desire for sensual pleasures, *vyāpado* or malevolence, *thīnamiddhaṁ* or sloth and torpor, *uddhaccakakkuccam* or haughtiness and restlessness, and *vicikicchā* or doubt), and the five objects of meditation (*asubha* or disagreeable, *anatta* or without individuality, *marana* or death, *āhāre paṭikkula* or disagreeableness in food, and *sabbaloke anabhirati* or not finding delight in the whole world). This *nipāta* also points out that a monk endowed with five evil qualities, viz., *avitarāga* or not free from passion, *avitadosa* or not free from hatred, *avitamoha* or not free from delusion, *makkho* or hyprocrisy, and *palāsa* or malice, is not dear to his fellow monks; but when endowed with five good qualities, he is dear to his fellow monks. It also deals with the five *phāsuvihāras*, viz. *mettam* (friendliness),

[1] II, p. k0.
[2] II, 227 & 229—*Ahirika Sutta*.
[3] *A. N.* III, pp. 1—278.

kāyakammam (bodily action), *vācikammam* (action by speech), *manokammam* (action by thought), observance of the *sīlas*, and holding right views which lead to the extinction of suffering. The idea of *āghāta* or harm should be replaced by *mettā* feeling. It deals with the degradation of the brāhmaṇas, the evils which befall a monk who becomes angry, and the evils of wrong behaviour.

The Buddha while living at Sāvatthī said to the princess Sumanā thus, "the alms-giver as man surpasses the non-giver in five ways: in human life-span, beauty, happiness, honour, and power. In these five ways the alms-giver as man surpasses the non-giver. The alms-giver when he has renounced the household life surpasses the non-giver in five ways : he is often asked to accept a robe. He is not rarely asked; often to accept alms, not rarely; often to accept lodging, not rarely; often to accept mendicaments for sickness; with whomsoever he dwells in leading a godly life such folk mostly act towards him in cordiality in their ways of living, talking and thinking; it is rare for them not to act cordially, cordially they offer service, seldom without cordiality. In these five ways an alms-giver when he has renounced the household life surpasses the non-giver. A virtuous and believing man outshines the niggardly or envious person in self-sacrifice on earth. The all-enlightened one lives after death blissfully in heaven.[1]

The Buddha spoke to Anāthapiṇḍika about the reasons for getting rich. He says thus, "an ariyan disciple with riches honestly earned makes himself happy, and makes his parents, wife, children and slaves happy. He makes his companions and friends happy. Again, when riches are honestly earned, ill-luck from fire,[2] water, rob-

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, III, pp. 32—34.

[2] *Ibid.*, III, p. 256—five dangers arising from fire.

bers, enemies and heirs is removed and he keeps his goods in safety. He makes the fire oblations to relatives, guests, spirits, kings, and gods with the riches honestly earned. He institutes offering for all those recluses and godly men who abstain from pride and indolence, who bear all things in patience and humility, each mastering self and each calming and perfecting self."[1] The Buddha said thus, "Whoever clings to a woman's form, infatuated, greedy, fettered, enslaved, and enthralled, he shall grieve for a long time snared by the charm of a woman's form. Whoever clings to the sound, perfume, taste and touch of a woman, he shall grieve for a long time. A woman even when going along will stop to captivate the heart of a man. It is wholly a snare of -Māra. Really speaking it is wholly a snare of womanhood."[2] The Buddha spoke to the monks about the five precepts, e.g., avoidance of life-slaughter, of theft, of sensual pleasures, of falsehood and of taking wine and intoxicating drinks.[3]

Chakka Nipāta.[4]—The Buddha spoke to the monks thus "a monk who follows six things is worthy of offerings, gifts, oblations, and reverential salutation. A monk on seeing a form with the eye is neither elated nor depressed but abides in patience, mindful and self-possessed. On hearing a sound with the ear, on smelling with the nose, on tasting with the tongue, on touching with the body, on becoming aware of an idea with the mind, he is neither elated nor depressed but abides in patience, mindful and self-possessed.[5]

The Blessed One says that a monk endowed with six qualities becomes worthy of veneration and worship.

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[1] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 45-46.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, III, pp. 67-68.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, p. 203.

[4] A. N. III, pp. 279—452.

[5] *Ibid.*, III, p. 279.

Such a monk should be indifferent to the objects of sight, sound, savoury, taste, tangible things, and phenomena. There are six *dhammas* which should be remembered by a monk. As regards his body, speech, and mind he should cultivate the feeling of love and compassion. He should also observe the *sīlas* (moral precepts) and hold right views which lead one to the destruction of suffering. The Exalted One speaks of the six *dhammas* which are essential for a monk to cultivate. They are as follows :—*na kammārāmatā* (no delight in deeds), *nabhassārāmatā* (no delight in talk), *na niddārāmatā* (no delight in sleep), *na saṅganikārāmatā* (no delight in society or company), *sovacassatā* (gentleness), and *kalyāṇamittatā* (association with the good).[1] According to the Buddha the highest of sight is the sight of the *Tathāgata*, the highest of hearing is the hearing of the preaching of the doctrine by the *Tathāgata*, the highest of gain is gaining faith in the *Tathāgata*, the highest of learning is learning the doctrine preached by the *Tathāgata*, the highest of service is serving the *Tathāgata* and his disciples, and the highest of recollection (*anussati*) is the recollection of the *Tathāgata* and his disciples.

The Master asked the monks to learn thus : "We will become guarded as to the sense doors; observe moderation in eating, we shall be vigilant, we shall become seers of right things; we shall live engaging ourselves in practising things that lead to our supreme knowledge."[2]

At the Jetavana monastery the Buddha also addressed the monks when the night was over, and told them all that had taken place : "Deep respect for the Teacher, for the Norm and for the Order, for learning, for reverence,

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 449.

[2] *Ibid.*, III, p. 301—*Bodhipakkhikānaṁ dhammānaṁ bhāvanānuyogaṁ anuyuttā viharissāmāti.*

for modesty and for conscientiousness; it is not possible for a monk to lose; he is near *nibbāna* or perfect beatitude."[1]

The Buddha further addressed the monks thus : "O monks, the giver's part is three-fold, and the receiver's part is three-fold."

"Before the gift the giver is glad at heart; in giving the heart is satisfied, and uplifted is the heart when he has given; this is the giver's threefold part. Receivers are free from passion or stepping to cast lust out; they are free from hatred or stepping to cast hatred out; they are free from delusion or stepping to cast delusion out; this is the three-fold part of the receivers. O monks, it is not easy to measure the merit of such a six-fold endowed offering. Verily the great mass of merit (*mahāpuññakkhandho*) is reckoned as incalculable (*asaṁkheyyo*) and immeasurable (*appameyyo*)."[2]

The Buddha addressed the monks thus "O monks, youngmen of good families, explain perfect knowledge, the goal is told but self is not mentioned; yet there are some fools here who explain perfect knowledge merrily or laughingly. Afterwards they suffer remorse. Birth is exhausted, holy life is lived, they move about being free from fetters."[3]

When there is no sense-control, virtue is destroyed in him who has fallen away from sense-control; when there is no virtue, right concentration is destroyed in him who has fallen away from virtue; when there is no right concentration, right knowledge and insight are destroyed in him who has fallen away from right concentration; when right knowledge and insight do not exist, disgust of worldly vanities and freedom from passion are des-

[1] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 331.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 336. [3] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 358-59.

troyed in him who has fallen away from right knowledge and insight; when there are no disgust of worldly vanities and freedom from passion, emancipated knowledge and insight are destroyed in him who has fallen away from disgust of worldly vanities and freedom from passion.[1]

Cankers are to be got rid of by monks by control, use, endurance, avoidance, ejection and growth.[2] The Buddha addressed the monks thus : sensual pleasures should be ascertained, the cause of sensual pleasures should be known; the difference of sensual pleasures, their consequence, their cessation and the path leading to their cessation should be ascertained. Sensation, consciousness, cankers, action and suffering, their causes, differences, consequences, cessation and the paths leading to their cessation should be known.[3] The monks should consider these three things; by giving up discontent, joy should be cultivated; by removing cruelty, freedom from cruelty should be thought of; by abandoning irreligious conduct, religious conduct should be practised.[4] Amity should be cultivated to get rid of hatred.[5] The *Adhigamasutta* deals with the attainment of skill in the norm and its increase.[6]

The *Sattaka Nipāta*[7] is devoted to the seven *dhanas* or riches, e.g., faith (*saddhā*), morality (*sīla*), bashfulness (*hiri*), shrinking from committing sins (*ottappa*), learning (*suta*), sacrifice (*cāga*), and wisdom (*paññā*). He or she who is possessed of these riches is free from poverty and his or her life is free from turmoil. This *nipāta* also deals with the seven fetters (*samyojanas*) : courtesy (*anunaya*), repugnance (*paṭigha*), false belief (*diṭṭhi*), doubt (*vicikicchā*) pride (*māna*), existence (*bhava*) and ignorance (*avijjā*). One

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[1] *Ibid.*, III, p. 360.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, p. 387.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, p. 410.
[4] *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 448.
[5] *Ibid.*, III, 446.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, 431.
[7] *A. N.*, IV, pp. 1—149.

leads a holy life by putting an end to these fetters. The Exalted One condemns the sacrifices in which slaughter of living creatures occurs. He says that a true and noble disciple does not trouble himself with the thought whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after death. He further says how a monk becomes an upholder of the *Vinaya* (*Vinayadharo*), who is endowed with seven things. He knows the offence and that which is no offence. He knows the offence, which is light and which is grave. He recollects various former dwelling places.[1]

There are seven persons who are worthy of worship, reverence, gift, salutation and excellent merit.[2] The Lord said to the Magadhan Chief-minister, the brahmin Vassakāra, that while dwelling at Vesālī at the Sarandada shrine he had instructed the Vajjīs about seven indestructible conditions. As long as the Vajjīs would follow these conditions, there would be gain to them and no loss.[3] These four belonging to the *Tathāgata* should be protected: (1) the conduct of the Buddha is pure in action, (2) the conduct of the Buddha is pure in speech, (3) the conduct of the Buddha is pure in thought, and (4) the conduct of the Buddha is pure in living.[4]

At one time the Buddha stayed at Sāvatthī in the Jetavana hermitage of Anāthapiṇḍika. Here the great sacrifice of Uggatasarīra brahmin was being performed elaborately. The brahmin informed the Buddha thus: "If sacrifice be offered to the fiire, and if sacrificial wood is raised by anybody, he will accumulate much merit." The Buddha said "If one gives up fire of passion, anger and ignorance, he will acquire the greatest merit." The Master also spoke of the three kinds of fire, viz., the fire

[1] *Aṅg.*, IV, p. 143.

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 11.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 20. [4] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 82.

of a householder, the fire of oblation, and the fire of wood, which one should honour and worship.[1]

The Master then went to Anāthapiṇḍika's house and instructed his daughter-in-law, Sujātā, on seven kinds of wives. The seven kinds of wives were those who were like killers, like thieves, like those lording over their husbands, like mothers, like sisters, like female friends, and like female slaves.[2] As regards seven kinds of wives, it may be mentioned as follows: (1) wife who is always angry, hot-tempered, wishing ill of her husband, who is attached to others, who does not care for her husband, who is always ready to kill her husband, if opportunity arises; (2) wife who steals the earnings of her husband; (3) wife who is lazy, does not mind to work, rough, hot-tempered, wants to lord over all the members of the family including her husband; (4) wife who is kind to her husband as a mother to her son, always protects her husband and her husband's earnings: (5) wife who behaves with her husband like an elder sister with her younger sister, who is bashful and devoted to her husband; (6) wife who finds delight in seeing her husband like a female companion seeing her friend after a long time, (7) wife who is not angry in any sphere, even if beaten or oppressed by her husband, who always pardons her husband with a loving heart, and who is always devoted to her husband like a maidservant to her master.

The lay disciples of Campā accompanied Sāriputta who was on his way to meet the Buddha for listening to religious discourses. The Master was then staying on the bank of the Gaggarā tank. Sāriputta spoke on charity in the presence of the Buddha to which the Master consented.[3]

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[1] *Aṅg.*, IV, pp. 41 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 91 ff.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp. 59 ff.

The Blessed One said thus to the monks at Vesālī in the Mango-grove of Ambapālī : "The constituent elements of being are impermanent. They are uncertain. They are not encouraging. Oh monks, enough to make them free from all constituent elements of being. The sublime precept, the sublime meditation, the sublime wisdom, and the sublime emancipation should be understood and realised. The precept, meditation, wisdom and emancipation are excellent. These are understood by the famous Gotama. The Enlightened One has explained the doctrine to the monks through his supernatural faculty. The Teacher who is the destroyer of suffering and who is endowed with insight, has obtained beatitude."[1]

In the *Aggikkhandopama Sutta* included in the *Suttaka Nipāta* of the *Aṅguttara* the Buddha attaches too much importance to diligence. This *sutta* also preaches morality of the monks.[2]

At the Jetavana hermitage at Sāvatthī the Master delivered a sermon to the monks on the good effect of developing *mettā* or amity and on the merit and importance of observing sabbath consisting of eight good qualities[3] (*aṅgas*). Here, the Master spoke to Visākhā Migāramātā about the eight and four qualities of women.[4]

At Campā the monks accused a monk for his blame. The Buddha addressed them thus: "This individual should be subdued. When the monks see the blame, they know it as the fault of a monk. Good monks do not accuse others. Skilful monks being united, will put an end to suffering.[5]

The general Sīha approached the Buddha at Vesālī and said thus to him : "It is heard by me that the monk

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[1] *Aṅg.*, IV, pp. 100 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 128 ff.
[3] *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp. 150-51; pp. 248 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 267, 269 ff. [5] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 168 ff.

Gotama, who is the preacher of non-action, preaches his doctrine through non-action and instructs his disciples in that way." The Buddha said, "Oh Sīha, there is the teaching and through teaching one should speak to me while speaking properly. The monk Gotama who holds the doctrine of action preaches the norm through action. He holds the doctrine of annihilation and preaches the norm through disgust. He who performs austerity, preaches the norm through austerity. Oh Sīha, there is the teaching, one should speak to me through teaching while speaking properly. The monk Gotama who is comforted preaches the norm through comfort. In that way he instructs his disciples. Oh Sīha, I speak of the destruction of passion, hatred, delusion, and also of the destructoin of sinful conditions. The Blessed One spoke to the general Sīha, for example, on gift, precepts, heaven, disadvantage of sensual pleasures, and advantage of renunciation etc. Pure insight arose in general Sīha while seated. He realised, "What is subject to origination, is subject to destruction." He fed the assembly of monks headed by the Buddha with excellent food. The Blessed One instructed him while seated on one side by giving a religious discourse and then departed.[1]

The Buddha said thus to his disciple Vāseṭṭha at Vesālī : "Oh Vāseṭṭha, eightfold *uposatha* ceremony (sabbath), if observed, brings about great fruit." Vāseṭṭha said thus to the Blessed One : "My beloved relatives and kinsmen should observe the eightfold *uposatha* ceremony, which is for the happiness and welfare of my beloved relatives and kinsmen for a long time. Oh Lord, if all the Khattiyas observe the eightfold *uposatha* ceremony, it will be for their happiness and welfare for a long time. So in the case of Brahmins, Vessas and Suddas. "The

[1] *Aṅg.*, IV, pp. 179—88.

Blessed One agreed and further said thus, "if the whole world together with gods, Māra, Brahmā, recluses and brahmins, with gods and men, observe the eightfold *uposatha* ceremony, it will be for their happiness and welfare for a long time. If men of wealth and position (*mahāsālā* observe the eightfold *uposatha* (sabbath) ceremony, it will be for their happiness and welfare for a long time."[1]

The Buddha was asked by Ānanda at Vesālī thus, "Endowed with how many good qualities a monk should be selected as an admonisher of monks"? Oh Ānanda, a monk becomes virtuous, is instructed in precepts, becomes learned, has thoroughly understood through insight both the *Pātimokkhas*, which are welcome in details, well-divided, well-preached and well-investigated so far as the discourse and exposition are concerned. He becomes good in speech and courteous in speech for the purpose of expounding the meaning. He becomes capable of instructing the congregation of nuns by a religious discourse. Gradually he becomes beloved of the nuns. It is not concerning the Buddha, so far as it relates to renouncing the household life and putting on yellow robe; he becomes guilty of the act towards his preceptor. He takes twenty years or more to live."[2]

There are eight forces or powers of a monk who has destroyed his sins. A monk whose sin is destroyed, endowed with these powers discerns the destruction of sins. All the constituent elements, as they are, of a monk whose sin is destroyed on account of impermanence, are well seen through right knowledge.[3]

The Tathāgata has arisen in the world, the elect, the exalted Buddha, one who is endowed with good conduct

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp. 258-59 [2] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 279—80.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 224.

and learning, blessed, the knower of the world and the enlightened one. The Norm is taught leading to the attainment of *parinibbāna* and enlightenment, preached by the Blessed One. This person is afterwards born in the middle countries. He becomes wise, not stupid, not deaf and dumb, and he is to make known the good and bad sayings.[1]

Faith, bashfulness, and good gift—these things are followed by good men. They call it the path of energy. He goes to the world of gods by this path.[2] A noble disciple by giving up life-salughter abstains himself from life-slaughter. He gives fearlessnes, freedom from enmity and malevolence to many beings. By so doing he takes share in immense fearlessness and freedom from enmity and malevolence.[3]

There are eight kinds of emancipation : One having forms sees forms. One who is conscious of internal formlessness sees external forms. One is emancipated as good. Overcoming of perception of form in every way, disappearance of perception of hatred, not paying attention to perception of pride, one lives depending on the abode of infinity of space saying that the sky is infinite. Overcoming of the abode of infinity of space in every way one lives depending on the abode of infinity of consciousness saying that consciousness is infinite. Overcoming of the abode of infinity of consciousness in every way one lives depending on the abode of nothingness saying that there is nothing. Overcoming of the abode of nothingness in every way one lives depending on the above of neither perception nor non-perception. Overcoming of the abode of neither perception nor non-per-

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 227.

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 236.

[3] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 246.

ception one lives depending on the cessation of perception and sensation.[1]

The Buddha said, "Oh Ānanda, there are eight causes, remote and proximate (aṭṭha hetu, aṭṭha paccayā) for the occurrence of this mighty earthquake. Oh Ānanda, when the Bodhisatta deliberately and knowingly comes out of the mother's womb, at that time the earth quakes; when the *Tathāgata* obtains the enlightenment, then the earth quakes; when the *Tathāgata* revolves the Wheel of Law, then the earth quakes; when the *Tathāgata* deliberately and knowingly rejects the natural term of life (*sato sampajāno āyusaṅkhāram ossajjati*), then the earth quakes; and when the *Tathāgata* obtains *parinirvāṇa* then the earth quakes."[2]

One sees the origination and destruction of five groups of attachment. This is the form. This is its origin and destruction. This is sensation, this is perception, this is the constituent element and this is consciousness.[3] A monk endowed with eight things is not dear to those who lead a religious life and *vice versa*.[4]

Gain, loss, fame, ill-name, blame, praise, happiness and suffering, all these are impermanent among men and they are subject to destruction.[5]

Gotama is the upholder of the doctrine of non-action. He says that he speaks of non-action of evil conduct in body, speech and thought and of non-action of many sinful and evil deeds.[6]

A man binds a woman by beauty, smile, speech, song, weeping or lamentation, decent or elegant attire, by not leading a forest life and by contact.[7]

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p, 306

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 308—13; Cf. *Digha*, II, 108-109.

[3] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 155.

[4] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 155.

[5] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 157.

[6] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 174.

[7] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 197.

Hatthaka Āḷavaka was full of faith and virtue. He was bashful, conscientious, learned, liberal and wise.[1]

There are eight powers. The boys have the power of weeping or lamentation, women have the power of becoming angry, the thieves have the power of weapon, the kings have the strength of supremacy, the fools have the strength of irritation,[2] and the wise have the power of insight or intuition, the learned have the power of reflection or contemplation and the monks and brahmins have the strength of forbearance.[3]

The Master spoke to the banker Anāthapiṇḍika about the way in which charity should be dispensed with.[4] The Buddha said to Anāthapiṇḍika who was then very poor: "Do you offer charity at home ?" He replied, "Yes, very little and very poor." The Master said, "You need not be sorry. If you offer it with true heart, it will no doubt get you much more merit than the offering of big charities made without sincerity."

The *Navaka Nipāta*[5] deals with the nine kinds of persons; *arahā* (saint), *arahattāyapaṭipanno* (one who has reached th stage of an *arahat*), *anāgāmī* (one who has reached the third stage of sanctification), *anāgāmiphalasacchikiriyāyapaṭipanno* (one who has attained the fruition of the third stage of sanctification), *sakadāgāmī* (one who has reached the second stage of sanctification), *sotāpanno* (one who has reached the first stage of sanctification), *sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyāyapaṭipanno* (one who has attained the fruition of the first stage of sanctification), *puthujjano* (ordinary man), and nine kinds of saññās or objects of thought; *asubha* (impurity), *marana* (death), *āhārepaṭikkula* (disag-

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 217

[2] *Ujjhatti* meaning to throw or to abandon.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 223. [4] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 392 ff.

[5] *A. N.*, IV, pp. 351-466.

reeableness in food), *sabbaloke anabhirati* (not finding delight in the whole world), *anicca* (impermanence), *anicce dukkha* (suffering in impermanence), *dukkhe anatta* (nonself in suffering), *pahāna* (abandonment), and *virāga* (absence of passion). It further says that one can attain arahatship by putting away *rāga* (passion),*dosa* (hatred), *moha* (delusion), *kodha* (anger), *upanāha* (enmity), *makkha* (ill-feeling), and *paḷāsa* (spite). It also mentions the five constituent elements :—*rāga* (passion), *vedanā* (sensation), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhāra* (constituent elements), and *viññāna* (consciousness) and the five destinies of beings :—*niraya* (hell), *tiracchānayoni* (region of animals), *pettivisayo* (realm of the departed spirits), *manussā* (human beings), and *devā* (gods).

Perception of non-self arises in a monk who has the perception of impermanence. Those who have the perception of non-self, obtain salvation in the present existence, just to make known the pride of self.[1] There are four powers, namely, the power of perception, of energy, of bashfulness and of collection.[2] A noble disciple endowed with these four powers overcomes five fears.[3] These five individuals exist in this world : the elect, one who has obtained the state of an elect, one who has obtained the third stage of sanctification, one who has realised the fruition of this stage, one who has obtained the second stage of sanctification, one who has realised the fruition of this stage, one who has obtained the first stage of sanctification, one who has realised the fruition of this stage, and an ordinary person.[4] The Buddha spoke to the banker Anāthapiṇḍika about the way in which charity should be given. He asked him whether charity was given in his family. The banker answered in the affirmative.

[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 353.
[2] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 363
[3] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 365.
[4] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 372

The Master further said thus "one gives charity, bitter or sweet. He gives not reverentially, thoughtlessly, and not with his own hands. He gives that which is discarded.[1] There are nine things having desire at the root. They are as follows : search depends on desire; gain depends on search; investigation depends on gain; depending on investigation there is passion for desire, depending on passion for desire there is the application; depending on application there is the favour; depending on favour there is avarice; depending on avarice there is the difficulty of possession; from quarrels, disputes, punishments, slander, and falsehood many evil conditions arise.[2] Where the happiness of equanimity is lost, those who live putting an end to happiness of equanimity, surely the revered ones have obtained perfect beatitude and they have crossed and gone to the other side. A monk lives having obtained the fourth stage of meditation by putting an end to happiness. One should approve of and find delight in the saying that one who is not a cheat, and who is free from delusion is surely a good person.[3] Depending on the first, second, third, and fourth stages of meditation sins are destroyed. Depending on the abodes of infinity of space, of infinity of consciousness, of nothingness and of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness sins are destroyed.[4] The five fetters belonging to the lowerpart (belonging to *Kāmabhava*) are the following—

(1) heresy of individuality, (2) doubt, (3) affectation of rites, (4) desire for sensual pleasures and (5) malevolence.[5]

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 392.
[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp. 400-401.
[2] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 412.
[3] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 422.
[4] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 459.

Nine things should be considered on knowing human passion :

(1) Perception of impurity,
(2) „ „ death,
(3) „ „ impurity in material food,
(4) „ „ non-delight in the whole world,
(5) „ „ impermanence,
(6) „ „ suffering in impermanence,
(7) „ „ non-self in suffering,
(8) „ „ abandonment and
(9) „ „ the absence of human passion.[1]

In the *Dasaka Nipāta*[2] we are told of the attainments of the Buddha. We find Upāli asking questions on the doctrinal points and the Buddha giving the replies. The Blessed One explains what is meant by the term *saṅgha-bheda* (causing divisions or schisms among the priesthood). He says that when the monks preach *dhamma* as *adhamma* and *vice versa*, *vinaya* as *avinaya* and *vice versa*, and attribute to the *Tathāgata* that which has not been spoken by him, preached by him, practised by him, and laid down by him, then *saṅghabheda* occurs. There is mention of the ten *saññās* (consciousness) the cultivation of which leads to great advantages. The *dasa saññās* are :—*anicca* (impermanence), *anatta* (non-self), *marana* (death), *āhāre pati-kkula* (disagreeableness in food), *sabbaloke anabhirati* (dissatisfaction towards the whole world), *aṭṭhika* (bone), *puḷavaka* (one of the *asubha kammaṭṭhānas*[3] which is called puḷavaka, being obtained by the contemplation of the

[1] *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 465.

[2] *A. N.*, V, pp. 1-310.

[3] *Kammaṭṭhāna* is one of the modes of Buddhist meditation and it may be called analytical meditation. The *Visuddhimagga* mentions forty *kammaṭṭhānas*. *Asubhakammaṭṭhāna* means contemplation on demerit. There are ten *asubhakammaṭṭhānas*.

worm-infested corpse), *vinilaka* (one of the *asubha kamma-ṭṭhānas* obtained by the contemplation of a corpse black with decay), *vicchidaka* (one of the *asubha kammaṭṭhānas*, obtained by the contemplation of corpse fissured from decay), and *uddhumātaka* (idea of a swollen corpse). There is also mention of the seven elements of knowledge viz. *sati* (recollection), *dhammavicaya* (investigation of norm), *Viriya* (energy), *piti* (delight), *passaddhi* (calmness), *samādhi* (meditation), and *upekkhā* (indifference). The seven *bojjhaṅgas* (requisites for attaining the supreme knowledge) make one to attain the three kinds of knowledge—knowledge of previous existence, knowledge of the passing of beings from one existence to another, and knowledge of the extinction of the *āsavas* (sins).

The ten *parisuddhis* (purifications) are also enumerated here. They are *sammādiṭṭhi* (right view), *sammāsaṅkappo* (right determination), *sammāvācā* (right speech), *sammā-kammanto* (right action), *sammā-ājīvo* (right living), *sammā-vāyāmo* (right exertion), *sammāsati* (right recollection), *sam-māsamādhi* (right meditation), *sammāñāṇam* (right knowledge), and *sammāvimutti* (right emancipation). The Blessed One explains to the monks what is *sādhu* and what is *asādhu*, what is *ariyamagga* and what is *anariyamagga*. A person possessed of the bad qualities should not be served whereas a person possessed of the good qualities should be served. The former is reborn into hell and the latter goes to heaven.

The Buddha, while he was in the pinnacled hall in the great forest at Vesālī, was asked by a Licchavi named Mahāli thus : "What is the reason and cause of doing sinful act ? What is the reason and cause of starting sinful act ?" The Buddha said "Oh Mahāli, avarice is the reason and cause of doing a sinful act and of starting a sinful act. Hatred and delusion should also be taken as reason and cause of sinful act and of starting a sinful act. Oh Mahāli,

wrongly directed mind is the reason and cause of doing sinful act and of starting a sinful act. What is the reason and cause of doing good act and of starting a good act? Absence of avarice (*alobho*) is the reason and cause of doing good act and of starting a good act. Freedom from hatred and delusion (*adoso*, *amoho*) should also be taken as reason and cause of doing good act and of starting a good act. Rightly directed mind is the reason and cause of doing good act and of starting a good act. Misconduct is a vice. Good conduct is a virtue. Oh Mahāli, as the ten virtues exist in the world, therefore it is made known that misconduct is a vice and good conduct is a virtue."[1]

There are ten fetters (*saṁyojanāni*) : The first five known as the *orambhāgiyasaṁyojanas* and the last five *uddhambhāgiyasaṁyojanas*. The first five are so called because they cause re-birth in the lower worlds and are got rid of by the first, second and third paths. The last five cause re-birth in the *rūpa* and *arūpadevaloka* and are got rid of by Arhatship.[2]

There are ten *nāthakaraṇadhammas*, living according to the precepts of morality and restraint, being versed in religious learning, being a good companion, meekness and patience, cheerful performance of daily duties, finding delight in *dhamma* and *vinaya*, contentment with the four *paccayas* or causes, energy in good works, thoughtfulness and wisdom in its highest sense.[3]

There are ten things which are good, beautiful, and pleasant but they are not easy to get. They are as follows: enjoyment, beauty, freedom from illness, virtue, holy life, friendship, great learning, wisdom, norm and heaven

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, V, pp. 86-87.

[2] *Ibid.*, V, p. 17—The whole realm of sentient existence is divided into *rūpa* and *arūpaloka* the realm of beings having form and the realm of beings having no form).

[3] *Ibid.*, V, pp. 25 ff.

these are all good, beautiful, and pleasant but it is difficult to get them.[1]

While the Buddha was in the great forest at Vesālī many distinguished Licchavis came there to see him. They then went to the Gosiṅgasālavana and lived there comfortably. Then the Blessed One addressed the monks thus : "Where is Cālā ? Where is Upacālā ? Where is Kakkaṭa ? Where is Kaḷimbho ? Where is Nikaṭo ? Where is Kaṭissaho ? Oh monks, where are those elders who are disciples (*therā sāvakā*) gone ? The Buddha further said : "Meditation on the thorns of sound has been uttered by me." "There are ten thorns : Delight in association or delight in solitude is a thorn; applying one's self to good signs of one devoted to bad signs is a thorn; theatrical performance of one who is restrained in senses is a thorn; examination of womankind of one leading a religious life is a thorn; the sound of first trance is a thorn; reflection and examination of the second trance may be treated as a thorn; delight in the third trance is a thorn; inhalation and exhalation of the fourth trance may be considered as a thorn; consciousness and feeling leading to the cessation of consciousness and feeling may be taken as a thorn; passion, hatred and delusion are thorns (*kaṇṭakā*). Oh monks, you live making yourself free from thorns. *Arahants* (the elect) are free from thorns."[2]

A noble disciple prospers with the things of the cultivated field, he prospers with wealth and corn, he prospers with wife and children; he prospers with slaves; he prospers with the four-footed; he prospers with faith, virtue, learning, sacrifice and wisdom.[3]

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[1] *Aṅguttara*, V, p. 135.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, V. pp. 133-35

[3] *Ibid.*, V, p. 137.

In the *Abhabba sutta*[1] we find that one is able to obtain destruction of birth, old age and death by giving up passion, hatred and delusion.

At Campā the Buddha related the conditions under which the *Tathāgata* was freed. The *Tathāgata* was freed from form, sensation, perception, confection, consciousness, birth, old age, death, suffering and sins.[1] A householder named Vajjiyamāhita came to the Buddha and informed him what conversation he had with the heretics and wanderers. As religious austerity grows from religious austerity, so evil conditions are lost and good conditions grow. Emancipation (*vimutti*) should not be neglected. In this connection the Buddha addressed the monks thus : "He who is free from impurity for a long time in this *Dhammavinaya*, should rebuke the heretics and wanderers with their doctrine, as they were rebuked by the householder named Vajjiyamāhita."[3]

One is unable to realise arhatship without giving up these ten things; passion, hatred, delusion, anger, enmity, hypocrisy, unmercifedness, jealousy, avarice and pride. One is able to realise saintship by giving up all these.[4] Wrong view is irreligious; right view is religious. Many sinful acts arise from wrong view; many good acts arise from right view. Wrong determination is irreligious and right determination is religious. Wrong speech is irreligious and right speech is religious. Right and wrong action, right and wrong living, right and wrong exertion, right and wrong recollection, right and wrong meditation, right and wrong knowledge, right and wrong emancipation are good and bad.[5]

Aṅguttara, V, p. 146. [2] *Ibid.*, V, pp. 151-52.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, V, pp. 189-92. [4] *Ibid.*, V, p. 209.

[5] *Ibid.*, V, 231.

In the *Ekādasaka Nipāta*[1] we are told of the qualities which are essentially necessary for the attainment of *nibbāna* and which will help one to become the highest and best among gods and men. It is stated that through *Vijjācaraṇa*[2] one can attain *nibbāna*. One endowed with knowledge and conduct becomes the best among gods and men. This *nipāta* (section) also deals with the eleven blessings which are to be expected from the exercise of benevolence, with the eleven gates leading to *nibbāna*, by each of which one may save oneself. One should also develop eleven conditions for acquiring the knowledge of human passion. One does not acquire that which is not acquired. One falls away from that which is acquired. One does not get purification of the true religion. One gets undue confidence in true religions or leads a holy life being dissatisfied.[3]

By ascertaining passion eleven things should be considered first, second, third and fourth stages of meditation, mental emancipation due to love, compassion, joy, indifference, abode of the infinity of space, abode of the infinity of consciousness and the abode of nothingness.[4] By the ascertainment, exact knowledge, loss, destruction, cessation of hatred, delusion, anger, avarice, deceit, pride, clamour, arrogance, etc.—these should be considered.[5]

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[1] *A. N.*, V, pp. 311-361.

[2] In the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* we read *vijjācaranasampanno so seṭṭho devamānuse*. The terms *vijjā* and *caraṇa* are explained in this sutta (pp. 99-100). It is explained as lore and conduct, lore and ritual, knowledge and conduct.

[3] *Aṅguttara*, V, p. 317.

[4] *Ibid.*, V, p. 360.

[5] *Ibid*, V, p. 361.

TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT*

By B. V. Sreenivasa Rao, m.a., m.r.a.s. (cylon), f.r.a.s. (london)

"Glories of the Later Veerashaiva Rules of the Sangama Dynasty of Vijayanagar Empire." on chronological Basis (From 1419 to 1491 A.D.)

INTRODUCTION

This document deals with the gories of the later Veeraśaiva Rulers of the Sangama Dynasty of Vijayanagar Empire of the period from 1419 to 1491 A.D. Matters in this document are recorded on yearly events basis, so as to enable the scholars to know (on chronological grounds) them and the factors of this document are recorded on authoritative basis on Devarāya II (1419 to 1446 A.D.), Mallikārjuna (1446 to 1466 A.D.) and Virūpāksha III (1466 to 1491 A.D.), who being Veeraśaiva Rulers of the Sangama Dynasty, tried their best to uplift the glory of South Indian culture. Besides, this document is the fresh interpretation of South Indian History and it is very well based on all possible sources, which would be useful for the historians to re-write the history of Vijayanagar Empire.

A.D. 1419

(Corresponding to Śaka 1340-41, Kali-4520-Caitrādi Vikrama 1476—Meṣādi-Solar-year in Bengal 825—Kollam 593-94 A.D. 1418-19 Vilamba.

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* Veerashaiva Ithihasa Praveena, Author of Veerashaiva Sahitya, Veerashiva Charitri, Raichuru Itihasa etc.

Life—Member, U.P. Historical Society Lucknow, North India Head of the Department of History, First Grade College, Oorgaum, K. G. F. (Mysore State), South India.

1. Sangama is said to have been of the Yadava stock, an assertion often made of Hoysala Rulers.

Vide *E. C.* V, Hn. 36, vide P. 400, *Historical inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar, "A" The First Sangama Dynasty.

2. In 1419 A.D., Gutti was under Mahāpradhāna Mallappa Odeya, the younger brother of Bachanna Odeya vide *E. C.* VII, Shikaripur No. 288 vide *Mys. Gaz.* Volume II Part III P. page 1553 by R. H. Rao.

3. In an inscription dated 1417 A.D., in the reign of Devarāya II on Vairāgya Shivāchārya Dakshiṇā Murthy Deva is mentioned as "Rāja-Guru" royal preceptor—vide *E. C.* VIII Thirthahalli 162, —vide P. 1654 *Mys.* Vol. II Part III R .H.R.

4. Lakkanna was a Governor over Madhura in 1419 A.D.—vide *Maduraittala-Varalaru,* Tamil book P. 347, *Ancient India and South Indian History and Culture* by S. K. Iyengar, Vol. II Appendix E.

5. Devarāya II, was known as Veeraśaivāgamasārasampanna—vide inscription No. 92 P. 91 *Mysore Archaeological Report* 1923.

6. Devarāya II was the son of Vijayarāya and Nārāyaṇīdevī—vide *M. A. R.* 1923. *P. I. A.* Vol. 57 PP. 77-85 May 1928. This Devarāya got the reigns of power from his father (Pitryam-simhāsanam prāpya)—vide *E. C.* Vol. XII Tumkur 11, *I. A.* Vol. 57 PP. 77-85 May 1928.

7. Nicolo Conti in 1419 A.D. called Malabar as Melibaria; vide the *Madras review* Vol I. P. 324 para 231 of the Report of the *Administration of Travancore* for the year 1881-82, the *Gazetteer of South India* P. 385, *Indian Empire* P. 104 by Hunter, *A. S. I. Report,* Vol. II by Sewell, *Malabar Manual* Vol. I. by Logan, *I. A.* XXXI 1902 PP. 338 to 350.

8. A political compact was signed between Narasin-

gadevar of Perambur and his followers on the one hand and the residents of Kilaikurichchi on the other-hand—vide 344 of 1914 *Ep. Report* for 1915 P. 106, PP. 2-3, *Karnatak Historical Review* Vol. II January 1933 edited by Dr. S. C. Nandimutt.

9. Mention is made of one Timmanna-Odeya in 1418-1419 A.D.—vide Page 12, No. 22, Nos. 762, 763 Public 25th July 1901 M. E. R.

10. Annappa Odeya and Governor of Mangalore and Bārakūru Rajyam in 1418-1419 A.D. vide page 15 No. 83 Nos. 762, 763 Public 25th 1901 M. E. R.

11. Registers the lease deed (adai-olai) given to the weavers to settle in a street, on the Temple land of Vanasundara Nayanar, on certain conditions, regarding the taxes due from them to the temple—vide P. 30 No. 381, *A. R. S. I. Ep.* for the year ending March, 31st 1924 for the year 1923-24.

12. In 1419-20 A.D. Hariyanna, a son of Lakkappa gave rent free lands to Singanna, son of Vitharasa and others for having constructed a tank and founded a village called Hariyasamudra to the East of Nonabana Arasiyakere by re-claming the foret—vide P. 25 No. 284 vide *G. O.* No. 1003, 16th August, 1919 M.E.R.

13. In 1419 A.D. Ramagowda, received an endowment of the specified land for 2000 Arcca trees as nadgowdige—vide *E.C.* XII Mi. 20, P. 106 P. 404.

14. Kumaran covered the roof with copper and had the purification ceremony performed in Madam in 1419-20 A.D.—vide P. 24 *Trav. Acrh. Department Admn. Report*, for the year 1922-23.

15. In 1418-19 A.D. Mallappa Odeya was ruling Guttidurga; vide P. 245 A. S. *Report* for 1907-08—vide *A. R. S. I. E.* for 1923 P. 117.

16. In 1419-20 A.D., in the year, when Rayanna Odeya son of Bhupathi Odeyar was ruling over that part of

the empire in which Nangupatti was included, a political compact was signed between Narasinga Devar of Perambur, and his followers on the one hand and the residents of Kilaikurichchi on the other—vide P. 358 *Social, Political Life in Vijayanagar Empire*, Vol. I, *B. A. S.*

17. Mallappa Vodeyar was a Governor of Gutti in S. 1341, 1419 A.D., vide 126, *M. A. R.* 1934.

18. Devarāya, was styled only the "paśchima Samudrādhipathi"; vide *I.A.* Vol. 57 May 1928, PP. 77-85.

A.D. 1420

(Corresponding to Kali 4521, Śaka-1341-42, Caitrādi-Vikrama-1477 Meṣādi (Solar) Year in Bengal 826, Kollam-594-95 A.D. 1419-20 Samvatsara-Vikram).

1. Baiche-danḍanayaka, a minister for Devarāya II under orders of Devarāya II granted in 1420 A.D., the village of Belame (in Mepinad) for worship of Gummataswamy of Belagola—vide E. C V. Manjarabad, No. 58—vide P. 1553, *Mys. Gaz.* by R. H. Rao.

2. Harihara III made gifts in 1420 A.D.—vide E. C. IV, 114 and 159 Gundulpet-24. He was a Governor of Terakanambi Rājyam—vide P. 1555 *Mys Gaz.* Vol. II part III by R. H. Rao.

3. Alagia Manavala, the great Nainar Āchārya, arrived at Conjeevaram in 1420 A.D.—vide P. 117-118, *Q. J. M. S.* Vol. VII Jan. 1937.

4. In 1420 A.D. the Italian Nicolo Dei-Conti, came to Vijayanagar and has given Vijayanagar description. As per him, "The circumference of the city is 60 miles. In the city there were 90,000 men fit to bear arms. There was *sati-sahagamana system*. Men used to marry as many wives as they pleased. King Devarāya II was a more powerful king than all other kings of India. In

his harem there were 12,000 concubines of whom 4000 followed on foot wherever he went—vide Sewell, *A forgotten Empire* 84-85—vide P. 1587, 1588 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II P. III. R. H. R.

5. Lakkappa's son Hariyanna in 1420 A.D. gave rent free lands to Singanna, a son of Vitharsu. and others for having constructed a tank and founded a village called "Hariyasamudra" to the east of Nonabana Arasiyakere, by reclaiming the forest—vide inscription No. 283 P. 25 *M. E. R.* No. 1003; 16th August, 1919 App. B.

6. Srinatha completed his "Śivarātri Māhātmya" —vide PP. 77-85 *I. A.* Vol. 57, May 1928.

7. Kapilendra Gajapathi, took the Warangal fort, Kondavidu and the neighbouring countries had been occupied by him since about 1420 A.D.—vide 1459 A.D. The *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

8. Pedda-Komativema, ruler of Koṇḍavidu died in the year 1420 A.D.— vide P. 259. *A History of South India* by K. A. N. Sastry.

9. The north and the south gopurams of Rāmeśwara temple are unfinished and ascribed to one Kiranarayar of the Dakhan in 1420 A.D.—vide P. 315, *I. A.* Vol. XII 1883.

10. In 1420 A.D. the Towns were classified like the following:

(1) Grāma, (2) Nagara, (3) Kheda, (4) Kharvada, (5) Madamba, (6) Dronamukha, (7) Pura, (8) Pattana, (9) Halli, (10) Chāvadi, (11) Nādu, (12) Vente, vide *E. C.* VII Sk. 288—vide PP. 43-50 *Karnatak Historical Review* Vol. IV January-July 1937-No. 1 and 2.

11. Saṅkaradeva Odeya was a Givernor of Bārakūru Rajya in 1420-21 A.D.—vide P. 20 No. 160, Nos. 762-763 *Public* 25th July, 1901 M.E.R.

12. Prince Rāmachandra through his agent Chennukali Keśava made gift of land at Pranturu (Guntur

Dist.) to a certain Kunduri Rāmānuja in 1420-21 A.D.—vide P. 81 No. 125 A. R. on *Epigraphy* for 1916-17.

13. In 1420 A.D. remissions of taxes on the houses, gardens and tanks, belonging to Sthāna Bhūmi (lands granted for the offices of trustees of the temple) including the land belonging to Rayade, Someyadol, Kelade, the Sthanika at Chidravalli (Sosale hobli) Someśwara Temple, T. Narasipur taluk Mysore District—vide P. 268, *A. R.* of *Mysore Arch. Department* for 1933.

14. In 1420 A.D. 19,000 men were fit to bear arms, the strength of the Vijayanagar Army—vide P. 414 *Social & Political Life of Vijayanagar Empire*. B. A. S.

15. In 1420 A.D. Jaya Gowda got the title (*Yalahankanāḍaprabhu*)—vide P. 242, *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. V. R.H.R.

16. In 1420 A.D. the temple at Virūpākshapura in Kolar Dist. was built—vide P. 289 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. 2 Part I R. H. R.

A.D. 1421

(Corresponding to Kali 4522, Śaka 1342-43. Caitrādi Vikrama 1478 Meṣadi (Solar) year in Bengal 827, Kollam 595-96 A.D. 1420-21 Sārvarin Samvatsara).

1. Vittanna Odeyar was the Administator of the Araga kingdom. His charge included Araga, Chandragutti, Bārakūru and Mangalore—vide E. C. VIII Shimoga 70. He is described as the son of Rajanna Odeya—vide *S. C.* VIII Tirthahalli 190. He was a Brāhmaṇa-Kṣatriya—vide *E. C.* VIII Thirthahalli No. 144, dated in 1421 A.D.—vide Page 1552 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II part III R.H.R.

2. The 18 Kampanas of Aragu were under the charge of Veeranna Odeya, who in Devarāya II's spirit put down the Bedar rebellion—vide S. C. VI Kappa 26 E. C. VIII Nagar No. 29—vide P. 1553 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II Part III R. H. R.

3. The last date of prince Vīra Bhūpathi Odeyar a nephew of Devarāya I and only one son of Bukka II is 1421 A.D. He was the patron of Chaundappā-chārya. the author of *Prayogaratnamālā*, vide M. E. R. 1905 Para vide 3, —vide P. 1656 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II part III R. H. R.

4. In 1421 A.D. Mangarasa was the chief of Nagaripura (Nagaragiri) in Gerusoppa, Shimoga District—vide P. 13 *Jaina Antiquery* Vol. IV No. 1 June 1939.

5. In 1421 A.D. Śrīraṅgāchārya visited Vijayanagara, and won over Pratāpadevarāya by his mastery of chess, got a jagir from him and the title (Chakra-Rāya) for his brother—vide P. 21 *T. T. D. M. B.* Vol. IV No. 12 December, 1953.

6. Tirumalai Nāyaka and the Ravuttas (horsemen) of Kannada country were very much attached to the Devarāya II in 1421-22 A.D.—vide P. 116 Govt. of *Madras Public Deptt. G. O.* No. 538 28th July, 1909 *Ep. Report* for the year 1908-1909.

7. In 1421-22 A.D. Mallanarya, a Brahmin from Udayagiri built a tank at the village of Mandanapati and gave some land for a flower garden—vide P. 22-No. 269 *M. E. R.* 1905-1906 Govt. of *Madras G.O.* No. 492, 2nd July 1906.

8. In 1421-22 A.D. A sale of land to Mannaippurru temple Puliyur-Kottam was otherwise known as Kulothunga-sola-valanadu—vide P. 40, No. 355 *M. E. R.* for 1905-1906 Govt. of *Madras G. O.* No. 492, 2nd July 1906.

9. In 1421-22 A.D. mentions Annamalai Nathar, a son of Mahāpradhāna Silupayarasar—vide P. 58 No. 520 No. 961; *Public* 2nd August 1913.

10. In 1421-22 A.D. Mahāpradhāna Śaṅkara Deva Odeya was a Governor of Bārakūru Rājyam. It registers grant of land by purchase at Hariharapura, made by the Settikaras of Bayaduru to two Brāhmins—Vithapa and

Mayanna, sons of Mallappa—vide P. 54 No. 545 *A. R.* for the year 1929-30.

11. In 1421 A.D. grant of a village, Indulavadi for god Dāmodara of Bannerughatta—vide E. C. IX An. 86—vide P. 273 *Social and Political life in Vijayanagar Empire*, Vol. II B. A. S.

12. In 1421 A.D. all the Brahmins of Hiriya Holalūru in Śāntaligenādu, sold certain specified land in Hangārabayal belonging to the same place, to Paramahaṁsa Parivrājakāchāraya teertha, Muthur Śaṅkarabhārathī Śrīpāda in Kelabhagi of Shantalige for 48 hons, the price fixed by arbitrators—vide *E. C.* VIII Ti. 144—vide P. 346 *Social & Political life in Vinanagar Empire*, Vol. II. B.A.S.

13. In 1421-22 A.D. Tirumam Alayiyar of Suraikkudi on the course of the river Tenar in Adalaiyurnādu a sub-divison of Keralasinga valanādu set apart the amount of 150 valuable Tirandan Kulisaipanam, due annually as Pachchai panam, from the temple offerings to god, at the service called after his name the Nattavar. The District Assembly subsequently deducted the above amount both from the Tax register and the village accounts—vide P. 108 *Chronological list of Inscriptions*, the pudukottai State.

A.D. 1422

(Corresponding to Kali 4523, Śaka 1343-44 Caitrādi Vikrama 1479 Meṣādi (Solar) year in Bengal 828, Kollam 596-97, A.D. 1421-22, Plava Samvatsara).

1. 1422 A.D. is the beginning year of the rule of Devarāya II who is otherwise known as Abhinava, Prauḍha, Pratāpa, Gajabenta-Kara. He married Siddala and Ponnala—vide P. 400, *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India by S. K. Iyengar*, "A-the first Sangama Dynasty.

2. The Bahamani Dynasty came into prominence

by Alau-d-din Hasan-Gangu-Bahamani. This dynasty was founded on 3rd August, 1347 A.D. February 2nd 1358 A.D. It rose to power under Muhammad hib-Tughlak of Delhi. These kings were made Sultans. Their capital was Kulbarga (Gulburga). The period of Firoz a Bahamani Sultan the successor of Ahmad Khan closes in 24th September, 1422 A.D.; vide P. 327, *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India by* S K. Iyengar). From 24th September, 1422 A.D., Ahmad I, the successor of Firoz, a Bahamani Sultan's period starts vide page 327, *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India by* S. K. Iyengar.

3. The year 1422 A.D. marks the accession of Jatilavarman-Arikesarī-Parākrama Pāndya who is otherwise known as "Mānābharanan or Mānākavaca" Kumāra Parākrama or perhaps Vīra-Pāndya. He fought with the King of Kerala—vide P. 380 *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

4. The year 1422 A.D. mentions the name of Prola or Anna-Vrola a Reddi chief of Rajahmundry (Branch B—vide P. 386, *Historical inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

5. The year 1422 A.D. mentions Allada or Alla or Allaya, a Reddy chief of Rajahmundry (Branch B), who married Vemambika daughter of Bhīma of the Choda family vide P. 386, *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

6. The year 1422 A.D. mentions the name of a Reddi chief of Rajahmundry (Branch B) by name Veerabhadra or Vira who married Anitalli, daughter of elder Kātaya's son Vema—vide P. 386 *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

7. From 1422 A.D., Arikesari Parākrama Mānābharana was a Pāndyan Ruler. He won small places in Tinnavelly and defeated the Kings of Kerala. He built

Viśwanātha temple at Tenkāśī. He made a large tank, called Viśwanāthappereri and erected maṇḍapa in Śiva temples in several places—vide P. 248, 249, 250 page 267 *the Pandyan Kingdom* by Dr. K. A. N. Shastry.

8. The year 1422 A.D. marks the last year rule of Devarāya I, the father of Devaraāya II—vide *M. E. R.* 1906, Appendix B. No. 345 also *Kielhorn's Southern List*, No. 480—vide P. 1544, *Mysore Gazeteer* Volume 2, part 3 by R. H. R.

9. Devarāya I (father of Devarāya II) lived up to Śaka 1344 (cyclic year Sarvari or A.D. 1422)—vide *E. C.* III Malavalli 80 and *E. C.* IV Gundlupet 24—vide P. 1548, *Mysore Gazetteer* Vol. II Part III by Rao Saheb Hayavadan Rao.

10. In 1422 A.D. Harihara III made a gift—vide *E. C.* IV Gundlupet No. 24—vide *Mys. Gaz.* P. 1555 Vol. II, Part III R. H. R.

11. On the death of Devarāya I in 1422 A.D. he was succeeded by Vīra-Vijaya Rāya *alias* Vīra-Bukka or Vijaya Bukka, Vīra-Vijaya, Vīra-Bhūpati, Vīra-Vijaya-Bhuūpati etc. He is called as Bukka the II. A record dated 1422 A.D. says that he was ruling from Hastināvatī with great security and peace—vide *E. C.* VII Shikāripur No. 93; *E.C. X* and *E.C.* IX both dated in 1422 A.D. Kolar 178, describe him as the ruling king and give him the full imperial titles. So, he succeeded his father immediately on his death—vide P. 1558 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II Part III R. H. R.

12. In 1422 A.D. Śrīgiri one of the sons of Vijaya was governing at Mulbagil, i.e., immediately after Vijaya himself left it to assume the sovereignty—vide *E. C.* X Bouringpet No. 15 Text—vide P. 1558 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II, Part III R. H. R.

13. Devarāya II's mother was Nārāyaṇāmbika and one inscription Mi. 121 describes him as having received

the throne from his elder sister (Nijāgrajā) which may perhaps refer to the princes married to Bahamani family. —vide P. 116, 117 *Mysore & Coorg*, from the inscriptions by Lewis Rice.

14. Devarāya II got the reigns of power from his father—vide *E. C.* XII Tm. 11.

15. Titles of Devarāya II.

1. Parameśwara, 2. Veeraprathāpa, 3. Mahāmaṇḍaleśwara, 4. Bhāshege tappuva rāyara ganda, 5. Mooru rāyara ganda, 6. Aṣṭadigraya, 7. Manobhayaṅkara, 8. Gajaventekara, 9. Apratimabirudaṅka —vide *I.A*. Vol. 57, May 1928 PP. 77-85.

16. A record at Bārakūru states that Devaraya II began to reign from the summer month of S. S. 1343 by which perhaps, the lunar month, Caitra, which commences, the summer season is meant. *Epigraphical collections* for 1901 No. 160—vide PP. 77-85 I.A. Vol. 57 May 1928.

17. In 1422 A.D. Calicut was a great emporium of trade as per Abdur Razaq—vide P. 21, *Journal of the Benares Hindu University* Vol. 10 No. 1, 1946-47.

18. Harihara II in 1422 A.D. divided the village of Somahalli in the Terakanambi kingdom into an Agrahāra and called it a new Devarāyapura—vide *E. C.* IV Gu. 24.

19. In 1422-23 A.D. Sale of Padikaval rights in Karaiyur by Tiruchchirappali Udauyar for 300 current Sakkaram panan to one Sema and others—vide P. 109 *Chronological list of Inscriptions*, Pudukottai state.

20. In 1422 A.D. there were 2000 Muslim soldiers skilled in archery in Vijayanagar Empire—vide P. 422, *Social and Political life in Vijayanagar Empire* by Dr. B. A. Salatore.

21. In 1422-23 A.D. Remission made by Ekambaranatha a son of Pallikonda Perumal, Kachchiyaraya of certain specified taxes in the village. Irajaraja-nallur, *alias* Samberi in Sangappadi-sirmari-in favour of the temple of

Tiruttungarai-madam-Udaiya-Nayanar, for offerings and repairs—vide P. 27 No. 247, *A. I. S. I. E.* for the year 1928-29.

22. In 1422-23 A.D. gift of land made after purchase by Narayanasetty of Chaulivakeri to the god Vināyakadeva of Kellamgere, on the occasion of Utthānadvādaśī, while Virupanna Odeyer was governing the Bārakūru rājya—vide P. 30, No. 265 *A. R.* for 1931-32.

23. The year 1422 A.D. records the rule of Mahāmaṇḍaleśwara and records the setting up of a lamp-pillar in front of the temple of Kāladevī by Nāgarasanāyaka son of Mañjunāyaka. It registers a gift of rice and money made by him for the maintenance of the pillar; vide No. 43 of 1939-40 *Karnatak Inscription* Vol. I edited by R. S. Panchamukhi, PP. 101 to 102.

24. The record dated 1422 A.D. refers to the reign of Mahārājādhirāja, Rājaparameśwara, Aṣṭadikkabhayaṅkara (terror to the eight quarters) Mahārāya, Vijayabukka and introduces his feudatory. Mahāmaṇḍaleśwara, Kaligala mukhanda, Kai-Kataka-Surekara, lord of Siddha-simhāsana, Haivaraṣa, Odeya's grand-son, Keśava odeya of Nagire as ruling the country. Keśavadeva marched against the kingdom of Sangirāyaodeya, of Haduvalli who is called Hosivarasuli and Kaḍitalayamalla. A battle ensued between these two chiefs at Asakeyatalira, in which Sangananāyaka son of Tammanāyaka, displayed heroism and met with violent death—vide No. 44 of 1939-40 *Karnatak Inscription* Vol. I edited by R. S. Panchamukhi, PP. 102, 104.

25. In 1422 A.D. Mahāpradhāna Virupannaodeya was ruling from his capital Barakanyāpura. In the battle between Virupannaodeya and Mahāmaṇḍaleśwara Saṅgīrāyaodeya of Haduvalli at Bayidura, Kotivanna, fell fighting in the battle field—vide P. 124-127 No. 52 of

1939-40 *Karnatak Inscriptions* Vol. I, edited by R. S. Panchamukhi.

A.D. 1423

(Corresponding to Kali 4523, Śaka 1344-45, Caitrādi Vikrama 1480 Meṣādi (Solar) year in Bengal 829, Kollam 597-98, Subhakṛt samvatsara).

1. The year 1423 A.D. marks the name of Kātaya Vema III of Reddi chief of Rajahmundry (Branch A) who married Mallāmbika daughter of Anna-vota, of Kondavīdu to whom he was a minister and was given the Rajahmundry province—vide P. 386, *Historical inscriptions of Southern Indian* by S. K. Iyengar.

2. In 1423 A.D., Śrīgirināthaodeya was in charge of the Araga province—vide *E.C.* VIII, Tirthahalli 2nd and 14 *Mys Gaz.* P. 1553. Vol. II part III by R. H. R.

3. Ahmad Shah of Bahamani clan opened his campaign by marching towards the Tungabhadrā, in the dry season of 1423. A.D. Vijayanagar was captured and people were subjected to all sorts of miseries and havocs and distress. Vijayarāya the father of Devarāya II was forced to sue for peace. This seize was ended on the agreement of payment of arrears of tribute and peace was concluded. The victorious Ahmad Shah returned to Kulbarga—vide P. 1561-62 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II part III R.H.R.

4. From 1399 to 1423 A.D. Vijaya or Yadu was the ruler of Mysore from 1423 to 1458 A.D., Here Bettada-Chama I of Yadu descent was the ruler of Mysore—vide P. 368 *Geneological tables, the Historical Inscriptions of Southern India* by S. K. Iyengar.

5. The Kakatiya Kingdom of Warrangal disappeared from history from 1423 A.D. and the Reddi principality of Kondavidu rose on its ruins—vide P. 384 *Q.J.M.S.* January 1933 Vol. XXIII No. 3.

6. Tippasetti of Vijayanagar treasury, in 1423 A.D., dedicated to the god Tirumala of Chikkahonnuru, the tank (taṭāka) which he had constructed in order that merit might accrue to his father and mother—vide *E.C.* IV, Hs. 27, vide P. 18 *Social & Political life in Vijayanagar Empire* Vol. II by Dr. B. A. S.

7. In 1423 A.D. Tammanāyaka a trusted servant of Mahāmaṇḍaleśwara Keśavadeva Odeya of Nagire died in a fight with the enemies. This Keśavadevaodeya marched agast the kindom of Saṅgirāyaodeya of Hāḍuvalli. In this battle Tammanāyaka, son of Chavadanāyaka met a heroic death—vide No. 42 of 1939-40 PP. 99 to 101, *Karnatak inscriptions* Vol. I, edited by R. S Panchamukhi. PP. 99 to 101.

8. In 1423 A.D. the two armies (Ubhayadala) or evidently of Keśavadeva Odeya and Saṅgirāva Odeya, fought against each other. In this battle Tammanāyaka fought bravely and went to heaven, vide No. 45 of 1939-40 P. 104 to 106 *Karnatak inscriptions* Vol. I edited by R. S. Panchamukhi.

9. In 1423 A.D. Haivarṣa Odeya, decribed as Gandara gora and Samanta Nārāyaṇa, led an expedition against Saṅgirāya Odeya of Hāḍuvalli, his forces being reinforced by an army, led by Keśavadeva Odeya and Alia Saṅgirāya Odeya. In this battle a hero named, Isaranna nāyaka fell fighting bravely on the side of Saṅgirāya Obeya—vide No. 46 of 1939-40 P. 106-108 *Karnatak Inscriptions* edited by R. S. Panchamukhi, Vol. I.

10. In 1423 A.D. there is an elaborate description of Jambūdweepa. It proceeds to describe Saṅgītapura its high-castle walls, lofty buildings and pious monks. Saṅgabhūpa's (Haivabhūpa of Nagari) medical and spiritual guidance to the people are also eulogised. The Jaina monk Māṇikasena, the preceptor of Saṅghabhūpa observed Sallekhana vow and passed away without touching

food—vide page 113 No. 49 of 1939-40 *Karnatak Inscriptions* Vol. I edited by R. S. Panchamukhi.

11. Haduvalli is a small village surrounded by jungle on four sides, situated at a distance of about 12 miles from Bhatkal. It is called in inscriptions by name Saṅgītapura which is a Sanskritised form of Hāḍuvolal or Hāḍuvalli vide P. 30 *A.R. of* Kannada Research in Bombay province for the year 1939-40, Kannada Research Office Dharwar.

BHATKAL

It is known under the name of Battakala or Bhattakala in inscriptions. It is also called Maṇipura, the capital of Babruvāhana, in local tradition.

KAIKINE

About 2½ miles, from Muruḍeśvara is a small village of Kaikine.

Muruḍeśwara

This village Muruḍeśwara is situated about 18 miles to the south of Kumta,—vide Page 24-25-29-30 A.R. of Kannada Research in Bombay province for the year 1939-40 Kannada Research Office, Dharwar.

A.D. 1424

(Corresponding to Kali 4525 Śaka 1345-46, Caitrādi Vikrama 1481 Meṣādi (Solar) year in Bengal 830, Kollam 598-99, Śobhana Samvatsara).

1. The year 1424 A.D. marks the construction of a dam across the Haridra at Harihar, Mysore State, Chitradurg District—vide *E.C.* XI Davanagere No. 23 and 29 Naganna-daṇḍnāyaka, a minister under Devarāya II felt very sorry for this. Boppadeva's son Chama-nṛpāla the commander in-chief for Devarāya II's Army asked Balla-

rasa to rebuild this dam. So, Ballarasa, a Brāhmin of Kammekula and a skilled engineer re-built the dam—vide *E.C.* XI Davanagere No. 29. Chamanṛāla is praised as 'Gandaraguli—vide P. 1551, *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II, Part III R. H. R.

2. Nagappa Daṇḍanāyaka, was a minister and a right hand to Devarāya II vide *M.A.R.* 1910-11, Para. 115, *E.C.* XI Davanagere 23 and 29—vide P. 1551 *Mys. Gaz. by* R. H. R. Vol. II, Part III.

3. Vijayarāya died in about Śaka 1343 A.D. 1424-1425 in which year Krodhi year, Māgha Su. 6 vide Namma Ayyagali Śāśwata Śivaloka Prāpiti yahamtagipa Hiraṇyodakadāna-Dhārāpūrvakavāgi Koṭṭarāgi etc.,—vide *E.C.* VIII Tirtahalli No. 161. So, this Vijayarāya ruled for only two years. His son Devarāya associated with him as co-regent from about Śaka 1343 ö A.D. 1422 A.D.—vide *A. S. I.* 1907-1908 para 247 also *M. E. R.* 1901 No. 160 and *M. E. R.* 1907 No. 158—vide P. 1560 *Mys Gaz.* Vol. II Part III R. H. R.

4. The King of Warangal had helped Vijaya against Ahmad Shah of Bahamani at the time of the latter's capture of Vijayanagar. But Ahmadshah after closing his campaign against Vijayanagar attacked Warangal and destroyed it in 1424 A.D.—vide P. 1563 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II Part III by R. H. R.

5. Devarāya II ascended the throne in 1424 A.D. He is known as Immadi Devarāya, Pratāpa Devarāya, Prauḍha Devarāya, Abhinava Vīra Devarāya, Devarāvaya Gajabentakara etc.—vide *S.C.* VII Shikaripur, 240, dated in 1442 A.D. *M. E. R.* 1901, No. 177, *I.A.* XX 303. His title was who took all countries—vide *M. E. R.* 1910, Para 53—vide P. 1571 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II Part III R. H. R.

6. Tāllapāka Annamāchārya of the Nandivarika sect of Brāhmins. He was a poet and musician. His native place was Tāllapāka in the Rajampeta Taluk of

the Cuddapah District. He later became Vaiṣṇava and a staunch disciple of Śrī Śrīnivāsa of Tirumala. When Annamāchārya was 16 years old Śrī Veṅkaṭeśwara manifested himself before him in S. 1346 (1424 A.D. and that Annamāchārya, composed this Adhyātma, Saṅkīrtanams from that time till Śaka 1424): probably the date of his demise. His compositions bore similarity to those of the Veeraśaiva saint of the same period Nijaguna Śiva Yogi of Chilakavadī—vide P. 15-16 *T. T. D. M. B.* Vol. IV No. 1, November 1953.

7. In 1424 A.D. Goa and Chandragutti were governed by Tryambaka Deva—vide *E.C.* VIII Sorb 565—vide P. 1583 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II, Part III R. H. R.

8. Vīra Bhūpati (1409 to 1424 A.D.) founded a village called Kriyāśaktipura after his guru in the Mulbagal provinie which he governed—vide *E.I.* XIV 68—vide P. 1654 *Mys. Gaz.* Vol. II Part III R. H. R.

9. In 1424 A.D. Kannada Poet Bhāskara wrote Jeevandhara-Charitre Dharanoja wrote Davanger inscription—vide P. 47. 48, 49 Dwitiya Samputa, Karnataka Kavi Charitre by R. Narasiṁha chārya.

10. Name of the capital in 1424 A.D. Vijayanagar—vide *E.C.* VIII Ti. 175 Shimoga District—vide Beginnings of Vijayanagar history by Rev Heras.

11. Gift of a village by the King's brother Śrīgiri, a Governor of Maratakanagana—vide P. 9, No. 16 *M. E. R.* for 1905-1906 Govt. of Madras 2nd July, 1906, *G. O.* No. 492.

12. Mention Nāganna Odeya in 1425 A.D.—vide P. 12, No 25 Nos. 762, 763; *Public* 25th July, 1901 *M. E. R.*

13. Narasiṁhadeva Odeya was a governor for Bārakūru Rājya—vide P. 21, No. 180, Nos. 762-763, *Public* 25th July, 1901 *M. E. R.*

14. Records the removal of the silt in the tank at

Tirumalai near Polur North Arcot Dist.—vide P. 13 No. 69, No. 574, *Public* 17th July 1908 M. E. R.

15. Gift of Salt pans in the village of Manali in Pulal Nadu as a devadance to the temple of Tiruvarriyu-rudaiya-nayinar at Tiruvorajun in Pular Kottam, a sub-division of Jayangonda Chola Maṇḍalam by the residents of the village. It mentions the salt pan Padampakkana-yaka-peralam—vide page 30 No. 367 *G.O.* No. 919, *Public*, 29th July 1912 M. E. R.

16. Gift of a village Kalluru, Ananthaur District, re-named Prauḍharāyapuram to the east of the Pinākinī river to a Vedic Scholar named Narasiṁhārādhya of Vasiṣṭhagotra and *Āśwalāyanasūtra*—vide P. 5 No. 6 *A.R.* for 1934-35.

17. Brāhmins of Padaividu Rājya, launched a useful measure of social legislation. As per this, marriages were to be concluded only by Kanyādāna—vide *Raṅgachārī Top List* 1 N. A. 602 P. 604; P. 118 *Social and Political life in Vijayanagar Empire* Vol. II B. A. S.

18. King Devarāya II was called a Suratrāṇa or Sulltan—vide P. 106, "the Bahamanies of Deccan" by H. K. Sherwani, Published by the Manager of Publications, Sawood Manzil, Himayatnagar, Hyderabad Deccan.

19. Śrīgīrinātha or Śrīgiribhūpāla, a brother of Devarāya II granted village, Nipatalaka *alias Vijayaraṅgapuram* (Kadapperi) N. Arcot District to a Brahmin named Sampat Kumāra Paṇḍita who was well-vorsed in the science of Āyurveda. This Sampatkumāra Paṇḍita divided this village into 56 shares gave two to the temple, one for feeding Brāhmins retaining 22 for his own use and bestowed the rest on his brothers, relatives and learned men—vide P. 167 *Social and Political life in Vijayanagar Empire* Vol. I. B. A. S. *Madras Museum copper plates* Nos. 9 PP. 45-46.

20. Mummidireddi gave this endowment while Maila-

rareddi son of Panta Mummadireddi was ruling Pahindipadu. Near the fields, belonging to the Gods and Brāhmins of this village in the time of Vemayya Reddi seven Kunahams of land were given as a Sarvamānyam at that time, Manta Reddi, settled the Vrittis of that village. Mylarareddi ave for the gods a Sarvamānyam at that time, Manta Reddi, settled the vrittis of that village. Mylarareddi gave for the gods and Brahmins of Payindipadu vrittis free from presents (katnalu) vide P. 1089 *Ongole* 104, *Nellur Inscriptions* Part III by A. Butterworth and V. V. Chetty.

A PRE-NYĀYA SCHOOL OF MIMĀṀSĀ

By T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyengar

M.A., F.R.A.S. (Lond.)*

The Vedas are the infallible authority to the propounders of the Nyāya system as much as they are to the systematizers of the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra. Unlike Kaṇāda, the exponent of the Vaiśeṣika thought, Gautama or Akṣapāda, accepts śabda-pramāṇa as a valid means of cognition. He divides śabda into dṛṣṭa and adṛṣṭa. [1] He accepts the Vedas under adṛṣṭa category and acknowledges the veritable truths embedded in them on transcendental matters.[2] Gautama asserts the Vedas as an authority on the strength of the trustworthiness of the various expositors.[3] Vātsyāyana, clearly defines āptas as those who have had a direct perception of the real essence of things and who have compassion on living beings.[4] As such, it is incumbent on the part of Gautama as well, to meet the criticisms levelled against the authority of the Vedas during his life time. Unlike the Mīmāṁsaka, Gautama's treatment of the Vedic authority is confined to the water-tight compartment, in so far as it is useful for him to propound his system.

So far as Gautama, the sūtrakāra and Vātsyāyana, the bhāṣyakāra are concerned, they are observed to be keen to establish the authority of the Vedas different from the defence accorded by the Mīmāṁsakas. The *prima-facie*[5] arguments employed in the sūtra and bhāṣya testify to the

* Department of Sanskrit: Srivenkatesvara University, Tirupati

1 *NSB.*, (Chowkhamba edition) 1. 1-7.

2 *ibid.*,

3 *ibid.*, 2-1-68.

4 *ibid.*, (Āptāḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ—Bhūtāni anukampante).

5 *ibid.*, 2-1-58 and 4-1-59.

contemporary anti-vedic attacks.[6] The manner of approach to counter the arguments is strikingly akin to that of the Mīmāṁsakas. The broad divisions which Gautama enumerates and the comments made by Vātsyāyana, on the relevant sūtras are remarkable.[7] The treatment aided by the harmonising spirit in the interpretation of the Vedic sentences[8] indicates the method adopted by the contemporary Vedic interpreters. It is doubtful whether the authorities on the vedic exegesis at the time of sūtrakāra and bhāṣyakāra, were styled as Mīmāṁsakas or not. No trace of the word Mīmāṁsaka or Mīmāṁsā is found either in the sūtras or in the bhāṣya, though the Mīmāṁsaka's theory of eternality of sound is refuted by the sūtrakāra.[9] It may probaly be that the theory as such, may be old, which later on Mīmāṁsakas would have adopted for the purpose of propounding their system. Therefore it may or may not be the theory of the Mīmāṁsakas which Gautama refutes.

The Nyāya-sūtras abound in technical terms adopted by the Mīmāṁsakas.[10] Some of the sūtras testify to the comprehensve knowledge of Gautama, in both the Mīmāṁsās, Pūrva and Uttara.[11] It is evident that Vātsyāyana is a Vedic scholar, possessed of the logical acmen emulating a regular Mīmāṁsaka. Vātsyāyana in particular, explains the spirit enshrined in the sūtras of Gautama, aiming towards the philosophical dogmas[12] embedded in the Vedas. Some of the sūtras of Gautama testify to the Vedic basis on which the edifice of the Nyāya

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[6] *ibid.*, 4-1-59.
[7] *ibid.*, 2-1-63.
[8] *ibid.*,
[9] *ibid.*, 2-2-13 to 38.
[10] *ibid.*, 2-1-63 to 67 and 4-1-60 to 62.
[11] *ibid.*, 4-1-61, 62.
[12] *ibid.*, 4-1-60.

theory of liberation is erected.[13] There are some more sūtras which bear testimony to Gautama's practical knowledge of the conduct of a sacrifice (yajña) and of certain rites (pātracayana) observed at the final stage of the sacrifice by the sacrificer.[14] Again, Vātsyāyana discusses at length about the four orders of life.[15] He expatiates on the necessary rites to be observed at each of the stages while countering the arguments of the opponents who hold that there is only one stage of life namely that of a householder. Like a full fledged Mīmāṁsaka, Vātsyāyana interprets the Vedic passages so ably that he could be recognised as an authority in the *vāky-śāstra* (*Mīmāṁsā*) as well besides Gautaṁa's Nyāya. The co-ordination and perfect harmony as aimed in the four fold divisions of Veda, Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmaśāstra[16] scriptures are expressed on the strength of their being upheld and vouchsafed in the Brāhmaṇa texts. He unequivocally asserts, the highest authority of the Brāhmaṇas and their contents with reference to Itihāsa and Purāṇa thus—

प्रमाणेन खलु ब्राह्मणेनेतिहासपुराणस्य प्रामाण्यमनुज्ञायते.[17] This defence on the part of Vātsyāyana would definitely recall to one's memory the Smṛtipāda of Jaimini's Mīmāṁsā system, where the validity of the Smṛtis based on the Vedic authority is established.[18] Vātsyāyana strongly believes that the seers and speakers of the Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharma-śāstra scriptures are the same as those of the mantras and Brāhmaṇas. Hence, it is said.—

य एव मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च ते खलु इतिहासस्य धर्मशास्त्रस्य चेति.[19]

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13 *ibid.*,

14 *ibid.*, 4-1-62.

15 *ibid.*,

16 *ibid.*,

17 *ibid.*,

18 *Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtras*, 1-3-1.

19 *NSB.*, 4-1-62.

F. 10

Further, Vātsyāyana lays more stress on the authority of the Dharmaśāstras stating that by refuting their authenticity the worldly transactions among the human beings will be paralysed and that the whole world will be in chaos—

अप्रामाण्ये च धर्मशास्त्रस्य प्राणभृतां व्यवहारलोपात् लोकोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ।[20]

Again, Vātsyāyana, expressly assigns the proper place and function to the aforesaid four-fold categories restricting them to their subject matter and holding thereby their authoritative character. He states:[21] 'sacrificial performance forms the subject matter of the mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts; the characterisation of men (loka-vṛtta) that of Itihāsa and Purāṇa and the regulation of men's conduct and code of life that of Dharma-śāstra sriptures." The scope of each of these categories, is expressed by striking analogy to the functions of each sense-organ in its field of cognition—

यथाविषयमेतानि प्रमाणानि, इन्द्रियवत् इति .[22]

In this connection, it is of paramount importance to find that Vatsyāyana quotes extracts from the *Ṛk-Saṁhitā* and Brāhmaṇas only and seldom quotes from the Upaniṣad anywhere.[23] He cites several Upaniṣadic passages, from *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* under the caption Brāhmaṇas.[24]

This express omission by Vātsyāyana may be interpreted to mean that the nomenclature as Upaniṣad was not assigned to the final parts of the Brāhmaṇas in his time and that they were treated as the integral part of the Brāhmaṇas. Thus it can be confirmed beyond doubt, that the Vedas occupied the highest place in the estimation of

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[20] *ibid.*,

[21] *ibid.*,

[22] *ibid.*,

[23] *ibid.*, 4-1-60 and 61.

[24] *ibid.*, 4-1-60 and 61.

Sūtrakāra and Bhāṣyakāra and that they were treated as the highest authority and valid means of cognition in all transcendental matters.

The Mīmāṁsakas, of course, are directly concerned with the Vedas and their contents to the core. It is their job to interpret and reconcile the apparently conflicting passages. They dilate on the division of the Vedas with special reference to the contents of each such division. They define and examine the divided categories and explain their bearing on the aim of the Vedic injunctions. Every problem of interpretation is styled as an *adhikaraṇa* and several such problems have given rise to several *adhikaraṇas*. Every *adhikaraṇa* is supposed to enunciate a *nyāya* or a principle of interpretation varying under different contexts. Thus, there are about thousand *adhikaraṇas* elaborately discussed and consequently there are more than thousand principles of interpretation, deduced and styled as *mīmāṁsā-nyāyas*. The best use of such *nyāyas* is abundantly and freely made in the Dharmaśātras where the baffling problems demand interpretation to reconcile them harmoniously.

But Gautama's treatment of the Vedic authority and the divisions of the contents are different from the manner of approach by the Mīmāṁsakas. The discussion opens with the *prima-facie* argument[25] calculated to disprove the Veda as an instrument of valid and right knowledge. The opponent contends that the Veda is beset with three defects of *falsity*, *contradiction and tautology*. Several Vedic passages are cited by Bhāṣyakāra in support of the alleged defects.[26] The defect of falsity is pointed out in the case of the *Putrakāma sacrifice* which fails to yield the visible fruit of begtting a son. On the basis of failure, witnessed in such and similar performances, the injunctions

[25] *ibid.*, 2-1-58.

[26] *ibid.*,

which promise invisible and transcendental results after one's life, are declared to be false. Regarding the defect of contradiction Bhāṣyakāra cites strikingly contradictory statements. Some passages lay emphasis that Agnihotra oblation should be offered before sun rise and some passages emphasise after sun-rise.[27] Similarly, the defect of tautology is found in the vedas wherein the first and the last mantra are repeated thrice each one at the beginning and in the end.[28] Gautama counters the arguments of the opponent stating that the failure to secure good results as enjoined in the injunctions does not lie with the Veda,[29] but with the defect of performer, defect in tools and defect in operation of the act.

न, कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ।[30]

Bhāṣyakāra cites analogous instance of securing sacred sacrificial fire from the rubbing of the sacrificial sticks and accounts for the failure of securing fire to the several defects in the agent, action and the object.[31] Sure results can be expected only when all the conditions are superbly satisfied without any flaw in all respects. Secondly, the contradictory injunctions are shown to have reference to the different parts of time and they are to be considered as alternative courses of conduct.[32] Thirdly, the tautology is removed by enunciating a principle that repetition with a definite purpose[33] is not to be calculated as a defect. The repetition of the mantra thrice both at the beginning and at the end is to serve the purpose of securing the required

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[27] *ibid.*,

[28] *ibid.*,

[29] *ibid.*, 2-1-59.

[30] *ibid.*,

[31] *ibid.*,

[32] *ibid.*, 2-1-60.

[33] *ibid.*, 2-1-61 (arthavān abhyāsaḥ anuvādaḥ).

number fifteen in common with the vedic declaration.[34] where the number fifteen is expressly stated.

"इदमहं भ्रातृव्यं पञ्चदशवारेण वाग्वज्रेण बाधे योऽस्मान् द्वेष्टि यं च वयं द्विष्मः"[35]

Then Gautama divides the scope of the Vedas into three categories on the basis of diversity in their purpose (arthgrahaṇāt).[36] The compound *Vākyabibhāgasya* means sentence-classification and consequently, it indicates explicitely the science of interpretation based on the classification of sentences. This indicates also that the term Mīmāṁsā, as such was not in vogue at the time of Sūtrakāra or Bhāṣyakāra, though *purposeful sentence-classification* (*vākyavibhāga*) *was known to them*. Bhāṣyakāra, holds that the sentence-classification serving useful purpose, whether Vedic or secular is a means of right cognition.

प्रमाणं शब्दः यथा लोके[37]

Gautama divides Brāhmaṇa texts into three categories i.e. injunctions (vidhi), descriiptions (arthavāda), and reiterations (anuvāda).[38]

Vidhi is defined as an injunction[39] which prescribes a course of action (as a means of attaining good). It incites an agent to activity. Vātsyāyana sub-divides *vidhi* as mandatory (*niyoga*) or pemissive (*anujñā*).[40] He cites the Agnihotra oblations as an injunction—one who is desirous of heaven, should offer Agnihotra oblations.[41] The distinc-

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[34] *ibid.*,

[35] *NSB.*, 2-1-62.

[36] *ibid.*,

[37] *ibid.*,

[38] *ibid.*, 2-1-63.

[39] *ibid.*, 2-1-64.

[40] *ibid.*,

[41] *ibid.*,

tion between *niyoga* type of *vidhi* and *anujñā* type is not stated in the Bhāṣya.

Secondly, *Arthavāda* is not defined in general as in the case of *vidhi*. It is divided into four categories—[42] Eulogy or valedictory (*stuti*), deprecatory (*nindā*), illustrative (*parakṛtiḥ*) and narrative (*purākalpaḥ*). These are the very technical terms employed in the Mīmāṃsāśāstra, and a few of them convey imports different from these acknowledged definitions.

1. *Valedictory category* (स्तुति) constitutes such of the texts as eulogise a certain injunction by describing desirable results following from an enjoined act. It serves the twin purpose. Firstly, it inspires confidence whereby the agent comes to have faith in what is eulogised and is consequently led to perform it. Secondly, it persuades one to a particular course of action by extolling its consequences. In support of this aspect the following passage is cited, "All the gods cognised all beings by means of *sarvajit* sacrifice. This sacrifice accomplishes the purpose of cognising all beings and obtaining all things. By means of this, a man obtains all things and conquers all things."[43] In this, there is no direct command but *sarvajit* sacrifice is eulogised in such a manner that we are persuaded to perform it. In other words, this praise has the force of the injunction or *vidhi*, and actuates one to its performance.

2. *Deprecatory* (*Arthavāda*) *category* (निन्दा) persuades one to adopt a certain course of action by furnishing the undesirable consequences of neglecting it.[44] The following Vedic passage is cited in this connection. "That which is known as *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the foremost of all sacrifices and one who without performing this, performs an-

[42] *ibid.*, 2-1-65.

[43] *ibid.*,

[44] *ibid.*,

other sacrifice falls into a pit and decays there." In this, one is indirectly forced to perform the sacrifice, the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.[45]

3. *Parakṛti* is a text which describes a contrary method of action. It mentions a course of action, the obstruction of which by some particular person lead to bad consequences. It implies a sort of warning.

Such texts as, "on presenting oblation, one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter (coagulated milk) afterwards; but alas! the *caraka* priests first took the coagulated milk which was as it were the life of fire."[46] Here, the foolish course of action adopted by the *caraka* priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid that course.

4. *Purākalpa* constitutes such of the texts as describe a method adopted traditionally.[47]

This is a kind of prescription signifying something as commendable on account of its antiquity. For example: "Thus it is that Brāhmaṇas have adopted in their hymns, the *bahiṣpavamāna-sāma*, thinking that in so doing they were performing the sacrifice in its very womb"[48] and so forth.

Then, the third category of the main division viz., *anuvāda* is the reinculcation,[49] wherein injunction (*vidhi*) and enjoined (*vihita*) are repeated with a purpose. This category of *anuvāda* is divided into *vidhivacana* and *vihitānuvacana*. The first is explained as verbal reiteration (*śabdānuvāda*) and the other material repetition (*arthānuvāda*).[50] Satiscandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa cites examples

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[45] *ibid.*,

[46] *ibid.*,

[47] *ibid.*,

[48] *ibid.*, 2-1-66.

[49] *ibid.*,

[50] *ibid.*,

thus, "non-eternal, not eternal this is verbal repetition. Non-eternal, possessing the character of extinction, this is objective repetition."[51]

Nyāya-bhāṣya points out that the sentence-classification as *vidhi*, *arthavāda* and *anuvāda* is not peculiar to Vedic passages alone but it is found employed even in common parlance.[52] In this connection, he cites examples to confirm again that re-inculcation with a purpose is *anuvāda* proper and it is not mere reiteration or *punarukta*, which is mere verbal repetition. He concludes and fixes place of *anuvāda* in the sentence-classification as a reference (*adhikāra*) for the purpose of praising or deprecating or laying down a supplementary detail or pointing out the sequence of what has been enjoined.[53]

Conclusion.

1. The Nyāya conception of the Vedic exegesis is, of course, discussed at length to prove that the Vedas are the valid means of right cognition on transcendental matters. Just as the Mīmāṁsakas state that every *vidhi*, arthavāda etc. conduce to the performance of Dharma or religious acts (dharme prāmāṇyam), so also Gautama's ultimate aim is to prove that the Vedic words contribute to valid means of right cognition.[54] The division of the Brāhmaṇas into *vidhi*, *arthavāda* and *anuvāda* is peculiar when compared to that of the Mīmāṁsakas. *Anuvāda* is not at all enumerated as a separate category in the Mīmāṁsā system nor is it accorded a high place on a par with *vidhi* and *arthavāda* which are the fountain heads of the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra. *Anuvāda* is, of course, employed by them in the sense of repetition of what is already en-

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[51] *NS.*, 2-1-65 *Sacred Books of the Hindus*, Series Vol. VIII.
[52] *NSB.*, 2-1-66.
[53] *ibid.*,
[54] *ibid.*,

joined. *Anuvāda* is an ordinary phenomenon which is not so significant and important in the course of discussion or interpretation, as *vidhi* or *arthavāda*. That repetition with a purpose styled as *anuvāda* by Gautama and Vātsyāyana seems to be of a peculiar type unknown to the Mīmāṁsakas.

2. *Vidhi* is divided into *niyoga* and *anujñā*. The term *niyoga* is of course, used in the sense of *ājñā* or command by reason of its association with the subsequent term *anujñā* (permission). It can be reliably deduced from the context that *niyoga* means Nitya and Naimittika Karma whose non-performance will conduce to the committal of sin (*akaraṇe pratyavāyaḥ*) *Anujñā*, consequently means *kāmya karma* or optional religious deeds like the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma etc. by those who opt for Svarga or attainment of son etc. etc. In the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra the *niyoga* is connected with *vidhi* and it is specially used also in the technical sense of *apūrva* or unseen result produced, by carrying out a Vedic injunction. It is a metaphysical link between the completion of the Yāga or karma and its result. It is therefore evident that the term *niyoga* as employed in the sense of *apūrva* is *unknown* to the Nyāya-bhāṣya-kāra and his contemporaries.[55]

b. Further, there is no such division as *niyoga* and *anujñā* in the Mīmāṁsā but as *nitya* and *kāmya*.

c. No school of thought is referred to with a Bhāṣya which advocates the theory of *apūrva*. It is therefore evident that no such theory as *apūrvavāda* had developed at the time of Vātsyāyana.

3. *Arthavāda* is divided into fourfold divisions wherein the definition of *parakṛti* and *purākalpa* largely differs from what the Mīmāṁsakas maintain. Vātsyāyana states

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[55] Mm. Ganganatha Jha : *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā in its sources*, p. 259.

parakṛti as a contrary method of action adopted by a person and it is implied thereby as a sort of warning—

अन्यकर्तृकस्य व्याहृतस्य विधेः वादः[56]

But Khaṇḍadeva, the stalwart among the Mīmāṁsakas defines it as a course regarding an act performed by one person.—

एककर्तृकमुपाख्यानं परकृतिः।[57]

Purākalpa, defined as a method adopted by tradition and consequently treated as commendable on account of its antiquity.—[58]

ऐतिह्यसमाचरितः विधिः पुराकल्पः।

But *Jaimini-sūtra-vṛtti* states as an act performed by many—[59]

बहुकर्तृकः विधिः पुराकल्पः

This evidences the fact that Vātsyāyana's information is altogether based on different branch and version of the *Mīmāṁsakas*.

4. *Anuvāda* as an important division of the Brāhmaṇas is peculiar to that of the Mīmāṁsakas. Its subdivisions into *śabdānuvāda* and *arthānuvāda*, and its justification of individuality by Vātsyāyana are altogether unknown to the Mīmāṁsakas.

This evidences the existence of the advocates of *Anuvāda* theory in the sentence-classification among the Vedic interpreters at the time of the Sūtrakāra and the Nyāya-bhāṣyakāra.

5. The term Brāhmaṇa as a Vedic division meant even the inclusion of *Upaniṣads* at the time of the Nyāya-bhāṣyakāra, whereas to the Mīmāṁsakas it meant only the ritualistic portions as found useful for dharma (karma) performance.

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[56] *NSB.*, 2-1-64.

[57] *Bhāṭṭdīpikā,* 6-7-16.

[58] *NSB.*,A. 2-1-63.

[59] *Jaimini-sūtra-vṛtti*, 6-7-16.

All the above facts prove beyond doubt that Mīmāṁsā was in its progress at the time of Sūtrakāra in general and Bhāṣyakāra in particular. It may probably be surmised that Bhāṣyakāra would have adopted the views of some of his sūtras.[60] We do not know what that school of Mī- the pre-Jaimini ācāryas whom Jaimini himself quotes in māṁsā is. Therefore, it can be conceded that the Mīmāṁ- sā as envisaged in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya is* a little known Mīmāṁsā or pre-Nyāya school of Mīmāṁsā.

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[60] Mm. Ganganātha Jha : *Pūrva-mīmāmsā in its sources*, vide. Appendix.

UDAYANA'S REFUTATION OF AN ANTI-THEISTIC ARGUMENT

By Shri. HEMCHANDRA JOSHI*

IN the third Chapter (stabaka) of his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Udayana refutes an anti-theistic argument put forth by the Mīmāṁsaka, or for the matter of that by most of the *'an-īśvara-vādins.'* The argument is as follows. "God does not exist. If He did, He would be perceived. Since He is not perceived, it follows that He dose not exist."[1] In other words, non-apprehension ('an-upalabdhi') which is recognised as an independent 'Pramāṇa' by the Mīmāṁsaka, proves that God does not exist. As the Naiyāyikas do not admit non-apprehension as an independent 'pramāṇa' it may be said that non-existence of God is cognised by perception (pratyakṣa).

As a reply to the above Udayana says that mere non-apprehension (kevalā an-upalabdhiḥ) does not establish non-existence but the non-apprehension of that which is capable of being perceived (pratyakṣayogya). Since God is incapable of being perceived (pratyakṣa-ayogya) non-apprehension cannot establish His non-existence. The opponent might say that if mere non-apprehension does not establish non-existence then it might as well be said that non-apprehension of a hare's horn does not preclude its existence because it is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya.' The Naiyā-

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* Lecturer, Department of Sanskrit, University of Gorakhpur.

† Paper read at the Gauhati session of the All India Oriental, Conference, Jaunary, 1955.

[1] यदि स्यादुपलभ्येत। *N.K.*, III sec. 1.1.1.

yika would say that both a hare and a horn are capable of being perceived. What is denied on the basis of non-apprehension in this case is the fact of 'belonging to a hare' in respect of a horn (Śaśīyatvam śṛṅge).[2]

At this the opponent points out that one who is sentient (cetana) is also embodied (śarīrin). And since God's body is not perceived and a body is 'pratyakṣa-yogya'—it follows that He is not embodied which eventually proves that He does not exist. In other words, what the opponent wants to say is that 'Śarīri-tva' is the 'vyāpaka' of 'cetana-tva.' Therefore, the non-existence of the vyāpaka' (Śarīri-tva) proves the non-existence of the vyāpya' (cetana-tva).[3] Udayana's reply to the above objection is elucidated by V. Rāghavācārya in his commentary (called *Vistara*-on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* as follows— The opponent should be asked to specify as to what he means by the non-existence of 'what is qualified.' Does he mean the non-existence of the qualification (viśeṣaṇa-abhāva i.e. the non-existence of (śarīra) or the non-existence of the 'viśeṣya' viz. Īśvara ? If it is the non-existence of the qualification that is meant by the opponent then that does not preclude the non-existence of the qualified viz. Iśvara. If it means the non-existence of the qualified (viśeṣya) then non-apprehension cannot prove it, for the 'viśeṣya' viz. Iśvara is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya.' The question of the existence of a hare's horn cannot be brought in, for, God and a hare's horn stand on different footings. The one is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya' whereas the other is not so.

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[2] अयोग्यत्वान्नोपलभ्यत इति चेत् तर्हि शशशृङ्गमप्ययोग्यत्वान्नोपलभ्यत इति स्यात् ।। नैतदेवम् शृङ्गस्य योग्यतयैव व्याप्तत्वादिति चेत्? *Ibid.*, III. sec. 1 ll. 2-3

[3] चेतनस्यापि योग्योपाधिमत्तयैव व्याप्तत्वात् तद्बाधे सोऽपि बाधित एवेति तुल्यम् । *Ibid.*, III. sec. 1 lines. 3-4.

All this is elaborated by Udayana himself in great detail as follows:[4]

Not only the non-existence of something is not proved by mere non-apprehension, it is not possible even to deny the existence of one's own self on the basis of non-apprehension of what is 'pratyakṣa-yogya.' During dreamless sleep (suṣupti) one's own self is not perceived. But one cannot deny its existence merely on that account. During 'suṣupti' the self (ātman) is devoid of any cognition and it is the nature of the self to be perceived only when it is characterised by some cognition. When the 'manas' enters the artery called 'purītat' the contact of the 'manas' with the tactual sense ceases and thus the essential condition of all knowledge being absent, there is no cognition and the self rests in dreamless sleep.[5]

Moreover, the self of X is not perceived by Y. It may be asked as to why is it so? It is not that the 'para-ātman' (another person's self) cannot be an object of perception, for otherwise, it will not be perceived by itself.

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[4] ननु योग्योपाधिविशिष्टचेतन एव हीश्वरः। स प्रतिषिध्यत इति चेत्—एवं योग्यानुपलब्ध्या गृह्यमाणो योग्योपाधिविशिष्ट-चेतनाभावः, किं विशेषणाभावः, उत विशेष्याभावादिः। नाद्यः, तावता उपाधिप्रतिषेधेऽपि ईश्वरव्यक्तेरबाधात्। नान्त्यः, अयोग्यत्वाद्विशेष्यांशस्य योग्यानुपलब्धेरनवकाशात्॥ ईश्वरे योग्यानुपलब्धिप्रसक्तौ किल शशशृंगप्रतिबन्देरवकाशः। तस्या एवाप्रसक्तौ कुतस्तरां प्रतिबन्दिः? नन्वयोग्यस्यापि शशशृंगस्य निषेधवदयं निषेधोऽस्त्विति चेन्न। अयोग्यशृंगस्य योग्यानुपलब्धिबलेनास्माभिरनिषेधात्। तस्मान्नेश्वराभाव-प्रत्यक्षम्। Vistara-Part I p. 146, lines. 13-19.

[5] *N.K.* III. sec. 3. स्वात्मैव तावद् योग्यानुपलब्ध्या प्रतिषेद्धुं न शक्यते: कुतस्त्वयोग्यः परात्मा? तथा हि सुषुप्त्यवस्थायामनुपलभ्यमानः नास्तीत्यवधारयेत्॥ कस्यापराधेन पुनः योग्योऽप्यात्मा तदानीं नोपलभ्यते? सामग्री-वैगुण्यात्। ज्ञानादिक्षणिकगुणोपधानो ह्यात्मा गृह्यते इत्यस्य स्वभावः॥ ज्ञानमेव कुतो न जायत इति चिन्त्यते। पश्चाद्वा कथमुत्पत्स्यत इति चेत्-मनसोऽनिन्द्रिय-प्रत्यासन्नतयाऽजननात्; तत्प्रत्यासत्तौ च पश्चाज्जननात्।

Nor is it that Y is incapable of (ayogya) perceiving the self of X. What after all constitutes the '*yogya-tā*' except "being the 'samavāyi-kāraṇa' (inherent cause) of cognitions." And certainly Y fulfils the condition. Nor is it some deficiency in 'manas', which is the 'karaṇa' of 'mānasa-pratyakṣa,' that is responsible for the non-apprehension of the self of X by Y, for, Y can perceive his own self. The contact of the 'manas' with the self causes the perception of the self. The contact of the 'manas' of Y with the self of X is there, for, all the selves are ubiquitous (vibhu). It cannot be maintained that it is the nature of a particular 'manas' to perceive only that self to which it belongs, so that the 'manas' of Y cannot perceive the self of X. If it were so, then it would mean that a particular 'manas' would give up its nature of belonging to a particular self during liberation (apavarga). Udayana says that it is the '*bhojaka-adṛṣṭa,*' on account of which a particular self gets a particular psycho-physical organism, that accounts for the fact that a particular 'manas' perceives only that self to which it is accredited.[6] It is thus that the non-apprehension of another person's self does not establish its non-existence. Thus there is all the more reason why the non-existence of God, who is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya' cannot be proved by non-apprehension. If mere non-apprehension were to establish non-existence then the existence of all super-sensible entities like 'adṛṣṭa' (desert) and 'para-loka' (world other than the one we are inhabit-

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[6] *N.K.*, III sec. 12 स्यादेतत्——परात्मा तु कथं परस्यायोग्य: । न हि साक्षात्कारिज्ञानविषयतामेवाय न प्राप्नोति; स्वयमप्यदर्शनप्रसंगात् । नापि ग्रहीतुरेवायमपराध: । तस्यापि हि ज्ञानसमवायिकारणतैव तद्योग्यता । नापि करणस्य; साधारणत्वात् । न हि आसंसारमेकमेव मन: एकमेवात्मानं गृह्णाति-इत्यत्र नियामकमस्ति । स्वभाव इति चेत्—तर्हि मुक्तौ नि:स्वभावत्वप्रसंग: तदेकार्थताया अपायात्-इति न; भोजकादृष्टोपग्रहस्य नियामकत्वात् । यद्धि मनो यच्छरीरं यानीन्द्रियाणि यस्यादृष्टनाकृष्टानि, तानि तस्यैवेति नियम: ।

ing) would have to be denied. Thus also the question of the existence of a hare's horn cannot be brought in as a counter-argument (*prati-bandiḥ*). No body ever denies the existence of a hare's horn on the ground of non-apprehension of what is 'ayogya', nor is God's existence denied on the basis of the non-apprehension of what is 'yogya.' A hare's horn is not 'ayogya' while God is not 'yogya.'[7]

The opponent may say that the existence of a hare's horn may not be denied on the basis of 'yogya-anupalabdhi' but one can say that the hare's horn is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya' and as such its existence cannot be denied. And if the Naiyāyika accepts this it means that its existence also has to be admitted. Udayana says that he would not object to admitting the existence of a hare's horn if there was some evidence for it. The opponent may come forward with an inference like this—

This hare has a horn (ayaṁ śṛngī),
because it is an animal (paśu-tvāt).

Udayana says that in bringing forth this objection the opponent misses his point, for, thereby he appears to establish the existence of a hare's horn and not to disprove the existence of God. Or it may be said that the opponent should put forth this inference when the Naiyāyika tries to establish the existence of God as the creator (kartṛ) of the earth and the like from the fact of 'being an effect' (kārya-tva). If the opponent says that although this inference should be introduced in the context of 'Iśvara-

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[7] *N.K.*, III Verse 1. abc. योग्यादृष्टिः कुतोऽयोग्ये प्रतिवन्दिः कुतस्तराम्। क्वायोग्यं बाध्यते शृंगम्......॥ and
N.K., 3 sec. 13 lines. 1-4. तदेवं योग्यानुपलब्धिः परात्मादौ नास्ति। तदितरा तु न बाधिका-इति तवापि सम्मतम्। अतः किमधिकृत्य प्रतिवन्दिः। न हि शशशृंगमयोग्यानुपलब्ध्या कश्चिन्निषेधति। न च प्रकृते योग्यानुपलब्धिं कश्चिन्मन्यते।

sādhana,' it nevertheless, eventually leads to the denial of God's existence, he may be asked to clarify whether this counter-argument is capable of disproving God's existence directly or indirectly through furnishing some parallel line of argument (samāna-nyāya-samarpaṇa). That this counter-argument is not capable of directly disproving God's existence can be explained in the following manner:

When the opponent puts the counter-argument viz. "A hare has horns, because it is an animal" he admits that being an animal' (paśu-tva) cannot prove 'having horns' (śṛngi-tva). Now in order to disprove the existence of God as the creator of the universe the opponent will have to say something like this; " 'Being an effect' does not prove 'having a creator,' because,' 'being an animal' does not prove 'having horns' ('kārya-tvam sa-kartṛkatva-a-sādhakam, paśu-tvasya śṛṅgitva-a-sādhakatvāt' But this presupposes that 'being an animal' as the 'Sādhaka' of 'having horns'' is the 'pervader' (vyāpaka) of " 'being an effect, as the 'śādhak' of 'having a maker,' " so that the absence of the 'vyāpaka' (i.e. the absence of 'being an effect as the 'sādhaka' of having a horn) would prove the absence of the 'vyāpya' (i.e. "the absence of 'being an effect as the 'Sādhaka' of 'having a maker' "). However, such a presumption being unwarranted how can the counter-argument disprove the existence of God as the creator of the universe?

As regards the second alternative the opponent will have to argue like this. In the inference, "This hare has horns, because it is an animal," the 'hetu' (middle term viz. 'paśu-tva') is 'bādhita-viṣaya' for the absence of the 'sādhya' (major term viz śṛṅgi-tva) is proved by the non-apprehension of what is 'yogya.' Similarly, in the inforenee "Earth etc. have a creator (kṣityādikam sakartṛkam') because they are effects, " the 'hetu, viz. 'kāryatva'

is '*bādhita-viṣaya.*' Since the absence of the 'sādhya' viz 'sa-kartṛka-tva' is arrived at by 'yogya-anupalabdhi.' (It may be recalled in this connection that the opponent had pointed out that a sentient being is embodied and the non-apprehension of the 'Yogya' body of the supposed creator proves the non-existence of the body together with the sentiment being who is supposed to be the creator)." But Udayana had already pointed out that God is 'pratyakṣa-ayogya' and therefore, non-apprehension cannot prove His non-existence. Thus the non-existence of the 'sādhya' is not established and therefore, the 'hetu' is not 'bādhita-viṣaya.' It can thus be shown that the counter-argument cannot disprove God's existence. For, while a horn is 'yoga', God is not so.[8]

The opponent might again argue that the Naiyāyika does not deny the existence of a hare's horn merely on the basis of 'yogya-anupalabdhi.' It may not be also possible to prove a hare's horn on the basis of 'paśu-tva.' But as regards the existence of a creator of the earth and the like one has to take note of the following. If the existence of something is proved by some 'pramāṇa' then the non-existence of that 'pramāṇa' proves the non-existence of that particular thing. For instance, the cognition of colour and the like proves the existence of the visual sense and the like. In the absence of the perceptual cognition of colour we infer the absence of the visual sense, as in

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[8] अथ-अयमाशयः––अयोग्यशशश्रृंगादावनुलब्धिर्न बाधिका-इति, ततः किम् ? तत्सिद्ध्येदिति चेत्––एवमस्तु। यदि प्रमाणमस्ति। पशुत्वादिकमिति चेत्— परसाधने प्रतिबन्दिस्तर्हि, न तद्बाधने, तत्रैव भविष्यतीति चेत्—तत्किं प्रतिबन्दिरेव दूषणम्। अथ कथञ्चित्तुल्यन्यायतया योग्या एव परात्मबुद्ध्यादयः ते च बाधिता एवेति अपहृतविषयत्वम् ? न प्रथमः अव्याप्तेः। न हि पशुत्वादेः शशश्रृंगसाधकत्वेन कार्यत्वादेः कर्तृमत्त्वसाधकत्वं व्याप्तं, येन तस्मिन्नसति तत् प्रतिषिद्धयेत। न द्वितीयः मिथोऽनुपलभ्यमानत्वस्य वादि-प्रतिवादिस्वीकारात्। *N.K.*, III sec. 13. lines. 3-10.

the case of a blind person. Similarly, wherever we notice speech and bodily activity we infer the existence of another self ('para-ātman'). And since we do not notice any bodily activity and the like when the seeds sprout up by themselves or when other physical phenomena take place, we infer that there is no maker (kartṛ). Udayana says that speech and bodily activity are not the only evidence for the existence of the self. For in that case there would be no self in case some body were enjoying 'suṣupti.' Nor can it be said that respiration is also a proof for the existence of the self. For in that case there would be no self in case one were holding one's breath in prāṇāyāma.' It would not do to say that in such cases the particular bodily posture would prove the existence of the self, for in the case of one who is lying unconscious as a result of poisoning the particular posture is also not there. It cannot be argued that the heat of the body is also an evidence for self. For, in the case of one who is lying unconscious as a result of poisoning and whose body has been sprinkled with water there is no bodily heat and yet the existence of the self cannot be denied in his case. Thus, it is that one infers the existence of a sentient being according as the indications are available thereof. The proofs for the existence of 'para-ātman' or 'Parama-ātman' as enumerated by the opponent like speech, bodily activity, respiration and particular pasture are not the only proofs. Udayana means to say that one has to go through the fifth chapter of the '*Nyāya-kusumāñjali* if he wants to know the proofṣ for the existence of God.[9]

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[9] *N.K.*, III sec. 14. स्यादेतत्––यत्प्रमाणगम्यं हि यत्, तदभाव एव तस्याभाव-मावेदयति। यथा रूपादिप्रतिपत्तेरभावश्चक्षुरादेरभावम्। कायवाग्व्यापारैकप्रमाण-कश्च परात्मा; तदभाव एव तस्याभावे प्रमाणमंकुरादिषु-तन्न-तदेकप्रमाणकत्वा-सिद्धेः। अन्यथा सुषुप्तोऽपि न स्यात्॥ श्वाससन्तानोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेन्न-निरुद्धपवनोऽपि न स्यात्॥ कायसंस्थानविशेषोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेन्न––

The *an-īśvara-vādin*' now proposes another line of argument. Before one tries to prove the existence of God as creator (*jagat-kartā*) one has to bear certain thins in mind. A 'kartā' is always an embodied person. Such a person is either motivated by some personal desire or he seeks to serve the interest of others. Thus 'kartṛ-tva' is the 'pervaded' and 'having some personal desire' etc. (svārtha-ādi-mattva') and 'being embodied' (śarīri-tva) is the 'pervader.' But according to the Naiyayika God is not embodied (a-śarīrin). Nor has He any personal motive in creating the universe, for if He had any, He could not be extolled as one who is devoid of any desire. Nor can it be said that He creates the universe in order to do good to others, since in that case there would have been no suffering. Thus in the absence of the 'pervader' viz. personal desire and the like we can infer the absence of God's 'kartṛ-tva.'[10]

Udayana points out that this sort of inference is not possible. The 'pakṣa' (minor term) in this case viz. Iśvara, is 'a-siddha' i.e. the existence of God is not an established fact. Therefore, no inference as to His 'kartṛtva-abhāva' is possiible. The hetu' (middle term) viz. 'svārtha-ādi-mattva-abhāva' would be 'āśraya-asiddha.'[11] It cannot be said that we can admit God's existence erroneously and then deny 'kartṛ-tva' in respect of Him or deny His exis-

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विषमूर्च्छितोऽपि न स्यात्। शरीरोष्मापि तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेन्न——जलावसिक्त-विषमूर्च्छितोऽपि न स्यात्। तस्माद् यद्यत्कार्यमुपलभ्यते——तत्तदनुगुणश्चेतनस्तत्र तत्र सिद्ध्यति। न च कार्यमात्रस्य क्वचिद् व्यावृत्तिः। न च त्वदभ्युगतेनेव प्रमाणेन भवितव्यं नान्येनेति नियमोऽस्ति।

10 व्यापकस्वार्थाद्यनुपलम्भेनाप्यनुमीयते, नास्तीति। को हि प्रयोजनमन्तरेण किञ्चित्कुर्यादिति——*N.K.* III. sec. 1. lines. 4-5., and प्रकृतेऽपि व्यापकानुपलब्ध्या तत्प्रतिषेधोऽस्तु। *Ibid* III sec. 17 line. 1.

11 क्वानुमानमनाश्रयम्, *N.K.*, Verse 1 d., न आश्रयासिद्धत्वात्। न ह्रीश्वरस्तद्ज्ञानं वा क्वचित्सिद्धम्। *Ibid.* III 17 lines. 1-2.

tence. Denying His existence would mean that He is the counter-entity of His negation. But it may be pointed out that only something real can be the counter-entity of its negation. God, whose existence has been admitted erroneously, therefore, cannot be a counter-entity of negation. That is, one cannot speak of the 'a-prasiddha-pratiyogika-abhāva.'

Denying His 'Kartṛ-tva' would mean that He is the locus (āśraya) of the negation of kartṛ-tva. Here again it has to be said that God, whose existence is admitted erroneously, cannot be the locus of the negation of 'kartṛ-tva, for only something real can be the locus of the negation of something.[12]

The '*an-īśvara-vādin*' puts forth another ingenious argument. He says that existence of 'selves' (ātman-s) is admitted. What is sought to be denied by inference is their omniscienc (sarvajña-tva) and their 'kṣityādikartṛ-tva' in the following manner.

Selves other than my own are not omniscient.—
(mad-itare-na sarvajñāḥ)
because they are sentient,
(cetanatvāt),
Like my own self,
(ahaṁ iva).

Udayana says that this inference again does not serve the opponent's purpose. If the opponent tries to prove that the empirical selves (Jīvātmans) are not omniscient and creators of the earth and the like, then that is

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12 आभासप्रतिपन्नमिति चेत्-न-तस्याश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेः, प्रतिषेध्यानुपपत्तेश्च ।
व्यावर्त्याभाववत्तैव भाविकी हि विशेष्यता ।
अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता ।।
न चैतदाभासप्रतिपन्नस्यास्तीति कुतस्तस्य निषेधाधिकरणत्वं निषेध्यता चेति ।
N.K., III sec. 17 lines. 1-3, Verse 2, sec. 17 line. 6

not disputed by the Naiyāyika. And if some unknown self is the 'pakṣa' then again there would be the fallacy called 'āśraya-asiddhi.' Nor can it be said that the self in general is the 'pakṣa' for in that case also we have to specify which kind of self is the 'pakṣa' viz. the empirical self or some unknown self and whichever alternative is accepted the two difficulties mentioned above would arise. Also one cannot say that 'ātma-tva-jāti' can be the 'pakṣa' for even if the 'atma-tva-jāti' is looked upon as 'pakṣa' the inference would take the following form :—

> The 'atma-tva-jāti' is not the creator of the earth and the like ('atma-tva-jātiḥ na kṣityādi-kartṛ')
> because, of 'ātma-tva' (ātma-tvāt)

Here again, it may be pointed out that firstly, there would be the defect called 'siddha-sādhana,' since the Naiyāyika also does not believe in the 'kartṛ-tva' of 'ātma-tva-jāti.' And secondly, as the 'hetu' 'ātma-tvajāti' does not inhere in 'ātma-tva,' there would be the fallacy called 'svarūpa-asiddhi.'[13]

In order to save his inference from the two fallacies viz. 'siddha-sādhana' and 'asiddhi' the opponent says that the existence of God is known from the scriptures and what is denied is His omniscience and His 'kartṛ-tva. Udayana says that if scriptures are 'pramāṇa' (authorita-

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स्यादेतत्—यद्यपि ईश्वरो नावगतः, यद्यपि च नाभाससिद्धेन प्रमाणव्यवहारः शक्यसम्पादनः, तथापि आत्मानः सिद्धाः, तेषां सार्वज्ञ्यं निषिद्ध्यते,क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वं चेति। तथा हि—मदितरे न सर्वज्ञाः, चेतनत्वात् अहमिव। न च ते क्षित्यादि-कर्तारः पुरुषत्वादहमिव। एवं वस्तुत्वादेरपि-इति। तदेतदपि प्रागेव परिहृतम्। तथा हि—

इष्टसिद्धिः प्रसिद्धांशे हेत्वसिद्धिरगोचरे।
नान्या सामान्यतः सिद्धिर्जातावपि तथैव सा॥

N.K., III sec. 19 and Verse 4.

tive) then no inference against what they say is possible. They glorify Him as omniscient and the creator of the universe. And if the scriptures are not 'pramāṇa' then again God being 'asiddha,' He cannot be the 'pakṣa' of any inference.[14]

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१४. आगमादेः प्रमाणत्वे वाधनादनिषेधनम् ।
आभासत्वे तु सैव स्यादाश्रयासिद्धिरुद्धृता ॥
N.K., III Verse 5.

THE ABSENCE OF THE BUDDHA IMAGE IN THE PRE-KUSHAN PERIOD

By D. K. SINHA, M.A.*

DURING the course of the famous controversy regarding the origin of the Buddha image Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy[1] and Shri O. C. Ganguly[2] had contended that sculpture of the pre-Kushan age were quite capable of representing Buddha in anthropomorphic form but they did not do so only because of the religious interdiction of the Pali Canon. Of course, the problem has been discussed from the archaeological point of view but little effort has been made to verify the Pali Canon with regard to this so-called interdiction problem. This paper is an attempt in this direction.

The most important sources to rely upon are the sayings of Buddha (*Buddha-vacana*) embodied in the *Nikāyas*. The authenticity of the Pali literature, which was reduced to writing in the 1st century B.C in Ceylon, is itself a subject of controversy between the scholars and a separate issue to be dealt with. However, it will not be out of place to mention that Buddha followed the literary convention of his period by embodying the preachings in a *sūtra* style of set phrases and compressed logic. These were to be memorized thoroughly. The same episodes are, therefore, repeated in several *Nikāyas*. This very principle is the guiding factor over the entire arrangement and spirit of the Pali Canon. This technique is very signifi-

*Jr. Keeper of Museums, Southern Zone. Fort & St. George Museum, Madras 9.

[1] Coomoraswamy, A. K., *The origin of the Buddha Image*, Beston Museum Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. IV.

[2] Ganguly, O. C., "*The antiquity of the Buddha Image.* The cult of the Buddha, ospsiatische Żeitschrift, New Folge, XIV,

cant because this *sūtra* style leaves enough scope for the monks to make commentaries on the sayings of Buddha and make it more intelligible with detailed arguments and conversation.

The *Theravadic philosophy* is of rationalistic morality and ethical in nature. Buddha lays stress on his preachings more than anything else including his personal adoration. The *Mahāvastu* instructs for the worshippers of Tathāgata "O bhikkhus, whoever renders ritualistic adoration (Satkarnaṁ) to the Tathāgata, thus purified by means of flowers, fragrance, festoons; flags and music and by applying fragrant paste, one cannot measure the limit of his spiritual merit." In *Vajrachhedika-sūtra* also the Master says "Whoever says you that he has seen me and yet has transgressed the *Dhamma*, is not seen by me. Whereas the man who keeps the *Dhamma* dwells even in my sight though he may be at the distance of ten thousand miles." Here the following of the preachings has been given preference over the personal adoration of Buddha. But here only order of preference is prescribed and the idea of adoration also does not necessarily imply image worship though it may be one of the prominent factors for the same.

Conception of Buddha's personality

"The usual expression, in which Gautama Buddha is referred to in the Pali texts, is "*Tathāgato araham sammāsambuddho*" (Tathāgata the perfect, the fully enlightened). The description found in the *Nikāyas* is generally as follows. The Tathāgata is fully aware of the nature of the five constituents (*khandhas*) of a being, their origin and decay, he is completely free from all thought-constructions and mental aberrations, including the notions of oneness, mineness, egoism and other mental proclivities, he is endowed with the supernormal powers (*bala*) and

four kinds of infallibility (*vesārajja*), he is the embodiment of clear vision, perfect knowledge, immaculate dharmas, absolute purity, he is the propounder of the truth, guide for the welfare of all beings, bestower of immortality and lord of dharmas.''[3]

A legend refers to a discourse between a Brāhman and the Buddha. The Brāhman wants to know whether the Buddha is a man, a God, a Deva, a yakṣa, or a Gndharva. Buddha replies that he is none of these. He says "I have conquered all *āsavas* through the non-abandonment of which I might have become a god, have been abandoned and cut off at the root like a cut off palm tree with complete cessation of becoming and without liability to arise in future. and likewise those *āsavas* through which I might have become a Gandharva, or a yakṣa, or a man. Just as a blue, white, or red lotus born. and growing in the water and having overcome the world, do I dwell unstained by the world. Remember Brāhman that I am a Buddha.''[4]

According to the above Buddha was a being who could be compared with himself only. But this reported event also does not serve the purpose. It does not describe the personality of Buddha in explicit terms and from a layman's point of view but lays stress on a metaphysical and doctrinal stand-point though it is clear that Buddha does not include himself within the categories of a mortal, semi-divine, or a divine being.

Legends occur in many places in *Nikāyas*. No doubt, much credence cannot be attached to the historicity of such legends but their conception gives an insight into the popular belief of the period and into the truth of the sentiments if not of facts. As such the sayings leave enough

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[3] Nalinaksha Dutta, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, p. 295.

[4] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iii, p. 3839.

scope for drawing inferences about the subtle intentions of Buddha. Even otherwise also oral tradition is the basis of the entire Pali canon and the discourses start with the word "So I heard" (evame sutam).

The *Brahmajāla-sutta* of the *Digha-Nikāya* states "the outer form, O brothern, of him who has won the truth stands before you but that which binds it to rebirth is cut to twains. So long as his body shall last, so long the gods and men behold him. On the dissolution of the body neither gods nor men shall see him."[5] Dr. O. C. Ganguly[6] is of the opinion that the above passage can be interpreted as an interdiction of the Buddha image. But there is nothing to interpret in that way. The passage only explains the state of *nibbāṇa* and cessation of cycle of births and deaths. No doubt, after the dissolution of the body neither gods nor men can see him but the image worship also does not require the physical presence of the Master for representing him through the medium of stone, wood or clay.

Buddha used to say "whoever sees me sees the *Dhamma* and whoever sees the *Dhamma* sees me." This idea may be the starting point of the *Trikāya* conception of Buddha. But at the same time there is no taboo in 'seeing' the Master. According to the above Buddha's personality is identified with *Dhamma* and can hardly be interpreted as an interdiction about the image worship. Moreover, not withstanding that Buddha said his personality was given the highest place of honour by the lay people because as early as in Pāli literature we start getting the reference of the 'Three jewels' *triratna* and the people used to mention first Buddha then *Dhamma* and then

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[5] Uchhinabhava nettiko bhikkhave tathāgattassà kāyo tittha-ti. Yāvassa kāyo tthassatittāva na dakkhanti deva manussā. Kāyassa bheda jivita pariyādana na naṁ dakkhanti deva manussā.

[6] Shree O. C. Ganguly, *Antiquity of the Buddha Image.*

Saṅgha. This formula was in vogue during the life time of the Buddha. But utterance of taking refuge in Buddha even after his death clearly suggests an attempt to establish relationship between the worshipper and Tathāgata who had attaned parinirvāṇa. Dr. Coomaraswamy rightly remarks that "the growth of this very conviction determined the development of the Buddhist iconolatory and all the mystical theology of the Mahāyana."[6a] Moreover, in the early Buddhist monuments it is the Buddha and none else who is being worshipped by the lay people through the medium of varieties of symbols.

Of course, Buddha always appealed to the reason of the people and never asked any body to follow his words blindly but did the laity also believe like that? Had it been so, his superhuman qualities would not have been established as early as in the Pali Canon. Buddha himself gives details of his superhuman qualities[7] and even describes the virtuous acts done by him in previous births as a result of whose merits he was bestowed with the superhuman qualities (*Mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇa*). He very often narrates his previous births (pubbe nivāsa) and always used to satisfy the queries of the monks whether a particular person, after death, had attained *nirvāṇa* or not. Naturally, he must have been regarded as a being much different from the ordinary man. Attribution of superhuman qualities must have created awe and reverence in midst of the masses and later on served as ready source of iconographic elements for the sculptors of the Kushān period when Buddha assumes the full status of God and when the idea of devotion is perfected according to the Mahāyāna conception.

[6a] *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism.* p. 225.

[7] *Digha Nikāya, Lakkhaṇa-sutta, Mahāpadāna-sutta; Majjhima Nikāya, Brahmāyu suttanta, sela suttanta.*

All these can definitely be regarded as the hazy appearance of the idea of deification of Buddha. As deification progresses man completely merges in the abstract and the Buddha becomes a personification of *Dhamma*. The *Majjhima Nikāya* describes Buddha's birth as a wonderful miracle (*Ācārya abhūta Dhamma*).

Buddha's personality has been viewed by another very significant angle. In many of his discourses he discusses some questions which he calls "not fit for explanation" or "inexplainable" (Avyākṛta)[8] Whether Buddha exists after death or not is also one of the *avyākṛta* questions. Māñlukyaputta even asks the reason for these questions being called *avyākṛta*. Buddha says that he does not explain these questions because they are neither useful for *nirveda*, *nor for nirodha*, *nor for abdijñā*, nor for *sambodha* nor for *nirvāṇa*. The question about the Buddha's existence after death is very specific in nature and Buddha's evasion in replying it must have created a void which could be interpreted in many ways later on.

The denunciation of Rūpa

The five skandhas include *Rūpa* also. This *Rūpa* is not only the form of the Master but denotes everything in the universe which is tangible to the eyes and is transitory. That is why it has been defined as the "form seen by the eyes" (*Cakṣu rijñeya rūpa*). Buddha always preaches[9] that all the five skandhas are transitory and whatever is transitory (*Anitya*) is a source of misery. No Bhikkhu should have any attachment to the elements which are

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[8] *Digha Nikāya, potthapāda sutta; Majjhima Nikāya, Chulamāñlukya suttanta, Aggivachhagotta suttanta; samyutta Nikāya,* 21/5.

[9] *Samyutta Nikāya,* XXVII, *Digha Nikāya, Mahāsatipatthāna sutta; Majjhima Nikāya, Mahārāhulovāda suttanta, Lakutikopam Suttanta, Satipatthāna suttanta, Mahāssapur Suttanta Vinayapiṭaka, Mahāvagga, Anattalakkhana suttanta.*

sources of misery because this "*Rūpa*" as seen by the eyes (*Cakṣu Vijñeya rūpa*) invites all sorts of attachments to one's mind.

Firstly, the denunciation is very general and philosophical in nature. Secondly it does not imply any binding in beholding Buddha for hearing his words either during his life time or beholding him through other mediums. after death. However, it reflects Buddha's intention of being detached with the idea of 'form' in any manner.

The idea of worship

The rationalistic outlook of Buddha in asking the people to believe only that which appeals to their reason unmistakably shows the preference given to wisdom over respect. The last words of Buddha are very important. He asks Ānanda not to be worried about having a teacher after death. He asks him to take refuge into himself and *Dhamma* will be his teacher. He says it may be that in some of you the thought may arise that the word of the master is ended and you have no teacher any more. But it is not thus that you should regard it. The *Dhamma* which I have given to you, let that be your teacher." It is evident here that he gave highest prominance to *Dhamma*. But his worship in the form of image may be unimportant for him but at least not mentioned here. Brahmajāla *sutta* of *Digha Nikāya* lists several low acts done by some Brāhmans and monks. These include *Adicyupatthānam* and *Mahatupatthanam*. The former can be interpreted as 'worship of the sun' and the latter can be explained as 'worship of the great ones' or "worsihp of Mahā-Brahma." Even we interpret *Mahatupatthānam* as "worship of the great ones" the reference is not conclusive since worship does not necessarily implies image worship.

It is very significant that at the time of *Parinirvāṇa* Ānanda puts a very specific question. He asks the Buddha, what should be done of Buddha's body after *parinirvāṇa*.

The Buddha replies "Ānanda, be always indifferent towards the body worship of *Tathāgata*."[10] Of course Buddha intended to leave his disciples in charge of *Dhamma* (*Dhammadāyāda*)[11] but this injunction should be taken with caution because immediately after saying the above, Buddha continues that his body should get the same treatment as given to an emperor (*cakravartī*). He prescribed four classes of persons worthy of stūpas (stūpārha) i.e., Tathāgata, pacceka-Buddha, *Tathāgatasāvaka* (a true hearer of Bddha's words or the direct disciple), and an emperor. How to reconcile with both the statements if we believe that they are authentic and without any distortion or interpolation? But actually they are not contradictory. The difference is very subtle here. He is against the conviction of attaching any idea of worship to the mere body but is not against the sanctification of the sacred memory of the great ones by erracting stūpas. But what are these stūpas for? Apparently for paying homage and doing worship. It can further be explained by another reference. The Vakajātaka records following conversation between the Buddha and emperor Bimbisāra. The emperor says "when you are gone, O blessed one, I shall be unable to do you honour, to make you the customary offerings, and it will grieve me. Give me a lock of your hair. Give me the pairings of your finger nail. I shall place them in a shrine in midst of my place. Thus shall I retain something that is part of you and each day shall I decorate the shrine with fresh garlands and I shall burn rare incense." The Master responded "Take my hair, take this pairings and keep them in a shrine but in your mind keep what I have taught you." Here Buddha is still careful in laying emphasis on his preachings but he, at

10 *Digha Nikāya Mahāparinibbāṇa sutta*, "Abyāvatā mā tumhe Ananda hoth tathāgatassa sariyapujāya."

11 *Majjhima Nikāya, Dhammadāyāda* sutta.

least allows the erection of *caityas* enshrining relic in memory, reverence or worship of his personality. "Buddha is said to have directed his disciples to bury his remains under a tumulous, a so-called stūpa, the traditional sepulchre of wordly monarchs. And he further ordered that after his death the faithful should visit especially those four places which were linked with the chief events of his life."[12] Nāgasena[13] also clarified this point to king Menander (probably 2nd century B.C.) and states that the real seeker of the truth should undertake self discipline and contemplation rather than the worship of the relics of the Buddha. He further informs the king that had Buddha not said so then the Bhikkhus would have taken his bowl and his robe and would have occupied themselves with paying reverence to the Buddha through them." It is interesting to note here that later on actually the worship of *uṣṇīṣa* (jewelled turban) and hair relic (keśadhātu) became in vogue and are represented in the Early Buddhist Monuments.

Accounts of the Chinese travellers

Last but not the least is the following tradition with regard to the image worship narrated by Fahian who says "when Buddha went to *Trayastriṁśa* and preached the law for the benefit of his mother for ninety days, Prasenajita, longing to see him, caused an image to be carved in *gośśīrṣa* sandalwood and put in the place where he usually sat. When Buddha on his return entered the *Vihāra*, this image left its place and came forth to meet him. Buddha then said to it." "Return to your seat. After I have attained *Parinirvāṇa* you shall serve as a pattern to the four classes of my disciples." Thereupon the image returned to its

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12 Whogel, *The Buddhist Art* (Introduction).

13 *Milinda Pañha*, translated by Rhys Davids.

seat. This was the very first of the image of Buddha and that which men subsequently copied."[14]

It is interesting to note that Hieun Tsiang also noticed this sandalwood image at Sravasti.[15] He also states that the king Prasenajita, having heard that the king Udayana had caused a sandalwood figure of Buddha to be carved, also caused this image to be made. It shows that two sandalwood images were carved-one at Kosala and the other at Kauśāmbī during the reigns of Prasenajita and Udayana respectively. About the Kauśāmbī image Hieun-Tsiang states the following. "In the city within an old palace, there is a large *vihāra* about 60 feet high, in it is a figure of Buddha carved out of sandalwood, above which is a stone canopy. It is the work of the King U-to Yen-na (Udayana). By its spiritual qualities (or between its spiritual marks) it produces a divine light, which from time to time shines forth. The princes of various countries have used their power to carry off this statue, but although many men have tried, none of the members could move it, and they pretend that the likeness is a true one; and this is original of all such figures. When Tathāgata first arrived at complete enlightenment, he ascended upto the heaven to preach the law for the benefit of his mother and for three months remained absent. This king (i.e. Udayana) thinking of him with affection, desired to have an image of his person, therefore, he asked Mudgalyāyanaputra, by his spiritual power, to transport an artist to the heavenly mansions to observe the excellant marks of Buddha's body, and carve a sandalwood statue. When Tathāgata returned from the heavenly palace, the carved figure of sandalwood rose and saluted the Lord of the world. The Lord then graciously addressed it and

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[14] *Legge*, pp. 55-56; Samuel Beal, *Chinese accounts of India*, Vol. I, p. 26.

[15] Samuel Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India*, Vol. III, P. 261.

said, "the work expected from you is to toil in the conversion of heretics and to lead in the way of religion of future ages.[16] Fa-hian allso visited Kauśāmbī but he does not mention this image later on seen by Hieun-Tsiang. It does not appear probable that Fa-hian would have afforded to miss the sight of this sandalwood image of Buddha here and this ommission is really surprising.

Out of the above tradition a presumption may arise that wooden images might have preceded the stone sculptures as in the case of rock cut architecture which was definitely preceded by wooden structures. But there are more points against the authenticity of these traditions than in their favour. Firstly, these traditions have been referred to by Chinese travellers who came to India in the 5th and 7th centuries A.D. when Buddhist images were being carved in plenty and in that situation it would have been possible for the massess to coin legends for justifying the anthropomorphic representation of Buddha and lending antiquity to this custom. Secondly, the archaeological corroboration in this respect is nil. Thirdly, for carving the earliest dated Buddha-sattvas, figures of the Kushan age, known at present, the sculptors would not have depended upon the early Yakṣa figures of 3rd-2nd centuries B.C. for deriving inconographic elements had there been an established tradition of carving the Buddha image from 6th century B.C. None of these Yakṣa figures, so far discovered, can be dated to the time of Buddha himself.

Fourthly, the Chinese travellers depended upon the traditions in vogue during this time about the antiquity of these sandalwood images. During their visits to Srāvasti and Kauśāmbī, they hardly had any means to verify the antiquity of these sandalwood images seen by them. Fifthly, they mentioned many traditions and legends about

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[16] Samuel Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India*, pp. 254-255.

the minor events of Buddha's life and miracles performed by him which are not found in the Pāli Canon. Not only this, Fa-hian has made responsible even the emperor Aśoka of placing a standing figure of Buddha of sixteen feet high in a Vihāra built by him at Sankissā.[17] It is not known whether this image was of sandalwood or of stone but no such image of the time of Aśoka has so far come to light. The bulk of the Aśokan art so far available unmistakably refutes the tradition narrated by Fa-hian. Last but not the least it will be impossible to justify the deliberate omission of Buddha's figure in his life scenes depicted profusely in the Maurya, śuṅga and Andhra period if we accept the origin of the Buddha image during the life time of Buddha himself. Believing the absolute correctness of the traditions referred to by Chinese travellers one may also argue that the images of Buddha were carved during his lifetime but later on discontinued during the Mauryan and Śuṅga age and again began to be carved during the regnal years of Kaniṣka. Without the support of literary and archaeological evidences it would be too ambitous to attach any credence to this theory.

Therefore such late traditions narrated by the Chinese travellers can hardly be regarded as authentic. From the above it can be concluded that Buddha was not against the age old tradition of sanctification of holy spots and erection of *caityas* and *stūpas*. Regarding body worship also he simply wants his disciples to remain indifferent. He gave supreme position to *Dhamma* and labelled the question about his existence after death, as *avyākṛta*. As such the interdiction about the image worship is only tacit and indirect and only inference can be drawn that Buddha was against the formulation of his image. Had the interdiction been unequivocal or categorical it could not have been

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[17] Samuel Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India*, Vol. I, p. 23.

broken easily in the beginning of the Kushān period. It is also noteworthy that irrespective of what Buddha said his personality was never considered second to *Dhamma* and the organisation by the masses.

DAŚAPADĀRTHAŚĀSTRA

(Sanskrit Restoration)

Chapter II

By Dr. KARUNESHA SHUKLA*

Continued from Vol XIX Pages 158

दशपदार्थशास्त्रम् (दशपदार्थी)

द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

दशपदार्थानां सामान्यधर्माः

प्रथममाह्निकम्

द्रव्यम्

१—द्रव्यं क्रियावन्निष्क्रियादि च[1]

तत्र कानि चैतेषु नवद्रव्येषु[2] क्रियावन्ति कानि (च)[3] निष्क्रियाणि ?

पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुमनांसि पञ्च द्रव्याणि क्रियावन्ति[4] शेषाणि तु[5] चत्वारि सर्वथा नष्क्रियाणि ॥१॥

यत्तानि मूर्त्तान्यमूर्त्तानि वा, ससंस्काराण्यसंस्काराणि[6] वा परत्वापरत्ववन्ति परत्वापरत्वरहितानि वा,[7] इति क्रियावत्त्व-निष्क्रियत्ववद्व्याख्यातम् ॥२॥

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*Lecturer, in Sanskrit, University Gorakhpur.

1—च has been added by us.

2—A.t.—नवसु द्रव्येषु, नवद्रव्याणाम्.

3—Added by us.

4—A.t.—सक्रियाणि.

5—May also be च.

6—E.T. suggests—संस्कारवन्ति तद्रहितानि वा.

7—न वा would also suffice, but the E.T. does not suggest this.

२——गुणादिवन्ति द्रव्याणि

कानि चैतेषु नवसु द्रव्येषु[8] गुणान् धारयन्ति, कानि वा न तद् धारयन्ति[10] ? सर्वाण्येव द्रव्याणि निरपवादतया गुणधारकाणि[11] ।।३।।

यत्तानि समवायिकारणानि, प्रत्येकं[12] द्रव्यत्ववन्ति (अन्त्य)विशेषवन्ति[13] स्वकार्यैरविनष्टानि,[14] अपेक्षाकारणवन्ति चेति तथैव व्याख्यातम् ।।४।।

३—स्पर्शवन्ति द्रव्याणि[14a]

कानि चैतेषां नवद्रव्याणां[15] स्पर्शवन्ति[16], कानि च नैतद्धारयन्ति ?

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुरिति चत्वारि द्रव्याणि स्पर्श धारयन्ति, परश्चान्यानि पञ्च नैतद् धारयन्ति ।।५।।

यत्तानि (गुणादिकार्य-) उत्पादकद्रव्याणि द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां च कारणानि, अथ वा एकतराणामेव केवलानां द्रव्याणां वा गुणानां वा कर्मणां वा कारणानि (किन्तु न कार्योत्पादकद्रव्याणि)[17] इति तथैव व्याख्यातम् ।।६।।

४—रूपवन्ति द्रव्याणि[18]

कानि चैतेषां नवद्रव्याणां[15] रूपवन्ति[19] कानि च नैतद् धारयन्ति ?

पृथिव्यप्तेजांसीति त्रीणि द्रव्याणि रूपवन्ति । शेषाणि तु षट् नैतद् धारयन्ति ।।७।।

8—May also be नवद्रव्येषु, नवद्रव्याणां.
9—A. t.—गुणधारकाणि.
10—A. t.—निर्गुणानि, गुणरहितानि, न तद् धारकाणि.
11— A. t. गुणीनि, गुणवन्ति
12—May be सर्वाणि.
13—A. t.—सविशेषाणि.
14—E. T. suggests—स्वकार्यैर्न विनश्यन्ति, but the terminology prevalent in the Vaiśeṣika system does not permit this.
14a.—स्पर्शवद्द्रव्याणि.
15 —A. t.—एतेषु नवद्रव्येषु.
16—E. T. suggests स्पर्शं धारयन्ति, but we have preferred स्पर्शं.
17—Added by E. T.
18—A. t. रूपवद्द्रव्याणि.
19—A. t.-- रूपं धारयन्ति.

यत्तानि प्रत्यक्षाण्यप्रत्यक्षाणि वा, चक्षुरिन्द्रियविषयाणि[20] वा न वेति तथैव व्याख्यातम् ॥८॥

५—नित्यद्रव्याण्यनित्यानि च

एतेषां नवद्रव्याणां (आकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि) पञ्च द्रव्याणि नित्यानि। पराणि चत्वारि चैवं विवेक्ष्यन्ते ॥९॥

एतेषु चतुर्षु द्रव्येषु अकार्य(द्रव्य)ाणि नित्यानि, कार्य(द्रव्य)ाणि न नित्यानि[21] ॥१०॥

यत्तान्यन्यस्मिन्द्रव्ये न समवीयन्ते, अन्यस्मिन् द्रव्ये समवीयन्ते वा,[22] न भागवन्ति भागवन्ति वा[23], स्वकारणैर्न विनाश्यन्ते कदाचित्तैर्विनाश्यन्ते वा, अन्त्यविशेषा न वा अन्त्यविशेषाः[24], पारिमाण्डल्यानि न वा पारिमाण्डल्यानीति नित्यानित्यवद्[25] व्याख्यातम्[26] ॥११॥

६—द्रव्याणीन्द्रियाणि च

[27]तत्रैतेषां नवद्रव्याणां पञ्च (ज्ञान)इन्द्रिय(उपादानकारण)[ानि-] अपराणि च चत्वारि न इन्द्रिय(उपादानकारण)ाणि(नि) ॥१२॥

कानि (तानि)[28] पञ्च ?

तानि च पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशश्च ॥१३॥

[27](तत्र) घ्राणेन्द्रियं पृथिवीमयं, रसनेन्द्रियमम्मयं, दर्शनेन्द्रियं तेजोमयं, स्पर्शेन्द्रियं वायुमयं, श्रवणेन्द्रियञ्चाऽऽकाशमयम् ॥१४॥

20—A.t.—दृष्टि (दर्शन) विषयाणि.
21—A.t.—अनित्यानि.
22—A.t.—यत्तान्यन्यस्मिन् द्रव्येऽसमवेतानि तत्र समवेतानि वा.
23—A.t.—अभागानि सभागानि वा.
24—A.t.—अन्त्यविशेषवन्ति, न वाऽन्त्यविशेषवन्ति.
25—E.T.—नित्यवदनित्यवच्च.
26—May also be—व्याख्यातानि.
27—Added by us.
28—Added by us.

७—द्रव्याणि गुणाश्च

नवसु द्रव्येषु किंगुणकत्वात्[29]पृथिवी गुणवतीत्युच्यते ?

चतुर्दशगुणकत्वादियम् (एवम् उच्यते)[28] ।।१५।।

के (ते[28]) चतुर्दश गुणाः ?

ते च रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वापरत्वगुरुत्व-द्रवत्वसंस्काराः ।।१६।।

किंगुण[29]कत्वादापो गुणवत्य उच्यन्ते ?

चतुर्दशगुण[29]कत्वादिमाः[29a] (एवमुच्यन्ते)[28] ।।१७।।

के (ते[28]) चतुर्दश गुणाः ?

ते च रूपरसस्पर्श-सङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-संयोगविभाग-परत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्काराः ।।१८।।

किंगुणकत्वा[29]त्तेजो गुणवदित्युच्यते ?

एकादशगुणकत्वादिदम्[29](एवमुच्यते)[28] ।।१९।।

के (ते[28]) एकादश गुणाः ? ते च रूप-स्पर्श-सङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग-विभागपरत्वापरत्वस्नेह-संस्काराः ।।२०।।

किंगुणत्वाद्[29] वायुर्गुणवानित्युच्यते ?

नवगुणत्वाद[29]यम् (एवमुच्यते)[28] ।।२१।।

के (ते[28]) नव गुणाः ? ते च सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वा-परत्वस्पर्श-संस्काराः ।।२२।।

किंगुणत्वा[29]दाकाशो गुणवानित्युच्यते[28] ? षड्गुणत्वादयम् (एवमुच्यते[28]) ।।२३।।

के (ते[28]) षड् गुणाः ?

ते च[28] सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभागः-शब्दा ।।२४।।

किंगुणत्वात्[29] कालो गुणवानित्युच्यते ?

पञ्चगुणत्वादयम्[29] (एवमुच्यते[28]) ।।२५।।

के(ते[28]) पञ्च गुणाः ?

ते च[28] सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभागा ।।२६।।

29—A. t. गुणवत्वाद्, गुणकत्वाद्.

दिक् कालवद् व्याख्याता ।।२७।।

किंगुणत्वादात्मा[29] गुणी (गुणवानि)[28]त्युच्यते ?

चतुर्दशगुणत्वादयम्[29] (एवमुच्यते[28]) ।।२८।।

के ते[28]) चतुर्दश गुणाः ?

ते च[28] सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखेच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्न-धर्माधर्म-संस्काराः ।।२९।।

किंगुणत्वान्मनो[29] गुणवदित्युच्यते[28] ?

अष्टगुणत्वादिदम् (एवमुच्यते) ।।३०।।

के तेऽष्ट[28] गुणाः ?

ते च[28] सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वा-परत्व-संस्काराः ।।३१।

× ×

द्वितीयमाह्निकम्

गुणः

१—प्रत्यक्षा अप्रत्यक्षाश्च[30] गुणाः

चतुर्विंशतिगुणेषु के प्रत्यक्षाः[31] के चाप्रत्यक्षाः[32] ?

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः प्रत्यक्षा अप्रत्यक्षा वा[30] ? ।।१।।

कदा[33] ते प्रत्यक्षाः[31] ?

यदा महत्स्वेकाधिकद्रव्येषु च विद्यन्ते[34] तदा ते प्रत्यक्षाः[31] ।।२।।

कदा[33] तेऽप्रत्यक्षाः[32] ?

यदा ते अणु-द्व्यणुकसङ्घातेषु[35] विद्यन्ते[36] तदा तेऽप्रत्यक्षाः[32] ।।३।।

29a.—E.T. suggests चतुर्दशगुणकत्वादेतद्.
30 —A.t.—प्रत्यक्षविषया अप्रत्यक्षविषयाश्च.
31—A.t.—प्रत्यक्षविषयाः
32—A.t. चाऽप्रत्यक्षविषयाः.
33—May also be कीदृश्यां स्थितौ, कस्यामवस्थायाम्, कुत्र
34—A.t.—महद्द्रव्यवर्तिन एकाधिकद्रव्यवृत्तयश्च.
35—May also be अणुषु द्व्यणुकेषु च.
36—A.t. अणु (परमाणु) द्व्यणुकवर्त्तिनः (-वृत्तयः)

शब्दस्तु सर्वथा प्रत्यक्षविषयः[37] ॥४॥

सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वापरत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्कारास्तु विविच्यन्ते यथा रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शविषये[38] ॥५॥

बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखेच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्नास्त्वात्मप्रत्यक्षाः[39] ॥६॥

धर्माधर्मसंस्काराः (गुरुत्वञ्च[40]) केवलमप्रत्यक्षाः[32] ॥६क॥

२—कार्यगुणा अकार्यगुणाश्च[41]

कतमे[42] चैतेषां गुणानां कार्याः के चाकार्याः ?

बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कार-विभागपरत्वापरत्व-शब्दाश्च केवलं कार्याः[43] ॥७॥

अन्ये च गुणाः[44] कार्या अकार्या वा स्युः ॥८॥

यदि ते पृथिव्या धार्यन्ते, रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शास्तु सर्वथा अकार्याः[45] ॥९॥

(यदा) परमाणुसमवेताः रूपरसस्पर्शद्रवत्वस्नेहाः अकार्याः त एव (गुणाः) च (यदा) द्व्यणुकसङ्घातेषु समवेताः कार्याः (भवन्ति)[46] ॥१०॥

गुरुत्वं तथैव व्याख्यातम् ॥११॥

अग्निवृत्ती रूपस्पर्शौ वायुवृत्तिश्च स्पर्शः अब्गुणवद्[47] व्याख्याताः ॥१२॥

एकत्वसङ्ख्यापृथक्त्वञ्च कार्यद्रव्येष्वकार्यद्रव्येषु वा विद्यमानतया कार्ये अकार्ये वा, द्वित्वात्परतराः सङ्ख्याद्वित्वपृथक्त्वञ्च कार्या एव[48] (गुणाः)[49] ॥१३॥

37—A.t. प्रत्यक्षः.

38—A.t. रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवद् विविक्ताः (विविच्यन्ते).

39—Added by us. May also be च.

40—Added by E.T.

41—A.t.—कार्या अकार्याश्च गुणाः

42—A.t. के

43—A.t.—कार्यगुणाः

44—May be omitted.

45—A.t.—अकार्यगुणाः, अकार्या एव (सर्वथा may be omitted).

46—A more accurate rendering would be—
परमाणुसमवेता रूपरसस्पर्शद्रवत्वस्नेहा अकार्याः, त एव च द्व्यणुक-समवेताः कार्या (भवन्ति).

47—A.t —जलस्थगुणवद्.

48—A.t.—एकत्वसङ्ख्यापृथक्त्वे च कार्याकार्यद्रव्यविद्यमानतया कार्याकार्यौ वा (गुणौ), द्वित्वादयः द्वित्वपृथक्त्वञ्च कार्यगुणा एव.

49—Added by us. E.T. omits it.

महत्त्वाणुत्वह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वानि च कार्याण्येव[50] पारिमाण्डल्यन्तु सदैवाकार्यम्[51]॥१४॥

अन्येन[52] मूर्त्तेण सह मूर्त्तद्रव्याणां संयोगाः, अन्येन[52] चामूर्त्तेणामूर्त्तद्रव्याणां संयोगाः कार्याः (गुणाः) ॥१५॥

३—नित्यगुणा अनित्यगुणाश्च[53]

गुणानां नित्यत्वानित्यत्वे कार्याकार्यवद्व्याख्याते[54] ॥१६॥

४—गुणानां भिद्यमाना प्रत्यक्षता[55]

ए(ते)षां गुणानां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा अनेकशः एकेन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षाः सङ्ख्या-परिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग-विभाग-परत्वापरत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेहसंस्काराश्च दर्शनस्पर्शेन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षाः ॥१७॥

५—गुणकारणानि

किंहेतुका इमे गुणाः ?

[57]सजातीयवस्तुहेतवः रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा द्व्यणुक(ादि)समवेताः[58] ॥१८॥

पार्थिवपरमाणुवृत्तयो रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः पार्थिव-तैजसोभयद्रवत्वञ्च तेजःसंयोग-हेतवः (गुणाः) ॥१९॥

उभयम् आप-पार्थिवगुरुत्वं[59] जलीयद्रवत्वस्नेहौ च (त्रयोऽपि) [61]द्व्यणुकसङ्-घातसमवेताः[62] । इमे सजातीय[57]वस्तुहेतवः ॥२०॥

50—A.t.—कार्यगुणाः
51—A.t.—सदा कार्यगुणः
52—A.t.—अपरेण.
53—E.T. suggests—गुणा-नित्या अनित्याश्च.
54—E.T. suggests—व्याख्याते यथा कार्याकार्यविषये.
55—A.t.—गुणानां भिन्ना प्रत्यक्षता,-प्रत्यक्षभिन्नता, प्रत्यक्षत्वे वैभिन्यम्, भिद्यमानं प्रत्यक्षत्वम्.
56—A.t.—गुणानां कारणानि, गुणहेतवः.
57—A.t.—एक, सदृश, समान.
58—E.T. adds यत् (ये) and तत् (ते), but it does not seem to be necessary to add these words.
59—A.t.—उभयोरप्पृथिव्योर्गुरुत्वम्
60—Added by E.T.
61—E.T. adds here यदा.
62—This might be omitted.

द्व्यणुकसङ्घातादिसमवेतैकत्वसङ्ख्यापृथक्त्वञ्च सजातीयवस्तुहेतुनी(कौ) ॥२१॥

द्वित्वात् परतराः सङ्ख्याः[63] द्विपृथक्त्वेषु पृथक्त्वानि च सजातीयविजातीयवस्तुकारणानि । एकपृथक्त्वञ्च स्वप्रत्ययकारणं (भवति)[64] ॥२२॥

महत्त्वदीर्घत्वेऽनेकत्वहेतुनी प्रत्येकं (परमाणु[65])सङ्घातहेतुनी च अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे तु द्वि(परमाणुजनितैकद्रव्य)हेतुनी ॥२३॥

संयोगविभागौ तु संयुक्तविसंयुक्तयोरन्यतरकर्महेतुकौ संयोगविभागोभयकर्महेतुकौ च ॥२४॥

परत्वापरत्वे च प्रत्येकमैककालिकादिपरत्वापरत्वप्रत्ययकारण(द्रव्य)[66]हेतुनी (के) ॥२५॥

बुद्धिर्द्विविधा—प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च ॥२६ ।

प्रत्यक्षं चतुर्विधम्-संशयो निर्णयो विद्या अविद्या च ॥२७॥

किन्तावत्संशय[67]प्रत्यक्षस्य कारणम् ?

एकाधिकद्रव्यगतसमानधर्मप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं विकल्पविशेषधर्मस्मृतिहेतुकाऽऽत्ममनःसन्निकर्षकारणम्[68] । एवमुक्तिषु किंस्विदिति ज्ञानञ्च[69]संशयप्रत्यक्षम् ॥२८॥

किं (तावत्[67]) निर्णयप्रत्यक्षस्य कारणम् ?

संशयप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमेकविकल्पविशेष-धर्म-निश्चयमूलकाऽऽत्म-मनःसन्निकर्षकारणम् । एवमुक्तिषु 'इदमेतदिति' ज्ञानञ्च निश्चयप्रत्यक्षम् ॥२९॥

किन्(तावद्)[67]विद्याप्रत्यक्षस्य कारणम् ?

यदेकाधिकद्रव्यगतसमानधर्मप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमेकविकल्पविशेषधर्मस्यान्यथा (विकल्पविशेषधर्मत्वेन) ग्रहणपूर्वक-आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षजनितञ्चाशुद्धोक्तौ ज्ञानं तदविद्या ॥३०॥

विद्यायाः को हेतुः ?

यदेकाधिकद्रव्यगतसमानधर्मप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमेकविकल्पविशेषधर्मप्रत्यक्षहेतुक-आत्ममनःसन्निकर्ष[70]कारणमदुष्टं[71]च ज्ञानं तद् विद्या ॥३१॥

63—A.t.—द्वित्वादयः
64—Added by us.
65—E.T.—adds this.
66—Added by E.T.
67—Added by us. किं may be used after प्रत्यक्ष also.
68—A.t. हेतुकम्.
69—A.t.—किंस्विदित्यनवधारणात्मकज्ञानञ्च.
70—A.t.—हेतुक
71—A.t. निर्दुष्टं

अनुमानमपि विभक्तं व्याख्यातञ्च[72], यथा प्रत्यक्षविषये ॥३२॥

त्रिधा प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते—चतुः(निमित्त)[73]सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षम्, त्रि(निमित्त)[73] सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षम्, द्वि-(निमित्त)[73] सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षञ्च ॥३३॥

किन्तावच्चतुः(निमित्त)[73]सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षम् ?

इदमिन्द्रियोपलब्धिः एकाधिकरूपिद्रव्यवृत्तित्वान्मिथः प्रशस्यतराणां रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वापरत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-प्रयत्नानां तथा पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्तीनामुत्क्षेपणादिकर्मणां, शब्दसमवेतानां शक्त्यशक्तिशब्दत्वापोदितानां[75] सत्त्व[76]सामान्य-विशेषशक्त्यशक्तीनां सर्वाणीमानि प्रत्यक्षाणि आत्मेन्द्रियमनोविषयचतुः-(निमित्त)-सन्निकर्ष कारणानि[77] ॥३४॥

किं (तावत्)[74] त्रि(निमित्त)[78]सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षम् ?

शब्दस्य शक्त्यशक्तिशब्द वसत्त्वादीनां शब्दसमवेतानाञ्च विषयाणां सर्वाण्येव प्रत्यक्षाणि आत्मेन्द्रियमन इतित्रि(निमित्त)सन्निकर्षकारणानि ॥३५॥

द्वि(निमित्त)सन्निकर्षजनितं प्रत्यक्षञ्च[79] किम् ?

सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नविषयाणां तथा एतद् (पञ्च)गुणसमवेतानां शक्त्यशक्तिसा-मान्यसत्त्वानां[76] सर्वा बुद्धय[80] आत्ममनो-द्वि(निमित्त)सन्निकर्ष कारणाः[81a] ॥३६॥

अनुमानञ्च एकद्रव्यसमवेतवस्तुसतोरेकतरस्यान्यस्य[82] विरोधि[83]वस्तुनश्च ज्ञान-पूर्वकं तयोः (वस्तुसतोः[84]) सम्बन्धस्मरणफलित-आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षकारणं[77] ज्ञानम् ॥३७॥
धर्माधर्महेतुनी[85] सुखदुःखे तु चतुस्त्रिद्वि (निमित्त)सन्निकर्षकारणे[86] ॥३८॥

72—A.t.—विभज्याख्यातम्.
73—Added by E, T.
74—Added by us.
75—A.t.—रहितानाम्.
76—A.t.—सत्ता.
77—A.t.—हेतुकानि, जनितानि, मूलकानि
78—E, T.—suggests this.
79—Added by us.
80—A.t—सर्वबुद्धयः
80a—A.t. हेतुकाः, जनिताः, मूलिकाः
81—A.t. हेतवः
82—E. T.—adds here यत् which is qualified by तत्.
83—A.t. विपरीत.
84—Added by us.
85—A.t:—पुण्यापुण्य
86—A.t.—हेतुनी, हेतुके.

इच्छाद्वेषौ च सुख-दुःख-(अनु[87]) स्मृत्यविद्याहेतुकाऽऽत्ममनःसन्निकर्षकारणौ।।३९।।

इदानीमिच्छारहितत्वाज्जीवनप्रवृत्तौ श्वासप्रश्वासादिकर्मसु चेच्छाद्वेषमूलाऽऽत्ममनःसन्निकर्षहेतुः प्रयत्नः ।।४०।।

किं हेतुकः संस्कारः[88] ? प्रेरणोत्थ[89]कर्मसंस्कारो[90] ह्यस्य कारणम् ।।४१।।

धर्माधर्मौ चेच्छाद्वेषपूर्वकौ, यत्पुण्यापुण्ये (धर्माधर्मौ) (अनेकशः)[91] भाविनि जीवने शुद्धाशुद्धस्थिती[92] उत्पादयत इति श्रवण-मनन-अनवधान(अध्यान)हेतुकाऽऽत्ममनः-सन्निकर्षकारणौ[93] ।।४२।।

संस्कारोऽनुस्मृतिहेतुर्वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानसंस्कारहेतुकाऽऽत्ममनःसन्निकर्षकारणः ।।४३।।

शब्दस्य तु त्रिधोत्पत्तिः, तद्यथा-संयोगजः शब्दो, विभागजः शब्दः, शब्दजः शब्दश्चेति ।।४४।।

तत्र[94] संयोगजः शब्दः संस्कारसहकृताकाशे (प्रदेशे[95]) स्पर्शवद् द्रव्यसंयोग-हेतुकः ।।४५।।

विभागजः शब्दस्तु द्रव्यविभागकारणसंस्कारसहकृताकाशे (प्रदेशे)[95] स्पर्शवद्द्रव्य-विभागहेतुकः ।।४६।।

शब्दजः [शब्दस्तु] स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यसंयोगविभागजनक[96]संस्कार-सहकृतशून्यप्रदेश-(जनित)[97]शब्दकारणः ।।४७।।

६—एकद्रव्यादिवृत्तयो[98] गुणाः

के चैतेषां चतुर्विंशतिगुणानां एकद्रव्याश्रयाः[99] ? के चैकाधिकद्रव्याश्रयाः ?

87—Reminiscence.
88—Impetus.
89—Impulsion.
90—Added by us.
91—E.T.—adds this.
92—E.T. suggests—शुद्धामशुद्धां वा स्थितिम्
93—A.t. हेतुकौ
94—Added by us.
95—E.T. adds this.
96—A.t.—कारण, हेतु.
97—This has been added by us.
98—A.t. वर्तिनः.
99—A.t. एकद्रव्याश्रिताः, एकद्रव्याश्रयवन्त,ः

रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-परिमाण-परत्वापरत्व-बुद्धि - सुख-दुःखेच्छा-द्वेष - प्रयत्न-धर्मा-धर्म-गुरुत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्कार-शब्दा एते एकविंशतिगुणा एकद्रव्याश्रयाः[99] ॥४८॥

संयोगविभागौ तु द्विद्रव्याश्रयौ[100] ॥४९॥

सङ्ख्यास्तु एकद्रव्याश्रया[99] वा द्विद्रव्याश्रया[101] वा ॥५०॥

का [102] (तावत् सङ्ख्या)[103] एकद्रव्याश्रया[99] ?

इयमेकत्वसङ्ख्या ॥५१॥

[102]कास्तावदे[103]काधिकद्रव्याश्रयाः[104]?

तास्तु द्वित्वात् परतराः सङ्ख्याः ॥५२॥

यावच्च पृथक्त्वम् । इदं व्याख्यातं यथा सङ्ख्याविषये ॥५३॥

७—स्वाश्रयव्यापिनोऽव्यापिनश्च गुणाः[105]

के[106] चैतेषां चतुर्विंशतिगुणानां स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति, के[106] च न तान् व्याप्नुवन्ति ?

रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-सङ्ख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-परत्वापरत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-गुरुत्व-संस्काराः स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति ॥५४॥

अन्ये पुनः[107] (गुणाः)[108] न स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति ॥५५॥

८—स्वकार्यादिभिर्नष्टा गुणाः

के[107]तावदेतेषां चतुर्विंशतिगुणानां स्वकार्यैर्विनश्यन्ते, स्वकारणैर्विनश्यन्ते, उभाभ्यां वा विनश्यन्ते ?

संयोगविभागजनिताः शब्दाः अन्यशब्दसमुत्पादकाश्च सर्वे शब्दाः (स्व)स्वकार्यैर्विनश्यन्ते ॥५६॥

धर्मः स्वकार्याभ्यां सुखविद्याभ्यां विनाश्यते ॥५७॥

अधर्मोऽपि[109] स्वकार्याभ्यां दुःखाविद्याभ्यां विनाश्यते ॥५८॥

100—A.t.—द्विद्रव्याश्रितौ, द्विद्रव्याश्रयवन्तौ.
101—A.t.—द्विद्रव्याश्रया, द्विद्रव्याश्रयवत्यः.
102—A.t.—कतमाः.
103—Added by us.
104—A.t. एकाधिकद्रव्याश्रिताः, एकाधिकद्रव्याश्रयवत्यः.
105—A.t.—स्वाश्रयव्याप्ता अव्याप्ताश्च गुणाः.
106—कतमे would be more appropriate.
107—Added by us.
108—E.T. comprises this, but this may be dropped.
109—Added by us.

सर्वा बुद्धयः स्वकार्यैः संस्कारैर्विनाश्यन्ते ।।५९।।

सर्वा विशेषबुद्धयः स्वकार्यैः सर्वैः परबुद्धिसंस्कारैर्विनाश्यन्ते ।।६०।।

अन्तजनितशब्दः स्वकारणैर्नाश्यते ।।६१।।

आत्मनोऽन्त्यसमुत्पन्ना गुणा[110] अपि स्वकारणैर्विनाश्यन्ते ।।६२।।

सुखदुःखे स्वकार्याभ्यामिच्छाद्वेषाभ्यां विनाश्येते ।।६३।।

धर्माधर्मौ स्वकारणाभ्यां विनाश्येते ।।६४।।

इच्छाद्वेषौ स्वकार्येण प्रयत्नेन विनाश्येते ।।६५।।

सुखदुःखे (स्व)-स्वकारणाभ्यां विनाश्येते ।।६६।।

मध्यमसमुत्पन्नाः शब्दा उपरिवद् व्याख्याताः (स्वकारणकार्यैर्नाश्यन्त इति)[111]।६७

आत्मगुणौ प्रयत्नदुःखे तु[109] स्पर्शवद् द्रव्यवृत्तिनी कार्यतया कारणतया वा न विनष्टत्वेन विनश्यत्वेन वा सम्बद्धे[112] ।।६८।।

आत्मगुणोऽनुस्मृतिहेतुः[113] संस्कारो दुःखञ्च कार्यतया कारणतया वा न विनष्टत्वेन विनश्यत्वेन [114]वा सम्बद्धौ (गुणौ) ।।६९।।

अनुस्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारः स्वकार्यैर्विनाश्यते ।।७०।।

स्पर्शवद् द्रव्यसंयुक्तः कर्महेतुः संस्कारो न स्वकार्यैर्विनाश्यते ।।७०।।

द्वित्वात् परतराः सङ्ख्या न द्वित्वादिबुद्धिरूपस्वकार्यविरोधिन्यः ।।७१।।

द्वन्द्वपृथक्त्वादिषु पृथक्त्वानि परत्वापरत्वे च व्याख्यातानि यथा द्वित्वादि-सङ्ख्याविषये ।।७२।।

पार्थिवपरमाणुसमवेता रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शास्तेषां तेजसा संयोगश्च कार्यतया कारणतया वा न विनष्टत्वेन विनश्यत्वेन वा सम्बद्धाः ।।७३।।

संयोगविभागौ न मिथः कारणकार्ये, परस्परविरुद्धौ[115] हि तौ ।।७४।।

एकद्रव्यस्य परमाणुगतरूपादयो ये तत् समूहस्य द्व्यणुसङ्घातानां रूपादीनुत्पादयन्ति न स्वकार्यैर्विनाश्यन्ते, तत् समूहकार्या हि ते ।।७५।।

110—Last produced attributes of the self.
111—This has been added by E.T.
112—A.t.—न विनष्टविनश्यसम्बन्धवती.
113—Reminiscence.
114—It might be rendered as in ftn. 112.
115—E.T. adds (न कारणकार्ये) सम्बन्धेन (मिथः) सम्बद्धौ

भागिनां द्रव्याणामन्त्यजनिता रूपादयः कार्याः स्वकार्यं रूपादिभिर्न विनाश्यन्ते, सजातीया हि ते ।।७६।।

मध्यजनितास्सर्वे भागिनां द्रव्याणां रूपादयो गुणाः सजातीये रूपादिभिः कार्यैः कारणैर्वा न विनाश्यन्ते ।।७७।।

एकस्मिन्द्रव्ये रूपादयो न साधारणतया कार्यकारणे[116] नान्योऽन्यं विरुद्धा वा ।।७८।।

सर्वे[117] गुणा न स्वद्रव्येण विरुध्यन्ते ।।७९।।

९—द्रव्यादौ समवेता गुणाः

[118]के [119]पुनश्चैतेषां चतुर्विंशतिगुणानां द्रव्यसमवेताः के[118] च न तत्र समवेताः ? सर्वो[120](सर्वे) गुणः(गुणाः) द्रव्ये समवेतः(ताः) ।।८०।।

यत्ते निर्गुणा, अक्रिया, असमवायिकारणानि, गुणवद्द्रव्यलक्षणा[121] अमूर्ता अभावाश्चेत्यपि तथैव व्याख्यातम् ।।८१।।

तृतीयमाह्निकम्

कर्म

कानि चैतेषां पञ्च कर्मणां द्रव्येषु समवेतानि, कानि च न तत्र[122] समवेतानि ? सर्वाणि द्रव्येषु समवेतानि ।।१।।

यत्सर्वाणि[123] तान्येकद्रव्याश्रयाण्य[124]मूर्त्तानि निर्गुणा[125]न्यभागानि,[126] विभाग-संयोगयोः (अत्यन्त)[127]कारणानि, कार्याभिमुखानि[128] कार्याणि चासंहतानि[129]द्रव्य-

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116—E.T. adds here (कार्यकारण)त्वेन सम्बद्धाः
117—A.t. प्रत्येके
118—A.t. कतमे.
119—Added by us.
120—A.t.—प्रत्येके, प्रत्येकः(म्).
121—A.t.—लिङ्गाः.
122—A.t.—तेषु.
123—E.T.—प्रत्येकानि.
124—A.t.—एकद्रव्याश्रितानि, एकद्रव्याश्रयवन्ति.
125—A.t.—अगुणानि.
126—A.t. अभागवन्ति, निर्भागानि.
127—E.T. adds this.
128—Productive.
129—A.t.—द्रव्याश्रितानि, द्रव्याश्रयवन्ति.

लिङ्गानि वेगादिजनितसंस्कारकारणानि विजातीयकारणानि चेति तथैव व्याख्या-तम् ॥२॥

२—द्रव्याश्रयाणि कर्म्माणि

कानि [130]तावदेतेषां पञ्चकर्म्मणां द्रव्याण्याश्रयभूतानि ?[131]

उत्क्षेपणकर्म सर्वेषु पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुमनस्स्वाश्रयवत्[132] ॥३॥

अवक्षेपणगमनाख्ये[133] कर्म्मणी तूत्क्षेपणकर्म्मवद् व्याख्याते ॥४॥

आकुञ्चनकर्म्म चातिस्रंसितभागानां विशेषप्रबन्धकार्यंद्रव्याश्रयवत् ॥५॥

प्रसारणकर्म्माऽऽकुञ्चनकर्मवद् व्याख्यातम् ॥६॥

३—स्वाश्रयव्याप्तानि कर्माणि

[130]कानि चै(ते)षां पञ्चकर्म्मणां स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति, कानि च न तान् व्याप्नुवन्ति ?

सर्वाणीमानि कर्म्माणि स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति ॥७॥

परमाणुमनोवृत्तीनि कर्म्माणि स्वाश्रयान् व्याप्नुवन्ति, द्व्यणुक(सङ्घात)-[134] वृत्तीनि च न तान् व्याप्नुवन्तीति केचित् ॥८॥

५—देहादिषु[135] कर्म्माणि

एतेषां पञ्चानाम् (शरीर-)[136] अभ्यन्तरवृत्तीनि कर्माणि देह-तद्घ्राणजिह्वात्वक्-चक्षुरिति चतुरिन्द्रियमनःसमवायिकारणानि ॥९॥

[135a] देहे प्रथमकर्म्मेच्छापूर्वकमात्मसंयोगप्रयत्नासमवायिकारणम् ॥१०॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि च (क्रमेण)[137] (स्वस्यान्तकर्मं)संस्कारासमवायि-कारणानि ॥११॥

130—Added by us.

131—A.t.—आश्रयत्वेनाभ्युपगतानि.

132—E.T. adds here स्व.

133—This word does not occur in the E.T., but has deen added by us.

134—This may be dropped.

135—A.t.—शरीरादिषु.

135a—A.t.—शरीरे

136—E.T. adds this

137—See ftn. 136

मनः(शरीर–)भागवृत्तीनि च कर्म्माणि देहकर्म्मवद्[137a] व्याख्यातानि ॥१२॥

घ्राण-जिह्वा-स्पर्श-दर्शनेन्द्रियेषु[138] प्रथमकर्माण्यात्मसंयोग(आत्म)प्रयत्न(शरीर-संयोग)[139]समवायिकारणानि ॥१३॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि च (क्रमेण[137] स्वान्त्य[न्तिम][140] कर्म-) संस्कारासमवायिकारणानि ॥१४॥

शूकनालादिषु शरीरसम्बन्धि माला(हार सुगन्ध्यादिषु च कर्माणि घ्राणादि-कर्मवद् व्याख्यातानि ॥१५॥

निद्रितस्य देह(।व)पतनस्य प्रथमं कर्म गुरुत्वासमवायिकारणम् ॥१६॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि च (क्रमेण[137]स्वान्तिम[न्त्य] [140]कर्म--) संस्कारासमवायिकारणानि ॥१७॥

[141]अद्यापि जिजीविषा[142]पूर्वकेच्छारहितत्वोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासयोः कर्माणि निद्रितानां प्रथमकर्माणि वाऽऽत्मप्रयत्नसंयोगासमवायिकारणानि ॥१८॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि च (कर्माणि) (क्रमेण स्वान्त्य[न्तिम] कर्म[140]) संस्कारासमवायिकारणानि ॥१९॥

पयसोऽधोगमनस्य प्रथमकर्म द्रवत्वासमवायिकारणम् ॥२०॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि च (कर्माणि)[130] (क्रमेण स्वान्त्य [न्तिम] कर्म–)[140] संस्कारासमवायिकारणानि ॥२१॥

तेजस ऊर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोः पार्श्वप्रवहणञ्चाऽऽत्मधर्माधर्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणे ॥२२॥

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137 a.—A.t.—शरीर.

138—A.t. दर्शनेन्द्रियाणाम्.

139—Professor Ui prefers this portion to be dropped. See also his notes (ad II.3.2.5) P.215-216, Cf. also—

उपस्कार add V.S., V.1.1.—(आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्यां हस्ते कर्म)—संयोगश्च प्रयत्नश्च संयोगप्रयत्नौ आत्मनः संयोगप्रयत्नौ ताभ्यां हस्ते समवायिकारणे कर्म। तस्य च कर्मणः प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम्, प्रयत्नश्च निमित्तकारणम्, and also ad V. S., V.1.2.—तथा हस्तसंयोगाच मुसले कर्म। अत्र च प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयुक्तेन हस्तेन मुसलस्य संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम्, मुसलं समवायिकारणम्, प्रयत्नगुरुत्वे निमित्तकारणे—उपस्कार, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Edition P. 129).

140—E.T. adds this.

141—Yet

142—A.t·—जीवनप्रवृत्ति.

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि (कर्माणि)[130] चोपरि व्याख्यातवत् (व्याख्यातानि)[130] ॥२३॥

[143]चतुर्भूतपरमाणुभ्यो देहजनककारणानां प्रथमकर्माऽऽत्मधर्माधर्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणम् ॥२४॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि (कर्माणि)[130] चोपरि व्याख्यातवत् (व्याख्यातानि)[130] ॥२५

वृक्षविकारहेतूनि कर्म्माणि द्व्यणुकादि(सङ्घात)[144]वृत्तीनि च (कर्माणि)[130] देहजनककर्मवद् व्याख्यातानि ॥२६॥

मनसि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः प्रथमकर्माऽऽत्मधर्माधर्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणम् ॥२७॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि (कर्माणि)[130] चोपरिवद् (व्याख्यातानि)[130] ॥२८॥

भूतानां हिताहित(शुभाशुभ विपाकलिङ्गानां[114] भूमितलकर्मणां[146] प्रथमकर्मात्मकधर्माधर्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणम् ॥ २९॥

द्वितीयं कर्म ततः पराणि (कर्माणि)[130] चोपरि व्याख्यातवद् (व्याख्यातानि)[130] ॥३०॥

नोदन-संस्कार-संयुक्त-(संयोग)[147]जनितपृथिव्यप्तेजस्सु कर्म्माणि संयोगगुरुत्वद्रवत्वप्रयत्नवेगासमवायिकारणानि ॥३१॥

एतान्युत्क्षेपणादिकर्मणामन्यतरं स्युर्यथास्थिति[148]। यद्यप्सु (तानि सन्ति)[149] गुरुत्वं परित्यक्तम्,[150] यदि वायौ (तानि सन्ति)[149] द्रवत्वं परित्यक्तम्,[150] यदि मनसि (तानि सन्ति)[149] नोदनसंस्कारौ परित्यक्तौ[150] ॥३२॥

———o———

चतुर्थमाह्निकम्

सत्त्वम्[151]

पूर्वोक्तं सत्त्वं कार्यमकार्यं वा ? ॥

143—A. t.—भूतचतुष्टय.
144—This may be dropped.
145—which represent.
146—Actions in the (present) world.
147—E.T. adds this.
148—A. t.— यथाप्रकृतम्.
149—This may be omitted.
150—Omitted.
151—A. t.—सत्ता, Compare, V.S., I. 1.5—
सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु.

सत्त्वमकार्यमेव ॥१॥

यदेतन्नित्यं, स्वस्मिन्निर्गुणम्, अक्रियम्, अविभागञ्चेत्युपरिवद् व्याख्यातम् ॥२॥

सत्त्वं द्रव्यगुणकर्मवत्[152], सामान्य-शक्त्यशक्ति-सामान्य-विशेष-विशेषापोदित-(रहित)-एतत्पदार्थ-त्रितयसमवेतं यत्किञ्चित्, एकञ्च, इदमेतेषां सामान्यबुद्धि-हेतु यदेते (तानि) सत्तावन्त: (न्ति), पृथक्तत्वानि[151a] चेति ॥

———०———

पञ्चममाह्निकम्

विशेष:

विशेषो द्रव्येषु वर्तते,[152a] एकद्रव्याश्रय:[153] परव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिरेकनियमनहेतुश्च, आकाश-दिक्कालवृत्ति:,[154] (आकाशदिक्कालानाम्)[155] आकाशादिबुद्धिहेतु: (यत्तदाकाशं, दिक् कालो वा),[156] नित्योऽकार्योऽगुणोऽक्रियो निर्विभागश्च,[157] सत्त्व-शक्त्य-शक्ति-सामान्य-विशेष-विशेषरहित[158]-(द्रव्य)पदार्थे समवेतं यत्किञ्चित्, एकाधिकश्च ॥

षष्ठमाह्निकम्

समवाय:

समवायस्त्वेक एव, नित्योऽकार्यश्च । नायं भागसंयुक्त:[159] अयममूर्त्तंसर्वद्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष शक्त्य-शक्ति-सामान्यविशेषाणां समवेतत्वहेतुश्च । अयं (स्वसत्ता) प्रत्यभिज्ञाननिमित्त: (अस्ति) ॥१॥

सप्तममाह्निकम्

शक्ति:

किं पूर्वोक्ता शक्ति: कार्यमकार्यं वा ?

शक्तिरकार्यमेव ॥१॥

151a—A.t.—पृथक्पदार्था:.
152—E.T. adds, here—तत्र विद्यत इति;—A.t. द्रव्यवृत्ति
153—A.t.—एकद्रव्याश्रयवान्, एकद्रव्याश्रित:
154—A.t.—वर्ती.
155—Added by us.
156—E.T.—adds this.
157—A.t.—अभागश्च.
158—अपोदित has been suggested by E.T.
159—A. T.—अयं निर्विभाग:, नायं भागवान्

यदियं नित्या, निर्गुणा[160], अक्रिया, अभागा, अमूर्ता चेति तथैव व्याख्यातम् ।।२।।

द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मवृत्तितया[161] शक्ति(र्वि)भिन्ना । इयं सामान्यशक्त्यशक्ति-सामान्यविशेषविशेषरहित (अपोदित)[162]द्रव्येषु समवेतं यत्किञ्चित् । इयमेकाधिका, (पदार्थशक्तिमत्त्व(शक्तत्व)बुद्धीनां हेतुश्चास्ति[163] ।। १।।

अष्टममाह्निकम्

अशक्तिः

अशक्तिः शक्तिसादृश्येन व्याख्याता ।।१।।

नवममाह्निकम्

सामान्यविशेषः

सामान्यविशेषो द्रव्यत्वेन द्रव्यपदार्थं व्याप्नोति । अयं द्रव्येषु समवेतं यत्किंचित्; एको मूर्त्तश्चास्ति । अयं निर्विभागो[164]ऽक्रियोऽनित्योऽकार्यश्च । अयं[165] सर्वद्रव्येषु सामान्यविशेषत्वेन[166] समवेतः, किं तु गुणकर्मसु सामान्यविशेषत्वतो भिन्नः ।।१।।

गुणत्वरूपेण, कर्मत्वरूपेण, पृथिवीत्वरूपेण[167] वा सामान्यविशेषो व्याख्यातो यथा द्रव्यत्वसामान्यविशेषविषये ।।२।।

दशममाह्निकम्

असत्त्वम्

१--असत्त्वं नित्यमनित्यं च

कान्येतेषां पञ्चासत्त्वानां नित्यानि, कानि चानि[167]त्यानि ?

प्रागसत्त्वमनित्यं यत इदं द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां कार्यैर्विपरीतम् ।। १।।

160—A.t. अगुणाः

161—A.t.—वृत्तिमुखेन, वृत्तित्वेन

162—See ftn 158 supra.

163—E.T.—adds this

164—A.t. अभागः, भागरहितः.

165—E.T. adds with every adjective अयम् अस्ति, but it is not necessary

166—Commonly.

167—मुखेन might replace रूपेण.

अन्तरासत्त्वान्योन्यासत्त्वात्यन्तासत्त्वानि[169] च सर्वथा नित्यानि, यतो हि तानि न द्रव्यादिभिर्नाश्यन्ते ॥२॥

स्वाभाविकमसत्त्वं[170] नित्यमनित्यं वा ॥३॥

कदा[171] स्वाभाविकासत्त्वं नित्यम् ?

पृथिव्यादिद्रव्याणि (न स्व(की)येभ्यो भिन्नैः) परगुणैः समवायत्वेन (सम्बन्धेन) सम्बद्धानि ॥४॥

सामान्यविशेषः द्रव्यत्वादिवत् शक्य शक्तिविशेषवच्च न स्वाश्रयाद्भिन्नाऽऽश्रयेषु समवीयते (समवेतः) ॥५॥

सत्ता (त्वम्) न सामान्यादिषु समवीयते ॥६॥

कदा[172] स्वाभाविकासत्त्वमनित्यम् ?

अस्ति तावद् दृष्टान्तो यत्र द्रव्यं द्रव्यान्तरैर्न संयुज्यते, किन्त्वनन्तरं तैः संयुक्ष्यत एव (संयोगात्[173] पूर्वं) नान्यमपरस्मिन् विद्यते ॥७॥

अथ वा एकद्रव्यस्यापरद्रव्यसंयोगात्पूर्वं स्वस्मिन्नपरद्रव्यगुणकर्मसमवायाच्च पूर्वं न पराण्याद्ये वर्तन्ते ॥८॥

२—असत्त्वानि—प्रत्यक्षाण्यप्रत्यक्षाणि च

कान्येतेषां पञ्चासत्त्वानां प्रत्यक्षविषयाणि, कानि च न तद्(प्रत्यक्ष)-विषयाणि ?

सर्वाण्येव पञ्चासत्त्वानि न प्रत्यक्षविषयाणि ॥९॥

[174]अपरञ्च यानि परवस्त्वनवधृतान्यपि वर्तन्ते, तान्यपि अनुमानविषयाणि (सन्ति)[168] ॥१०॥

168—Added by us.
169—This is sometime translated—प्रध्वंसासत्त्व—(भाव) also
170—A.t.—संसर्गासत्त्वम्
171—A.t. कुत्र विषये, कस्मिन् दृष्टान्ते ।
172—Cf. frn. 171 supra.
173—Added by E.T.
174—On the other hand.

एकादशतमसाह्निकम्

ज्ञेय:

के चैतेषां दश-पदार्थानां ज्ञेया:, के च न ज्ञेया: ?

सर्वे (तावत् पदार्था:[168]) ज्ञेया:, स्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतवश्च (सन्ति[168]) ।।१।।

इति श्री मतिचन्द्राचार्य्यरचिते वैशेषिकदशपदार्थशास्त्र संस्कृतभाषायां दशपदार्थ-सामान्यधर्माख्य द्वितीयोऽध्याय: समाप्त: ।।[175]

।। समाप्तश्चायं ग्रन्थ: ।। [175]

175—There is no colophon in the English translation of the treatise. We have supplied this.

SENTIMENT IN THE HARAVIJAYA.

By DR. SANTOSH KUMARI SHARMA, M.A. Ph.D.*

MANY are the bright gems, that lie hidden underneath the vast ocean of Sanskrit Literature, awaiting the scrutiny of Indologists. It is needless to say that the *Haravijaya* is one of such precious gems, which has been over-looked so far. *Haravijaya* is an epic poem, consisting of fifty cantos, ascribed to the authorship of Rājānaka Ratnākara, a Kaśmīrien poet of the 9th. century A.D.. It celebrates the victory of Hara (Śiva) over Andhaka, the lord of demons. This paper is an attempt to throw light on the employment of the sentiment in the *Haravijaya* Mahākāvya.

Sentiment has been accepted as the soul of poetry,[1] while the rhetorical embelishments are only the means to enhance, and not to create,[2] its beauty. Therefore, to present the full and natural development of the sentiment, chosen for the poetic composition, becomes a fundamental duty of a poet. No compostion, bereft of the proper and successful development of its sentiment, can be regarded as a fine piece of literary art. According to the opinion of the Sanskrit rhetoricians, there should be only one main sentiment in a poetic work: either it should be the sentiment of love, or of heroism, or of tranquility: the employment of other sentiments must be only to support the main one.[3]

The *Haravijaya* of Rājānaka Ratnākara has the sentiment of heroism as its main sentiment. It is, because

* Head of the Skt: Deptt., M. M Colleye, Modinagar

1 Viśvanātha, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, I. 4. vākyaṁ rasātmakaṁ kāvyam.

2 Daṇḍin-*Kāvyādarśa*, II. 1. kāvyaśobhākarān dharmān alaṅkārān pracakṣate.

3 Viśvanātha. VI. 316. śṛṅgārapraśāntānām eko'ṅgīrasa iṣyate.

the theme of the epic is the description of the accomplishment of Śiva's victory over demons and not of some love or the like. Therefore, it is natural for the poet to accept heroism as the main sentiment for such a theme.

Though the other sentiments are also employed in the *Haravijaya*, yet it is the sentiment of heroism which is found to be predominant. The very title of the poem, i.e. Śiva's victory (Haravijaya), indicates that the theme, which describes the battle and the victory, must be embeded with the sentiment of heroism. The theme of the poem deals with the bravery of those two opponent parties —one of the gods and the other of the demons—which are equally powerful, and both of which leave no stone unturned to supress the other. Heroism pervades throughout the poem, as from the first to the fifth canto of the poem there is the description of Lord Śiva, where we come to know about the dance (Tāṇḍava Nṛtya) and the heroic deeds of Śiva. With the opening of the seventh canto the erotic description of the activities of love transforms and merges into the serious and heroic speeches, because the sorrowful information about Andhaka's (of the Lord of demons) outrageous deeds cause extreme pain to the hearts of Śiva's courtiers. The whole court announces in a vigorous language to defy the demons. From the eighth to the thirteenth canto, there is an exciting description of the speeches of Śiva's courtiers, namely; Kālamusala, Prabhāmaya, Vahnigarbha, Agnidaṁṣṭra and Nandiṣeṇa, who reveal the history of the past heroic deeds and declare to destroy demons completely by their unfailing fierce weapons and invincible physical power.

After a little pause, we have the heroic speeches again. Because there is the message for reconciliation, which is conveyed to Andhaka by Śiva's messenger to Andhaka's court, we find the description of the vigour of the demons. They, too, like Śiva's courtiers, recollect the

deeds, they accomplished in the past. The forceful manner of challenging to destroy /the enemy in the battlefield is very thrilling and exciting, and paints a life-like picture in the minds of those who go through these descriptions. Every word uttered by the fighters speaks of bravery, they possess. As Kanakākṣa, the courtier of Andhaka, declares : 'In the battle-field, either there may be one, who bears wheel as his weapon, i.e. Viṣṇu; or one, for whom pestle serves as a weapon, i.e., Musalāyudha; either there may be one, who has spike as his weapon, i.e. Śiva; or one, who bears the thunderbolt as his missile; i.e., Indra; yet by this arm of mine without any weapon, I will drive them to such a plight that their faces get besmeared with dust :'

'Cakrāyudho'stu samare musalāyudho vā
śūlāyudho bhavatu kuliśāyudho vā,
doṣṇaiva tānahamanena nihatya heti-
śūnyena dhūsaramukhacchavitāṁ nayāmi.[4]

Besides this, the charm and excellence of this sentiment may be observed in those verses which contain an appropriate arrangement of the resonant words. In the description of the fight, such words are used as are capable to reflect the noisy atmosphere, which would have been there. Mostly, the hard—sounding harsh-words, which may resound the twang of weapons, are employed to strengthen the heroic sentiment. The following verse will suffice to indicate the development of the heroic sentiment by means of suitable words :—

'kaṅkālasaṅkulamasaṅkitakākakaṅka-
saṅketadhāmaraṇavartmaśaśāṅkamaule,
ṭāṅkārikārmukaviṭaṅkapaṭāṅkam astu
ṭaṅkāṅkasaṅkaṭaviśaṅkaṭakaṅkaṭaṁ vaḥ.'

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[4] *H. V.* XXXVII. 25.
[5] *H. V.* XIII. 76.

(May that fight of Śiva, which is full of skeletons, which is an inviting place for fearless crows and herons, be for you, one, in which the strings may be fastened to the edges of the howling bows (i.e. fasten the strings to the edges of your howling bows), and in which the strong armours may be put on owing to fear of being injured with arrows).

The sharp missiles, thrown swiftly from both the sides, are described in the form of eagle (Garuḍa):

nirdhautakanakacchāyāḥ sacchadāḥ śīghragāminaḥ,
tārkṣyeṇa sadṛśās tasya sāyakā rejire raṇe.[6]

The brave warriors have no fear of death or of harm. They impatiently wait for an opportunity for testing their powers upon their enemy. In the following stanza, Viṣṇu is described as completely engrossed in the deed of killing demons, and no sooner does He leave His place to throw a slaughtered demon aside than the goddess appears there:

sārābhā vivibhārāsā rājitāgagatājirā,
mātājite tejitābhā vigatena nate gavi.

(When Viṣṇu hurled the enemy down on the ground, there shone that goddess, who was exquisitely beautful, who had various graces and sounds, who walked on the mountain, and who was of a war-like nature).

The goddesses, too, appear in the battle with full heroic feelings. Goddess Vāruṇī fights with opponents with her firebrand which shatters then like the tossed sesamum seeds:

lālitailīlatālātā līlālalitatātatā,
tālottāla tilatulā lolitā lulitālitā.[8]

(Vāruṇī, who had the firebrand, as the gleaming sword, who grew expansive by the beauty gained by the sports,

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[6] *H. V.* XLIII. 346.
[7] *H. V.* XLIII. 102.
[8] *H. V.* XLIII. 136.

who was as high as the *palm tree* by her clapping, and who tossed the battle about like the sesamum seeds).

The battle which is full of the sounds of weapons and of the twanging of the bows, becomes still more resounded by the sounds of several instruments. The echo of instruments sounded in the battle, excites the vigorous warriors to fight more courageously, and checks the progress of the terrified opponents :

vāditā tarasā bhīmā bherīṇāṁ sakalā tatiḥ,
sāditā tatra sāyāmā sārīṇāṁ sabalā gatiḥ.[9]

(The whole row of trumpets, which was terrifying and rapid (in sounds), was beaten. The irresistible progress of the enemies was made, come to a stop).

So, the effect of the heroic sentiment is enhanced by the employment of hard-sounding words, by the sound of armours and trumpets, and by the expressions of various physical gestures of the warriors.

THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE : The sentiment of love has been recognized as the most important of the sentiments to be used in a poetic composition. Indian rhetoricians have named it 'Rasarāja' or the king of sentiments. But, in the *Haravijaya*, it has been subordinated to the sentiment of heroism, which is the main sentiment (*Aṅgī Rasa*) of the epic, its theme being a delineation of the accomplishment of a heroic deed. In this epic, the employment of the erotic sentiment has become to serve as a back-ground for the effective presentation of the main sentiment and for exhibition of the extra-ordinary qualities of the hero, and above all, for the display of poet's profound knowledge in erotics. Sometimes, our poet seems to indulge in the delineation of the erotic scenes with such an interest that he forgets the demand of his theme. The *Haravijaya* will certainly be considered faulty in this respect.

[9] *H. V.* XLIII. 63.

Even then, we have very effective and natural delineation of the erotic scenes, which Ratnākara has portrayed and, which will ever be ranked among the best specimens of their type in Sanskrit Literature. It is in these descriptions that we find the genuine and unsophisticated heart of the poet. All the descriptions of *love* speak of his conception of *love*.

Our poet does not approve of a *love* of fickle nature. To him, *love* is a sacrifice. The *Haravijaya* depicts that sort of love which is eternal, and in which two devoted souls are interwoven with each other from the mental as well as from the physical point of view. It is that sort of meeting in which separation is beyond the imagination, and, if, unfortunately, separation happens to come, it is merely a physical separation and has nothing to mar the true love of a lover, for, the departed one has the picture of the consort drawn on the heart to view whenever desired.[10] The pains of separation, which Pārvatī had to bear in the moments of Śiva's meditation, result in her eternal union with Śiva, because, He, by assuming the form of Ardhanārīśvara relieved her from the fear of separation for ever.[11]

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[10] *H. V.* XIX. 29—
preyāṁsam arkam iva dṛṣṭipathavyatītām,
antarvikalparacitākṛtim īhamānāḥ /
premṇā vilokayitum askhalitena cakrur-
ambhojanetravinimīlanam ambujinyaḥ||

[11] *Ibid.* XXI, 31—
samāptasandhyāvidhir īśvaro'pi tāṁ
vilokya kopāt parivṛtya tasthuṣīm /
rasārdragarbhair bahusāntvanakramaiḥ
prasādayāmāsa cireṇa sasmitaḥ //

Iidb. 34—
tayā viyuktāṁ kila kokakāminīṁ vilokayan-
tayā bhuvanābjinīgatām /
ayācayat aśaṅkitaviprayogayā śarīrabhāga-
sthitim induśekharaḥ //

Ibid. 37—
iti priyasyārdhaśarīrasaṁsthitau kṣaṇam
vikalpākulamānasā satī /
babhūva tatsaṁśrayakātarā||

Moreover, the *Haravijaya* has given a psychological description of the nature of one who falls a victim to love. First of all, the feeling of love for some one sprouts only if one finds a person of the similar nature—*'sadānukūle hi janonurajyate*[12]'—and the lover adopts the liking of his beloved'—*premāhoracayrtum īhate' nukūlam.*[13] The sincere love performs all sorts of activities, whether becoming or unbecoming, easy or hard—'*premāho vividhavidhiprapañcadakṣam.*[14] True love is that where the lover does leave no stone unturned to do the desired of the dear one : *prakarṣataḥ premaguṇasya nāśti tan na vallabhāya kriyate yadīpsitam.*'[15] True love always tries to do good for its object and dare not commit any harmful thing—'*premāho kvacid api nekṣate vyapāyaṁ.*'[16]

Here Love can be divided into three categories :

1. Love for (or devotion to) Gods.
2. Love in meeting.
3. Love in separation.

Love for Gods : The sentiment of love contains sometimes the lasting feeling of love for gods. For example, in the very first verse of the first canto, god Śiva is worshipped :—

kaṇṭhaśriyam kubalayastabakābhirāma
dāmānukārivikaṭacchavikālakūṭām/

bibhrat sukhāni diśatād upahārapīta-
dhūpottadhūmamalinām iva Dhūrjaṭir vaḥ.[17]

(May Dhūrjaṭi, bearing the lusture of his throat with the excessively charming poison, as if a beautiful wreath

[12] *Haravijaya*. XXI. 17.
[13] *Haravijaya*. XVII. 67.
[14] *Haravijaya*. XVII. 14.
[15] *Haravijaya*. XXI. 35.
[16] *Haravijaya*. XVII. 12.
[17] *Haravijaya*. I. 1.

made of the blue lotuses, darkened, as if it were, with the smoke or the incense inhaled at the time of worship, confer good fortunes on you).

God Viṣṇu is also invoked like other gods of the triad :—

jṛmbhāvikāśitamukhaṁ nakhadarpaṇāntar—
āviṣkṛtapratimukhaṁ gururoṣagarbham/
rūpam punātu janitāricamūvimarṣam
uddṛttadaityavadhanirvahaṇaṁ Harer vaḥ.[18]

(May you be purified by that form of Viṣṇu which had the mouth, wide-opened in yawning, which had another mouth in the form of reflection, fallen in the mirror-like nails, which had great rage, which accomplished the slaughter of the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu, who had violated the law of good conduct).

In another verse, the feeling of devotion to god Brahmā is expressed :

paryantavartiparipāṇḍurapatrapaṅkti-
padmāsanāsanakuśeśayakoṣacakram/
yuṣmān punātu dadhad uddhatadugdhasindhu-
vīcicchaṭāvalayitāmaraśailalīlām.[19]

(May you be purified by the pericarp of the lotus, with the row of white leaves around, which is the seat of Brahmā, and which bears the beauty of the waves of the Ocean of milk (in the form of its leaves) and of the mountain of gods, the Sumeru (in the form of the pericarp).

Besides this, the feeling of love for god Śiva is found in every part of the poem. The author of the poem is a devotee of Śiva—'*Candrārdhacūlacaritāśrayacāru*'[20]— therefore, it is natural to handle this sentiment elaborate-

[18] *Haravijaya*. I. 2.
[19] *Haravijaya*. I. 3.
[20] *Haravijaya*. Praśasti.

ly. In the illustrations given above, the permanent feeling is love for (devotion to) god Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Brahmā. The great deeds, accomplished by gods, such as the killing of Hiraṇyakaśipu, excite and strengthen the permanent feeling for divinities.

Again, in the sixth canto, where the greatness of Śiva is described, and in the forty-seventh canto, where gods pray goddess Caṇḍī, the emotion of devotion is employed. The six seasons address Śiva with the words : '*kathayanti nātha daśahetusaṁśrayavyavadhūtaviplava,*[21] and gods say in adoration of Caṇḍī'—*Tara tvam amba kathitābjakula-prasūti*[22]; the words '*Nātha*' *and* '*Amba*' indicate the deep and sincere devotion to these divinities.

Love in Meeting : In the *Haravijaya*, the scenes of the love in meeting are painted from the very first canto. In the first canto, we meet with the beautiful description of a lover, trying to have a glance at the moon-like face of his beloved,[23] and the description of the ladies, who are pierced by the arrows of the flower-bowed Cupid.[24] Cupid, though burnt by Śiva, secretly puts his hand in the form of moon beam in the windows of the magnificent buildings of Jyotsnāvatī and excites the feeling of love in the hearts of the ladies[25] who hurry towards the residences of their dear ones.[26] Again, in the second canto, Śiva is de-

[21] *Haravijaya*. VI. 20.

[22] *Haravijaya*. XLVII. 54.

[23] See *Haravijaya*, I. 6.

[24] See *Haravijaya*, I. 7, 20.

[25] *Haravijaya*. I. 27.—
yasyāṁ vrajaty adhiniśīthini kānataveśma-
līlāgṛhītavikacotpalapāṇipadmaḥ /
vaibhāvareṇa rabhasāt timireṇa datta-
hastā'valambana ivā'stu purandhrilokaḥ //

[26] *Ibid*. II. 2.
tasmin kṛtāsanaparigarbham adrirājakanyā-
nukūlarasadigdhakathāvidagdham /
Ibid. II. 64.
iti samayam anaiṣīt tatra tās tāḥ sā ceṣṭā
vidadhada acalakanyāviprayogānabhijñaḥ //

picted as overpowered by the love for Pārvatī and passes his time joyfully in her association by performing frantic dance.[27] In the same strain, the description of love continues upto the fifth canto of the Kāvya. In the description of the third and the fifth cantos, we note that the objects of nature deeply moved by the feeling of affection, and that they are in love with each other. In the nineteenth canto, in a description, we find a water-lily passing the whole day in the past recollections and getting blossomed in happiness to get an opportunity to meet her dear moon, engrossed in the attempts to soothe and please the water-lily, though he has to stoop to unfair means like the trampling of the day lotus, the beloved of the sun, by the ruthless feet in the form of beams.[28] The dawning day is beautifully pictured in the twenty-eighth canto, where we have a description of the frantic attempts of the young couple trying to make the best and maximum use of the few moments left before them.[29]

The other portions of the theme are also devoted to the amorous sports of young people. In this respect the twenty-sixth and the twenty-seventh cantos are the unique specimens in the rich employment of the erotic sentiment. For example, there is the description of a lady, who be-

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[27] *Ibid*. See. XIX. 48.

In Sanskrit the moon is regarded as masculine, whereas in English it is treated as feminine, and hence, a difficulty arises here. But, while writing something related to Sanskrit Literature through English medium, it would not be unfair to treat the moon as masculine like the sun, where Sanskrit takes it as a lover or as a God, and as a neuter, where it is considered simply a planet, and elsewhere as feminine following the grammar of the English language.

[28] *Haravijaya*. XX. 73.

saṅkocadhūsaram akāri sarojakhaṇḍam
agre yad asya śaśinā paripīḍya pādaiḥ /
tena sphurad vikaṭakesaradantapaṅkti
toṣād ivā'tiviśadaṁ kumudaṁ jahāse ||

[29] See also. *Haravijaya*. XX. 65-66, 74 & 75.

comes angry with her consort, who resorts to all manners to please her.[30] The scenes of wine-drinking, painted in these cantos, are full of the erotic activities of an intoxicated couple.[31] The whole of the twenty-seventh canto describes the amorous sports of young people, in which all ensuants of the sentiment of love, like kissing,[32] biting,[33] touching,[34] staring,[35] and embracing,[36] are mentioned.

For example, we may observe the following illustration :—

nepathye masṛṇamanorame kṛtāstha
śṛṅgārāñcitarasaśālitāṁ vahantī/
kāntasya pramadam udāranṛttalīlā-
rambhorur atanuta kaiśikīva vṛttiḥ[37]||

(The beautiful lady, present in the secret place, was even and charming, passionate owing to love, performing the lovely dances and dalliances, enhanced the pleasure of her consort, like the gay style (*Kaiśikī vṛtti*) prepared in postscenium (nepathya), even and attractive, having the sentiment of love, containing fascinating dances and dalliances).

In this verse, the lady is the substratum (ālambana-vibhāva) and her beauty and the loneliness of the place serve as the excitants (uddīpana-vibhāva). By dance, she expresses her feeling of happiness; this may be called the accessory ensuant (anubhāva). The permanent feeling (sthāyī-bhāva) of love is lying in the heart of the male consort (kānta), whom the lady pleases by her activities like

[30] *Haravijaya*. XXVIII. 3, 4, 5, 6.
[31] *Ibid*. XXVIII. 4 & XXVI. canto.
[32] *Ibid*. XXVII. 21.
[33] *Ibid*. XXVII. 22.
[34] *Ibid*. XXVII. 11.
[35] *Ibid*. XXVII. 21.

[37] *Haravijaya*, XVII. 79.

dance etc. All these result in the intensification of the permanent feeling of love of the male consort (kānta).

Love in Separation : The *Haravijaya* contains an elaborate description on that pathetic aspect of life which is pregnant with erotic sentiment. The whole of the twenty-fourth canto is devoted to it, though such depictions are scattered almost in every canto. Human heart is always affected more deeply by the pangs of the sufferings of life, either created by the cruelty of nature or by the separation of one's alter ego, than by those of its rejoicings. For this reason, the sensitive and emotional author of this poem deals with the touching sides of life and the separation of dear ones more successfully than those of the other scenes of life.

He has given his own view regarding the importance of love in meeting and love in separation. To him, sometimes, the separation seems more desirable than meeting, especiallly, that sort of meeting of two devoted souls, which is full of the fear of separation, is not desirable, because the mind being overpowered by the imagination of separation cannot engross itself completely in the rejoicing of meeting. On the other hand, the separation, which is pricked with pains, is far better than the momentary meeting, because every moment of the period of separation passes in the thrilling imaginations and joyful presuppositions of the occasion of reunion, which is drawn nearer and nearer as the time passes.

Thus speaks the verse :

prātaḥ samāgamasukhānubhavaṁ vidhāya
cetasy aniyata niṣā rabhasena kokaiḥ/
kṛcchrād viyogacakitais tu dinaṁ vyalaṅghi
duḥkhe suhaṁ bhavati sādhu sukhe na duḥkham[38]

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[38] *Haravijaya*. XIX. 52.

(Feeling in their hearts the rejoicings of union, obtainable in the morning, the ruddy geese (koka) spent the night easily, but the day was spent by them with much difficulty, being afraid of the (coming) separation. The thought of happiness is good in adversity, but not that of distress in happiness).

The descriptions of love in separation have a deep pathos lurking behind them as the twenty-fourth canto shows this fact. Its twenty-third canto contains the description of ladies, who most enthusiastically adorn themselves with the desire of meeting their consorts, but fate deceives them, because all their restless waiting becomes useless. Such tragic failure of high expectations strengthen the pathetic sentiment more charmingly.

The tender heart of the disappointed delicate lady gets easily wounded by the sharp arrow of Cupid'........ smṛtibhuvā hṛdi śalya ivārpite'[39]......'priyaviprayuktapurandhrimanobhid.'[40] but the tragedy is that the perpetual attacks of Cupid neither break the tender heart of the poor lady, nor give it strength enough to bear the brunt of the gushes of pain :—

> na niṣṭhuratvaṁ hṛdayaṁ viyoge
> na saukumāryañca bibharti tasyāḥ/
> vibhidyamānaṁ smaramārgaṇair yan-
> na dārḍhyam āpnoti na śīryate vā[41]//

(In separation, her heart becomes neither hard nor tender (delicate), it being pierced with the arrows of Cupid neither attains stability nor is shattered).

The lady, whose ambition for meeting failed hopelessly—'mūḍhamanorathā,'[42] and who is very much weakened by the pangs of separation—'abalatvam upeyuṣī tathā

[39] *H. V.* III. 19.
[40] *H. V.* III. 71.
[41] *H. V.* XXV. 18.
[42] *H. V.* XXIV. 39.

virahe,'[43] spends every moment in bewailing. At one place, the maid-servant of a departed lady describes before the male consort the miserable condition of his beloved, in which she tells that the departed beloved has been refused to such a miserable condition that all sorts of cool treatment fail to heal her. Though she is lying in the shelter of plantain trees, yet she is burning with the fire of passion,[44] and all other means have failed to recover her :—

vyartho hāro mṛṇālaiś citamapi
śayanandhik kim ambhoruhair vā
karpūra dūra eva kṣipata himaśilā-
śarkarābhiḥ kim ābhiḥ ||
mithyā mai vā'tikhedam bhajata
gurutaraḥ ko'pi dāhajvaro'syā !
ity anyonyaṁ tad alyaḥ subhaga
parigadanty aśrupūraplutākṣyaḥ[45]||

(With their eyes laden with tears, her friends say talking to each other, "O beautiful one! be not too much grieved uselessly, this (lady) is suffering from the severe burning fever (of love) and, therefore, there is no use of the necklace; lie on the bed made of lotus-stems; or what can be done with the lotuses ? Throw the camphor away. These pieces of snow-rocks are of no use).

During the painful period of separation the delicate body of the slender lady becomes so weak and thin that she looked like a fibre of the lotus-stem :—

sraṣṭā bhujābjaśayanānmaṇikuṭṭimastha-
raktāravindamukhalagnanakhāṁśulekhā
udgrīvahaṁsaśiśucañcuvikṛṣyamāṇa-
sūtrā mṛṇālakalike'va tanor abhāsīt[44] ||

[43] *Haravijaya*. XXIV. 26.
[44] *Haravijaya*, XXV. 41-2.
[45] *H. V.* XXV. 40.
[46] *H. V.* XXIV. 47.

(There shone her body, slipped from the bed of lotus-like arm and embellished with the radiance of her nails-touching her face, which resembled the red lotus, which (face) rested on the floor studded with jewels, looked like the stem with a bud, its (stem) fibres being taken out with the beak by little one of a swan with its neck upraised).

Besides this, the objects of nature, which are fully bloomed, increase the sadness of the lady, because the sight of happy and content objects cause grievance for the lonliness of her life, and she feels as if the expression of others' happiness is a hammer, which strikes her heart :—

'smṛtibhuvo virahe navamālatī-
mukulamudgara evavadhūr vyadhat.'[47]

(In separation, the new Jasmine bud in the form of a hammer, upon which (bud) the bees, desirous of getting intoxicating honey, were humming, made the woman unconscious, expecting another blow from Cupid).

The delineation of such sufferings, which the departed consort has to undergo, reaches its extreme in the description of one whose life is saved by tears clogging her throat so that the vital airs may find no way through it to come out :—

mā smo'dgamanniḥśvasitena sārdhaṁ
viyogaduḥkhād asavo'bhitaptāḥ/
itīva sañcintyatāsu bāspastambhena
smarabhya niruddhakaṇṭhām[48] ||

(Some one saw the beloved, whose throat was chocked at once by the tears in the form of obstruction, thinking, as it were, not to let her breaths (vital airs), which were afflicted with the grief caused by separation, come out with exhalation).

[47] *H. V.* III. 59.

[48] *H. V.* XXV. 57.

In the verses cited above, the sentiment of Love in separation (vipralambha-śṛṅgāra) is developed with the aid of its important parts. Here the feeling of love (Rati), which the lady (who is Ālambana-vibhāva) has for her consort, is the permanent feeling (sthāyī-bhāva). This feeling is excited by the objects of nature, which serve as excitants (uddīpana-vibhāvas). Here, the Jasmine flower rouses the feeling of love. The terrible reduction in health, shedding of tears and getting fainted, are the ensuants (anubhāvas) of the feeling of love. The feeling of sadness, which is caused by prosperity of others, serves the purpose of the transitory feelings (sañcārī-bhāva). Such feelings tend charm to the sentiment of love. Thus, the sentiment of love is developed quite scientifically with the strict application of the rules, prescribed by the rhetoricians.

The Sentiment of Pathos: In the *Haravijaya*, the sentiment of pathos is generally applied to enhance the effect of the sentiment of love in separation. As an independent sentiment we have a meagre use of it. But, we cannot ignore the naturalness and tenderness of feeling which the scenes contain. For instance, let us feel the pathos of the ocean of milk, which has been robbed of its riches :—

Lakṣmīsurāvimalakaustubhapārijāta-
candrāmṛtāpaharaṇotthitayā śuceva/
hemādrikūṭavikaṭārciṣi nirvyapekṣam
ātmānam aurvadahane vinipātayantam[49] ||

(He beheld the ocean of milk throwing itself indifferently in the Submarine fire, which had Hemādrikūṭa mountain as its terrible flames, because of its sorrow caused after being robbed of Lakṣmī, wine, undefiled Kaustubha gem, Pārijāta (the celestial tree), moon, and nectar).

[49] *H. V.* XXX. 44.

Similarly, the moon, whose bright streak is supposed to be beyond comparision, feels herself defeated by the exceeding beauty of Pārvatī. The extreme sadness, caused by the idea of defeat, creating in her a desire for self-destruction, and she is protected by Śiva, while she is to jump down in the fire of His third eye :—

Śailātmajāvadanacandramasaḥ kathaṁ 'nu
lekhā'pi me na sadṛśī śaśinā saśokam/
ūrdhvekṣaṇotthaśikhinī'va nipitsunettham
adhyāsitonnatalalāṭatatopakaṇṭham[50]||

(They saw lord Śiva, on whose broad forehead there rested the moon as if intending, in dejection, to jump down in the fire coming out of the upper eye (the third eye); for, even a streak (which is always unstained) of her could not stand in comparison with the face-moon of Pārvatī, the daughter of Himālaya).

Yasyādrirājatanayāvadanāravinda-
lāvaṇyakāntivijitasya salīlam indoḥ/
bandīkṛto'rbhaka iva ślathajūṭakoṭi-
bandhacyutaściram abhāri kareṇa khaṇḍaḥ[51] ||

(The phase of crescent moon, defeated by the lusture of the beauty of the lotus-like face of the daughter of Himālaya-Pārvatī, was held up as a child playfully with His hand, while she was to fall from the lock of (His) hair).

Besides this, here is one more example of the feeling of pathos : before marching for the flight, a soldier comes to his consort to bid her good-bye, but she, engrossed in the attempts to protect her dear one from the appearance of her inauspicious tears, finds her eyes insensitive :—

saṁstambhitā api tu maṅgalabhaṅgabhīror-
viṣādavaśaśūnyadhiyas tadā'kṣaṇaḥ/

[50] *H. V.* II. 6.
[51] *H. V.* I. 42.

nirdhautakajjalavidhūsaritā nirīyur-
indīvarān madhukarā iva bāspaleṣāḥ[52] ||

(Then from her eyes, afraid of the violation of auspiciousness, timid and unconscious owing to sorrow, came out the tears checked and mixed with the collyrium washed, as bees restrained from coming out of the blue-lotuses).

In the verses, quoted above, the sentiment of pathos is roused by the permanent feeling of sadness. The transitory feelings (sañcārī-bhāvas), such as, the attempts for death, intensify the sentiment.

The Sentiment of Terror (*Bhayānaka Rasa*) : In the description of the battle, we have this sentiment. The fierce appearances of the warriors, tend to rouse the feeling of terror in the hearts of opponents. Goddess Caṇḍī, bearing the vessel of skull full of blood and having fierce teeth, creates the feeling of fear among demons :—

nirmāṁsyatādhavalarāhuśiraḥ kapāla-
kāṁsyāgrapītabhuvanakṣatajāsavaśrīḥ/
viśrāṇayasy-atanutatpiśitāvadaṁśa
leśānuviddhadaśanāṁba na kasya bhītim[53] ||

(O, Mother, who is not terrified by you, who are glamorous because of drinking the wine, produced by the destruction of the world, with the bronze vessel of the skull of Rāhu's head, which is white, being without flesh, and whose teeth are expansive and decorated with the pungent food stuck to them?)

Besides this, the feeling of terror is roused sometimes, by the recollection of the past terrible occurrences. The *Haravijaya* contains a beautiful description of those gods who, being frightened by the remembrance of the terrific deed of the burning of Cupid, had to come daily to Śiva's

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[52] *H. V.* XL. 58.
[53] *H. V.* XIVII. 14.

court to pay their humble homage in order to please Him.[54] Not only gods but also the other citizens of Jyotsnāvatī are extremely frightened by the fire of Śiva's anger, because they remind that once Cupid was burnt by Him, and, now, He can burn them, too :—

bhītaiḥ puraḥ kusumamārgaṇadehadāha-
samrambhaghoravikṛtir dadṛśe surair yaḥ/
kanṭhodarāspadam anargalahuṁkṛtāgni-
dhūmacchalena vikirann iva kālakūṭam[55] ||

(The horrified gods witnessed a great chaos in the city caused owing to the burning of the body of Cupid, as if (they witnessed) the poison (kālakūṭa), which had its seat in the interior of the throat (of Śiva), spreading under the pretext of the smoke of the fire caused by the roars unchecked).

Here is one more example of the sentiment of terror, in which the victorious goddess Brāhmī is described as turning (making) the whole battle-field into a cause of terror for the opponent forces and disappointment among the brave soldiers :—

adabhrabhītide'nindye dakṣamānacchavisādini/
bhramāgatagamāsāde bhīmatattvam āgacchati[56] ||

(Brāhmī attained glory) in the battle, which was such terrifying, which was unapproachable, in which the warriors were such as could destroy the pride even of the experts, in which even the swift gaited ones were afflicted from everyside, and which was growing terrible).

The Sentiment of Fury (*Raudra Rasa*) : This poem contains an exuberant application of the sentiment of Fury. The very first canto of the poem describes god Viṣṇu as the destroyer of evil-doers and refers to His

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[54] See *Haravijaya*. I. 63.
[55] *H. V.* I. 53.
[56] *H. V.* XLIII. 113.

fierce form of Nṛsiṁha, in which He accomplished the violent slaughter of Hiraṇyakaśipu. The permanent feeling of anger is strengthened by the furious physical gestures, and by the wide opened mouth and big nails :—

Jṛmbhāvikāsitamukhaṁ nakhadarpaṇāntar-
āviṣkṛtapratimukhaṁ gururoṣagarbham/
rūpaṁ punātu janitāricamūvimarśam
uddhṛttadaityavadhanirvahaṇaṁ Harer vaḥ[57]||

(May you be protected by that form of Viṣṇu which had the mouth wide-opened in yawning, which had another mouth in the form of reflection fallen in the mirror-like nails, which had very much anger, which created various ideas in the minds of the opponent forces, and which accomplished the slaughter of the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu, who had violated the law of good conduct).

The sentiment of Fury is fledged fully in the description of the battle. The warriors in their terrible anger jump high and determine violently to destroy even those who are immortal :—

sabrahmadhūrjaṭiharīṁs tridaśāṁstṛṇāya
vispaṣṭamatsaradhiye yudhi manyamānāḥ/
daityādhipas cakamire kamalāsanāṇḍam
utplutya pātayitum utkaṭaroṣarukṣāḥ[58] ||

(In the battle the lords of demons, who were of a distinctly jealous mind, who were haughty owing to great rage, who thought Viṣṇu along with Brahmā and Śiva, and other gods as a straw, wished, jumping up, to destroy the world).

The Sentiment of Disgust (*Bībhatsa Rasa*) :—In the description of battle the sentiment of disgust is used at many places. There are such numerous scenes as are

[57] *H. V.* I. 2.
[58] *H. V.* XXXIV. 58.

extremely loathsome. Goddesses are described as performing disgusting deeds. They bear the skeletons of the slain soldiers on their shoulders. Their bodies are decorated with the garlands of bones. They celebrate their dance ceremony in the river of blood of the battle-field. The warm blood, flowing from the skulls of the wounded soldiers, is their most favourite drink which they drink with the vessels of the bleeding skulls. Here, we have a description of a goddess :—

helāviniḥśvasitapītakaṭhorakaṇṭha-
nāḍīnirargalagalat kṣayasāgarāṁbhoḥ/
rūpaṁ bibharṣi valayīkṛtaṁ saptasaṅkhya
dviposṇaraśmikiraṇāvadhiśailacakram[59]||

(Having drunk the water of ocean of destruction, i.e., blood, flowing unceasingly out of the veins of the hard throats (of the persons killed) by your inhalation sportively, you appear as the mountains, surrounded by the rays of the sun, and worn by the continents seven in number as bracelets).

Besides this, the scene of goddess of battle is terribly disgusting, in which she is described as scratching flesh from the skull :—

etena kiṅ nu kavalīkṛtasūryacandra-
bimbena Rāhuśirasā sphuratān'tarikṣe/
Cāmuṇḍayā kim iti muṇḍam akhaṇḍam etad
utkṛtya māṁsam adhunā dhriyate na pāṇau[60]||

(What has to be done with Rāhu's head, which has taken the disks of the sun and the moon as morsels, and which is shining in the atmosphere ? Does not Cāmuṇḍā hold this skull now in her hand, scratching all the flesh (from it ?)

Moreover, the feeling of disgust develops fully in the description of the cemeteries, where goddess Caṇḍī wan-

[59] *H. V.* XLVII. 16.
[60] *H. V.* XI. 48.

ders about with her bell, resounded by the hammer of skeliton :—

tārakkvaṇaḍḍamarukā karasīṣu Caṇḍī
saṁhārakālam uditā vicarasy amandam/
skandhādhiropitaviṭaṅkaviraňcikāya-
kaṅkālabhāganinadatsamavartighaṇṭā[61] ||

The Sentiment of Mirth : (*Hāsya Rasa*):—In the heroic descriptions of the *Haravijaya*, the sentiment of mirth does not get an opportunity to develop properly. On rare occasions, we meet with instances of laughter, which is very mild. The verse given below may be taken as an instance for its illustration :

ālokitas tuhinaśailabhuvā sahāsam
ākṛṣya śekharaśaśāṅkakalāṁ smarāreḥ/
nṛtyan vidūṣakabhuvaṁ bhujagāriketur-
agre cakāra kuṭilonnatadaṇḍakāṣṭham[62] ||

(Kārtikeya, who was humorously looked upon by Pārvatī made the crescent of Śiva's head, drawing it towards himself, a crooked and uplifted wooden staff, while he was playing the role of a jester).

The Sentiment of Tranquility (*Śānta Rasa*): The feeling of contentment and tranquility is found in the philosophical verses of the sixth canto of the *Haravijaya*. The following verses contain this sentiment :

amanaskayogagatisaṁśitavratair yad-
avāpyate kila nirañjanam padam/
nirupaplavāñca dadhad ātmani sthitim
bhava nāntarīyakam anugrahasya tat ||
sphuṭayogadharmajanitād anugrahāt-
kuśalo nije paragate tathātmani/
aṇucetaso vyatikarāt tavecchayā-
viṣayāntareṣu ca tanoti saṁvidam ||

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[61] *H. V.* XLVII. 24.
[62] *H. V.* II. 58.

abhimānakāryam iti yan na kathayate-
na bibharti śabdaguṇatāṁ yad avyajam/
na ca yatra visphurati tārakāgaṇo-
gatir asti yatra na nabhasvataḥ kvacit ||
yad anāvṛtatridaśakārmukāṅkitaṁ
vicaranti yatra na payodapaṅktayaḥ/
avalokya tatra nabhasi vyavasthitam-
kṛtino, bhavantam apavargam adhyaguḥ||[63]

(O Śiva, that highest abode, which the yogins, engaged in the yogic practices, in which there should be no wavering of the mind, attain by their unfluctuating stage in the soul, can never be achieved without your favour. By the distinct merit, caused by Your favour, the Yogin, well acquianted with the soul of his own and of others, can infuse consciousness even in other unconscious objects by introducing the subtle mind. The pious ones obtained emancipation apprehending You, the undeclinable (immortal) one, in the sky of their hearts, which is not the product of Ego, which does not have the sound as its quality, where there shine no stars, where there is no access of the sun, where the rain-bow does not appear, and where clouds do not float).

In the verses mentioned above, there is the description of the Absolute Reality and the means of obtaining the highest goal, i.e., the realization of the Supreme Being. Here, the craving for realising the Ultimate Reality, or the feeling of self-contentment,[64] is the permanent feeling, which is not mentioned through words, but is suggested. The practice of Yoga, lack of egoism, strong belief in the grace of God, and the craving for complete freedom, are the accessory and transitory feelings; all these support the sentiment of tranquility.

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[63] *H. V.*, VI. 143-46

[64] *Kāvya-Prakāśa*, IV. 47:
nirvedasthāvibhāvo'sti śānto'pi navamo rasaḥ.

In this poem, the sentiment of heroism is predominant. The permanent feeling of heroism, i.e., vigour, goes against the nature of the feeling of tranquility. Besides this, the sentiment of heroism is related to the function of violence and destruction, while tranquility indicates the sense of pacification and non-violence. Therefore, in the heroic atmosphere of the poem the sentiment of tranquility finds no scope for its free development.

GUJARRĀ ROCK EDICT OF THE GREAT EMPEROR AŚOKA

By SADHU RAM, M.A.*

INTRODUCTION

THIS edict was discovered in 1953 by Śrī Lāl Chand, a forest contractor of Jhānsī, in a thick jungle about half a mile to the south of the village Gujarrā in the Datiā district of Uttara Pradeśa. It was inspected by Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra, Joint Director General of Archaeology in India, and his report on it was published in 1964.[1] According to him, the edict is inscribed on an oval-shaped rock lying at the foot of a hillock, locally known as *Siddhān-kī-toriyā*, 'the hillock of the Perfected Ones,' which is resorted to by the neighbouring villagers as a holy place. On the top of the hill, there is a crude *Śiva-liṅga* which is worshipped by the people, and a festival is held there annually.

The record is another version of the Minor Rock Edict of Aśoka at Rūpnagar, and its importance lies in the fact that it is a second edict that mentions Aśoka by his personal name. In addition to that, it compounds the word *rājasa* with the name. The other one which mentions only his name without the word *rāja* is at Māskī in Hyderabad Deccan. The record was again edited by Dr. D. C. Sircar with copious critical notes.[2]

TEXT

१. देव[ानं]पिय[स] पियदसिनो असोक-राजस [।*] अ[ढ]तियानि स[ं] वछरानि

Skt. देवानां प्रियस्य प्रियदर्शिनः अशोक-राजस्य अर्ध-तृतीयान् संवत्सरान्

उपासके सि[म] [।*] साधिके स[ं]वछ[रे] य च मे संघे य[ा] ते ति[अहं] बा

Skt.-उपासको ऽस्मि । साधिकं संवत्सरं यत् च मया संघः यातः इति अहं बा-

* U.G.C. Scholar, New Delhi.

1 *PIHC*, 1954, pp. 65-71.

2 *Ep. Ind.*, XXXI, pp. 205 ff.

२. ढ[ं] च परकंतें ती [आ]हा [।*] एतेना अंतरेना जंबुदीपसि देवान [ं]
पीयस Skt. ढं च पराक्रान्तः इति आह। एतेन अन्तरेण जम्बुद्वीपे
देवानां- प्रियस्य

[अ] मिसं-देवा संतो मुनिस मिसंदेवा कटा परकमस इयं फले [।] नो च इयं
महतेना Skt. अमिश्र-देवाः सन्तः मनुष्याः मिश्र-देवाःकृताः, पराक्रमस्य
इदं फलम्। न च इदं महता ति व

Skt. इति एव

३. छकिये पापोतवे [।*] खुदाकेन पी परकममीनेना धंमं चरमीनेना पानेसू
संयतेना Skt. शक्यं प्राप्तुम्। क्षुद्रकेणापि पराक्रममाणेन धर्मं चरता
प्रोणेषु संयतेन

विपुले पी स्वगे छकिये आराधयितवे [।*] स [*] एताये

Skt. विपुलः अपि स्वर्गः शक्यः आराधयितुम्। तद् एतस्मै

४. अठा [ये] इयं सावणे [।*] खुदा के चा उडारे चा धंमं चरंतू [यो]गंयुंजंतू[।*]
अंता Skt. अर्थाय इदं श्रावणम्। क्षुद्रकाः च उदाराः च धर्मः चरन्तु योगं
युञ्जन्तु। अन्ताः

पि चा जानंतू किंति च चिलथि [ति] के धंम-च [रने?] [।*]

Skt. अपि च जानन्तु, किमिति च? चिर-स्थितिकं धर्मचिरणम् [?]।

५. [इयं अठे वढिसि[3]] ति[च] एनं[वा] ध[ं]मं चर[ं] अति[यो] [।] इयं
[च] Skt. अयम् अर्थः वर्धिष्यते च इमं वा धर्मं चरन् अतीव। इदं च
सावन [ं] विवुथे [ं] [२००] ५० ६ [।*]

Skt. श्रावणम् व्युषितेन २०० ५० ६।

TRANSLATION

1. (This proclamation is) of king Aśoka, the Beloved of Gods and Pleasing of Aspect. I have been a lay follower (of the Lord Buddha) for two years and a half. Saith he, "It is more than a year that the Saṁgha (fraternity of the Buddhist monks) has been resorted to by me. And I have

2. strenuously exerted myself (for the propogation of *Dharma*)." During this period, the subjects of the Beloved of Gods in the Jambu-dvīpa, who had been

[3] As restored by D. C. Sircar.

dissociated from the gods, were made (by him) to associate with them. This is the reward of strenuous effort. Not that by big persons only

3. Can it be obtained. Even a humble person—provided he makes strenuous efforts, practises *Dharma*, and exersices restraint (i.e., abstention from violence) towards living beings—can attain even to the great heaven Hence for this very

4. purpose (is) this proclomation. Let both the low and the high practise *Dharma* and contribute mite (to its propagation). Let the people living on the frontiers (i.e., in the neighbouring kingdoms) also know; what? the practice (?) of *Dharma* endures for long. If one (continues) practising this *Dharma*,

5. this object (of the propagation of *Dharma*) would greatly be advanced. And this proclamation (is issued by me) while on tour (for) 256 (days).

NOTES

१. अढतियानि संवछरानि उपासके स्मि (line 1)—Other versions have

(a) सातिरेकानि अढतियानि व य सुमि पाकास सके (Rūpnāth)

(b) .....यानि सवछरानि उपासके सुमि (Sahasrām)

(c) साति.....वसानि य हकं उपासके (Bāirāṭ)

(d) ....नि वसानि त्रुवशके (or बुंपाशके) (Māskī)

(e) अधिकानि अढतियानि वसानि य हकं उपासके (Brahmagiri & Siddāpur)

The omission of the qualifying *sātirekāni or adhikāni* before *aḍhatiyāni* is, according to D. C. Sircar, due to the oversight of the scribe or engraver.[1] Again, what has been read as *va ya* in Rūpnāth version is, we think, a fumbling execution of *vasāni* by the engraver who has also made a mistake in incising *pākāsa* for *upāsake*, the *kāsa* portion of which he corrected to *sake* in the margin, but forgot to make good the omission of the initial *u*. Thus, *pākāsa sake* does not mean 'openly Śākya' as rendered by

[1] *Ep. Ind.*, XXXI, pp. 205 ff.

Hultzsch, but is *upāsake* as in other versions. Similarly. the Māskī *Buddha śake* (or *bumpāśake*)[5] is also wrongly executed for *upāsake* by the engraver.

The Southern versions have *aḍhatiyāni or aḍhātiyāni*. the plural of *aḍhātiya* from which the Hindi *aḍhāi* is probably derived. The Pāli form is *aḍḍhatiya*, 'two and a half.' Dr. Sircar has given *ardha-trīṇi* as its neuter Sanskrit equivalent and explained it as *sārddha-dve*. As a matter of fact, the correct Sanskrit equivalent form should be *ardhatṛtīyāṇi* in neuter and *ardha-tṛtīyān* in masculine accusative case, according to Pāṇini's rule (I.1.23)—explained as *ardhaṁ tṛtīyaṁ yasya*. Sircar's explanation should also have been *sārddhe dve* or *sārddha-dvyam*, and not *sarddha-dve*.

The three versions (Rūp., Sah., Mās) have *sumi* for *smi* (=*asmi*). Bhandarkar says, "This shows that till the time of the promulgation of this edict, Aśoka had been a lay worshipper for more than two years and a half."[7] In Bairāṭ version, there is no verb like *smi* or *sumi*. On the basis of this edict, Bhandarkar has tried to prove that Aśoka was converted to Buddhism in the 9th year of his reign, a year before his Rock Edict VIII and that his activity in the Saṁgha is reminescent of his zeal shown in Rock Edict IV.[8] But this view is hardly tenable, because it involves anachronism. The Minor Rock Edict I was issued while on tour, i.e., during the course of Aśoka's *parākrama* for the propagation of *Dharma*, whereas Rock Edict IV was issued to publicize Aśoka's achievements at the completion of the twelfth year of his reign. Thus. according to Bhandarkar's calculation, the Minor Rock Edict falls earlier to Rock Edict IV, being issued during

[5] R. K. Mookerji, *Aśoka*, p.108.

[6] *Sel. Ins.*, p. 51.

[7] D. R. Bhandarkar, *Aśoka*, pp. 332-333.

[8] *ibid.*, p. 72.

the 12th year of his reign. It cannot, therefore, be cited as evidence of his zeal shown in Rock Edict IV.

Almost all other versions have an additional sentence *no chu bāḍhaṁ* (or *bāḍhi*) *pakate* (or *pakaṁte* or *palakaṁte*). The Brahmagiri and Siddāpur versions, however, make it more definite by saying : *No tu kho bāḍhaṁ pakaṁte husaṁ ekaṃ saṁvachharaṁ*. This statement restricts the period of less vigorous action to only one year.

२. साधिके संवछरे य च मे संघे याते, बाढं च पकंते ती आहा (lines 1—2) The first half of this sentence appears differently in the other versions, i.e., in the passive form as here, e.g., *mamayā saghe upayāte* (*Bairāṭ*); *mayā saghe upayīte* (Brahm. & Sidd.), while in others, the active form is found, e.g., *ya sumi hakaṁ sagha upete* (Rūp.). Thus, for *yāte*, we have the variants *upayāte*, *upete* and *upagate* (Mās.).

Evidently, the Minor Rock Edicts give an account of two stages in the religious life of Aśoka. According to the northern versions, Aśoka was an *upāsaka* for over two years and a half during which period he did not exert much (for the propagation of *Dharma*), but for more than a year, when he became associated with the Saṁgha, he put forth greater efforts in that direction. This would seem to comprise a total period of four years. The southern versions (Brahm., Sidd., etc.), on the other hand, seem to show that it was only one year out of the two years and a half of his *upāsakatva*, that he remained lax in his efforts, while for the remaining period of a year and a half when he came into contact with the Saṁgha, he became more vigorous in his efforts.

Opinions of scholars are sharply divided on this point. Bühler and Kern are of opinion that Aśoka relinquished his royal status before taking to Orders, because he thought the monastic vows to be incompatible with kingly duties, whereas Smith saw no incompatibility between the two

functions and held that he continued to occupy the throne even when he assumed the role of a monk.[9]

Mookerji thinks that this points not to "the permanent monkhood of the emperor," but to "his actual visit to the Saṁgha such as is related in the legends."[10] In the *Mahāvaṁśa* and *Samantapāsādika*, he is said to have remained in his ancestral faith for three years from his coronation; and his *sāsana-ppavesa* is taken to correspond to *Saṁghe yāte* or *upete* of the edicts, i.e., the stage of his active pursuit of *Dharma*.

The Pāli legends, however, count the period of three years from Aśoka's coronation, and that too when he was not a convert to Buddhism. From Rock Edict,[11] we learn that it was after the conquest of Kaliṅga in the 8th year of his reign (*abhiṣeka*) that Aśoka's conscience twinged him at the great holocaust caused by the war, and his mind took a true religious turn. The period of *upāsakatva* mentioned in the Minor Rock Edict should, therefore, be taken to have begun from the time after the Kaliṅga war. It was as a result of this change of heart that Aśoka proceeded to visit *Sambodhi* in the 10th year of his reign,[12] and to have begun promulgating his religious rescripts in the twelfth year of his reign.[13]

In order perhaps to justify the Pāli accounts, Barua says, ' By the term *upāsaka*, we need not understand a lay worshippper, but the lay supporter of the Order, as distinguished from the ordained members, the monks and nuns, as *upāsakas and upāsikās* (Bhabru Edict). All that he wanted to say is that while he remained a lay adherent of ascetic orders other than Buddhist, his religious activity

[9] Cf. Barua, *Glossary*, pp. 334 ff.
[10] Mookerji, *Aśoka*, pp. 108-9.
[11] Barua, *Glossary*, pp. 335-336.
[12] Rock Edict VIII.
[13] Pillar Edict VI.

was less vigorous until he came in contact with the Buddhist Saṁgha, until he accepted the guidance of this order in matters religious. In other words, his *saṅghaṁ upagate* is to all intents and purposes the same expression as the Pāli *saṅghaṁ saraṇaṁ gato, saṅghaṁ saraṇatthaṁ upeto, saṅghassa sissa-bhāraṁ upagato*, all met with in Buddhaghosa's *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*''[14]

This justification can hardly apply to the period before the Kaliṅga war. In the first place, how can we be sure that Aśoka was a lay adherent of ascetic orders other than Buddhist ? Secondly, how can the word *upāsaka* mean 'a lay supporter' of any order, much less the Buddhist order ?

Senart regards the recourse of Aśoka to Saṅgha (*Sanghaṁ upagamana*) to be no more than the state visit "in the midst of which he took his seat and made a public profession of his Buddhist faith, as the Siṁhālese Chronicle *Mahāvaṁśa* informs us.[15]" This view is considered to be absurd by Bhandarkar who believes that the king lived with the Saṁgha for the entire period of his second stage of vigorous enthusiasm, and it would be non-sensical to say that he visited the Saṅgha for over a year.[16] Bhandarkar, therefore, upholds the view that the first stage of non-enthusiasm and inaction in Aśoka's religious career lasted for one year, and the second of fervent zeal and strenuous action, for more than one year, but both in his career as *upāsaka*.[17]

According to Dr. Sircar, the use of present tense (*smi* or *sumi*) with more than two and a half years of being an *upāsaka* till the date of the edict and also with the period of over a year immediately preceding the said date of his enthusiastic career, but past tense (aorist—*husaṁ* in

[14] I, pp. 230-36. [15] *IA*, 1891, 233 f.

[16] Bhandarkar, *Aśoka*, p. 74.

[17] *ibid.*, p. 333.

connection with his one year of lesser exertion, also supports the above view.[18]

३. एतेना अंतरेना जंबुदीपसि देवानंपीयस अमिसंदेवा संतों मुनिसा मिसं देवा कटा (line 2)--This sentence also shows great variations in other versions, e.g.,

(a) या इमाय कालाय जंबुदिपसि अमिसा देवा हुसु ते दानि मिसा कटा (Rūp.)

(b) एतेन च अंतलेन जंबुदीपसि अमिसंदेवा संत मुनिसा मिसदेव कटा (Sah.)

(c) ....जंबुदिपसि अमिसा न देवेहि...मि.... (Bai.)

(d) पुरे जंबु...सि ये अभिसा देवा हुसु ते दानि मिसिभूता (Mās.)

(e) इमिना चु कालेन अमिसा समाना मुनिसा जंबुदीपसि मिसा देवेहि (Br. & Sid.)

In this sentence, the inclusion of the epithet *Devānaṁpīyasa* is peculiar to the Gujarrā edict alone. According to H. P. Śāstrī, who takes *amisā* = *amṛṣā* (true), *misā* = *mṛṣā* (false) and *devā* = Brāhmaṇas, Aśoka claims to have falsified the Brāhmaṇas (*devas*) who passed as true gods.[19] But this interpretation was given up as untenable when Sylvain Lévi showed that *mīsā* = Sanskrit *miśrāḥ*, and *misibhūtā* = *miśrībhūtāḥ*. But Lévi and Filliozat translate *devā* as 'kings' which again is inadmissible, because, as Sircar says, Devānāṁpriya Aśoka would not have thought it proper to refer to his own self, or to all kings including himself, as 'a god.'[12]

F. W. Thomas expressed the view that Aśoka brought the Brāhmanical gods to the knowledge of the wild tribes and backward peoples of India who were formerly ignorant of them.[22] But Buddhism had nothing to do with the Brāhmanical gods, and why should Aśoka have taken the trouble of introducing them to the wild and backward

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[18] *Ep. Ind.*, XXXI, pp. 205 ff.

[19] *JRASB*, 1910, pp. 259 ff.

[20] *JA* (10), 17, 124 ff.. *JA*, Tome ccxxxvii, 1949, pp. 225 ff.

[21] *Ep. Ind.*, XXXI, pp. 205 ff.

[22] *CHIR*, I. p. 505.

people when he himself had no faith in them ? Moreover, the edict does not specify any class of people, but refers to all people in general. Hultzsch takes *devā = divyāni rūpāṇi* of Girnār Rock Edict IV, and thinks that the expression refers to certain religious shows at which Aśoka had exhibited to his subjects *in effigie* the gods whose abode they would be able to reach by the zealous practice of Dharma.[23] Mookerji, on the other hand, has shown his ingenuity in suggesting three interpretations which he thinks more probable, but which, in our opinion, are fantastic. They are : (i) that Aśoka in this interval (of over a year) caused such men in the Jambūdvīpa as were 'unmingled with the gods' to be 'mingled with the gods,' i.e., he made irreligious men religious or god-worshipping, (ii) that by Aśoka's effort, men whose gods were disunited became men whose gods were united, that is to say, religious strife came to an end and there was religious toleration, and (iii) that as a result of Aśoka's effort, men in Jambūdvīpa could have commerce with gods.[24]

But we along with Dr. Sircar consider Dr. Bhandarkar's interpretation to be nearer the mark who says that Aśoka led men in the path of *Dharma* so that they became fit to be commingled with gods not only in heaven but also in this life.

४. नो च इयं महतेना ति व छकिये पापोतवे । खुदाकेन पी परकममीनेना धंमं चरमीनेना पानेसु संयतेना विपुले पी स्वगे छकिये आराधयितवे

(lines 2–3)

This version explains *parakamamīnena* as *dhamaṁ charamīnena* and *pānesū saṁyatenā*, i.e., 'by one who practises *Dharma* and abstains from using violence towards living beings.' The Māskī version has *dhamma-*

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[23] *C.* II, I, p. 168, fn. 3. *JRAS*, 1913, pp. 652 ff.

[24] Mookerji, *Aśoka*, pp. 110-111.

yutena instead of *pakamamīnena*. This shows that the word *dhaṁma-yuta* which occurs in other edicts of Aśoka, means 'one who exerts oneself in the cause of *Dharma* or one who makes strenuous efforts to practise *Dharma*.

This sentence and its variants in all other versions indicate that the great *svaga* (heaven) is not the monopoly of the rich, highborn, or kings only, but even humble persons can also attain it provided they exert themselves in the practice and propagation of *Dharma*.

५. खुदाके चा उडारे चा धंमं चरंतू येाग युंजंतू (line 4)—Other versions have *pakaṁtu*, *palakamaṅtu* or *pakameyu* instead of *dhammam carantū*. But our present version has an additional sentence *yogaṁ yuñjantū* which, according to Sircar, means "(and) effect (thereby their) association (with the gods)."[25] He further says that this phrase "throws welcome light on the interpretation of the controversial reference to the commingling of gods and men in the earlier part of the edict." In our opinion, however, it only means that both the low and the high should 'contribute their mite and extend their co-operation' in the propagation of *Dharma*.

६. अंता पि च जानंतु किति च चिलठितिके धंमचरने (line 4).—On the analogy of *hoti* (Siddāpur) or *hotu* (Sahasrām), we may supply *hoti* after *dhamma-carane* in this version. "According to the Kālsī and Shāhbāzgarhī Rock Edicts,[26] these borders were Antiochus II of Syria and four other Greek kings (in the west), and the Choḍas and Pāṇḍyas in the south."[27]

७. इयं च सावने विवुथेन २०० ५० ६[2][8] —The word *vivuthena* here is controversial. Its variants are *vyuṭhena* (Rūp.) and *vyūthena* (Brahm.). According to

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[25] *Ep. Ind.* XXXI, pp. 205. ff.

[26] XIII, Q.

[27] *CII*, I, p. 168, fn. 7.

[28] line 5.

the Rūpnāth version, which has the sentence *Etenā ca vayajanenā yāvataka tupaka ahāle savara* (*savata*) *vivasetavāya* (*vivāsetaviye*) containing *tupaka* (= *yuṣmākam*) in second person genitive plural, the edict seems to have been addressed to Aśoka's officers.[29]

Now, *vivuthena* can refer to none else but Aśoka himself. Hultzsch derives it from *vi-* √*vas*, which means 'to stay out (overnight.)' *vyuṣṭa* would therefore mean 'one who has passed or spent (*rajanī*, night).' Here *vyuṭha* (Rūp.) must be taken in this sense which is the same as that of another participle *vyuṣita* (absent from home) from the same root, and not in the sense of 'dawn or day-break.' *Vivuthena*, which is the same as *vyuṭhena*, therefore, shows that the proclamation in question was issued by Aśoka when he was on tour, away from home.

The figure 256, according to Bühler, indicated a date after the *Nirvāṇa* of the Buddha. But the expression *Duve sapaṁnā lāti-satā vivuthā ti* 200, 50, 6, in the Sahasrām version gave the clue to the real significance of the figure 256, and Thomas[30] showed that it referred to the *lāti* (*rātrī*), i.e., the nights for which Aśoka was away from his home. It is surprising that in spite of this clear explanation, Dr. Bhandarkar still referred the figure to the year "reckoned from some event connected with Buddha, most probably the Nirvāṇa of Buddha which came off 21 years prior to his Parinirvāṇa.[31]

The spirit of the edict may best be gathered from Dr. Smith's tribute to Aśoka, the Great. He remarks, "The edicts reveal Aśoka as a man who sought to combine the piety of the monk with the king, and to make India the kingdom of righteousness as he conceived it, a theocracy without a god; in which the Government should act the

[29] *ibid.*, p. 169, fn. 8.

[30] *JA*, (10), 15, 5097 :.; *CII*, I. p. 169, fn. 9.

[31] *Aśoka*, p. 334.

part of Providence, and guide the people in the right way. Every man, he maintained, must work out his own salvation, and eat the fruit of his deeds." Not that only great men can attain the fruit, even small men who choose to exert themselves on the path of *Dharma* may win immense heavenly bliss. The government can only point out the way but each man must travel it for himself.

ABBREVIATIONS

CHIR = Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, edited by E. J. Rapson.
CII = Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum.
Ep. Ind. = Epigraphia Indica.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JRASB = Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal
PIHC = Proceedings of Indian History Congress.
Sel. Ins. = Select Inscriptions by Dr. D. C. Sircar.

THE OLD ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

By S. L. PANDEY, M. A., SAHITYĀCHĀRYA *

I. *The Sources of Gauḍapada, Maṇḍana Miśra & Śaṅkara*

(*a*) *The sources of Gauḍapāda.*

Śaṅkara says that the *Āgamaśāstra*, a treatise of four chapters, is an epitome of the essence of Vedānta.[1] Elsewhere[2] he calls its author the knower of the Vedānta tradition. From these statements it is clear that Gauḍapāda, author of the *Āgamaśāstra*, represents the Vedānta tradition in philosophy. He explicity names the *Taittirīya upaniṣad* and the *Madhu Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad* and observes that his philosophical views are the settled conclusions of Vedānta.[5] He refers to the Vedic and Upaniṣadic passages by such words as Śruti,[6] āmnāya,[7] and manīṣiṇaḥ[8] (meditators) and to those of the smṛtis by *Vedapāragāḥ*, masters of the Vedas.[9] Besides, he quotes a number of passages from the old Vedāntic literature without explicitly mentioning his sources. But it is not difficult to find out these sources which include the Saṁhitās, the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtra*. All the important sources of Gauḍapāda are shown in the following four tables :—

* Lecturer in Pilosophy, Allahabad University.

[1] Vedāntārthasārasaṅgrahabhūtamidam prakaraṇacatuṣṭayam. A. S. B. Introduction.

[2] B. S. B. I/4/14 and 2/1/9.

[3] A. S. 3/12.

[4] Ibid. 3/2.

[5] Ibid 2/12 and 2/31.

[6] Ibid. 3/23.

[7] Ibid. 3/24.

[8] Ibid 2/1 and 2/5.

[9] Ibid. 2/35.

(i) *Saṁhitās and Āgamaśāstra.*[10]

Āgamaśāstra	*Saṁhitās*	*Subject*
(1) III. 14	*Ṛgveda* X. 121. 1	Difference between Jīva and Ātman before creation.
(2) III. 24	*Ṛgveda* VI. 47. 18	Māyāvāda.
(3) III. 24	*Vājasaneya* XXXI. 19	Ajātivāda.

(ii) *Upaniṣads and Āgamaśāstra.*[11]

Āgamaśāstra	*Upaniṣads*	*Subject*
(1) I. 1–29	M.U. 1–12	Four states and meditation on Om.
(2) I. 1–6	*C.V.* VIII. 7–12	The school of Prajāpati i.e. investigation into the nature of self with the help of waking, dreaming, sleep, and turīya experiences.
(3) I. 12	*B.U.* IV. 3. 21	Prājña knows nothing.
(4) I. 26	*B.U.* IV. 5. 13	Anantaro' bāhyaḥ.
(5) I. 28	*K.U.* I. 2. 22 II. 1. 4 II. 3. 6	Matvā dhīro na śocati.
(6) II. 1	*B.U.* IV. 3. 19 *A.U.* I. 3. 12	Sleep and waking are also dreams.
(7) II. 3	*B.U.* IV. 3. 10	Non-existence of Chariots etc. in dream.
(8) II. 5	*B.U.* IV. 3. 14	Waking and dreaming stand on the same footing.
(9) II. 35	*M.U.* 7	Prapañcopaśama.
(10) III. 11	*T.U.* II.	The doctrine of five sheaths. Self as transcendence of these sheaths.
(11) III. 12	*B.U.* II. 5	Madhu Brāhmaṇa. Self is the honey of all things.
(12) III. 13	*C. V.* VI. 8. 7 *B.U.* I. 4. 10 II. 5. 19 *Mu. U.* III. 2. 9	Identity between self and Brahman.

[10] V. Bhattacharya, op. cit. pp. 57, 62, 63.

[11] Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan has shown some of these sources. See "Gauḍapāda" pp. 62-75. He has also outlined in detail the Upaniṣadic doctrines embodied in the A. S.

Āgamaśāstra	*Upaniṣads*	*Subject*
(13) III. 13	*B.U.* IV. 4. 19 *K.U.* II. 1. 10 II. 1. 11	Denunciation of the view of plurality.
(14) III. 14	*C.U.* VI. 3. 2	Difference between Jīva and self before creation.
(15) III. 15	*C.U.* VI. 1. 4-5	Creation is explained with the illustration of clay and metal.
	B.U. II. 1. 20 *Mu.U.* II. 1. 1 *Ma.U.* VI. 26	Creation is explained with the illustration of sparks.
(16) III. 23	*T.U.* II. 7. 1 *C.U.* VI. 2. 1	Creation *ex nihilo*. Creation out of something.
(17) III. 24	*B.U.* IV. 4. 19 *K.U.* II. 1. 11	Denial of difference or duality.
	B.U. II. 5. 19	Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate. (Māyāvāda)
(18) III. 25	*I.U.* 12	Denunciation of Creation or Saṁbhūti.
	B.U. III. 9. 28	Ko-nvenam janayet=who indeed would produce him? =ajātivāda.
(19) III. 26	*B.U.* III. 9. 26 IV. 2. 4 IV. 4. 22 IV. 5. 15	The doctrine of "neti neti", -not so, not so.
(20) III. 36	*C.U.* VIII. 4. 1-2	The doctrine of sakṛd vibhātam, -illumination once and for all.
(21) III. 38	*C.U.* VII. 24. 1-2	Jñāna is ātmasaṁstha i.e. instituted into self.
(22) IV. 47—50	*Ma.U.* VI. 24	The illustration of firebrand.
(23) IV. 72	*B.U.* IV. 3. 15 IV. 3. 16	Self is unconditioned or asaṅga.
(24) IV. 78	*B.U.* IV. 2. 4	Attainment of fearlessness.
(25) IV. 81	*C.U.* VII. 24. 1-2	Illumination once and for all.
(26) IV. 85	*B.U.* IV. 4. 23	The State of Brahmahood.

(iii) *Bhagawadgītā and Āgamaśāstra.*[12]

Āgamaśāstra	*Bhagawadgītā*	*Subject*
(1) I. 24 and III. 38	VI. 25	Na kiñcid api cintayeṭ Ātmasaṁstham manaḥ.
		Mind being transformed into self, nothing should be thought.
(2) I. 25-26	VIII. 12-13	Meditation on OM.
(3) I. 28	XIII. 17	God is seated in the heart of everyone.
(4) II. 6=IV. 31	II. 28	That which is naught at the beginning and at the end, necessarily does not exist in the present.
(5) II. 7=IV. 32	II. 14 V. 22	Objects of experience are unreal because they have a beginning and end.
(6) II. 12 and 19	VII. 14	Māyā pertains to Self.
(7) II. 29	VII. 21	People look at reality from their own perspective.
(8) II. 35	II. 56 IV. 10	The sage is free from attachment, fear and anger.
(9) III. 21=IV. 7	II. 16	The real cannot be unreal or vice versa.
	III. 33	The innate character of a thing cannot be altered.
(10) III. 39-40	VI. 14–19 V. 6–10	Asparśayoga.
(11) IV. 85	XV. 19-20 VI. 22	The achievement of Brahmanhood.
(12) IV. 92	II. 15	So amṛtatvāya kalpate.
(13) IV. 93	IV. 19	The enlightened one is free from every action.

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[12] This table is largely drawn upon an article by Prof. N. B. Purohita, "The Gauḍapādakārikās and Buddhism," proceedings of the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference pp. 375-376.

(iv) *Brahmasūtra and Āgamaśāstra.*[13]

Āgamaśāstra	*Brahmasūtra*	*Subject*
(1) I. 18	II. 1. 14	Ananyatva between Self and the world.
(2) IV. 30	II. 1. 35	Eternity of the world.
(3) III. 26	III. 2. 22	Neti neti.
(4) I. 6	I. 1. 23	Prāṇa as the first principle of cosmology.
(5) I. 19	II. 1. 33	Līlāvāda.

Gauḍapāda is fully acquainted with the philosophical systems of his times. In the Kārikās I. 7-9 he refers to eight theories on the nature of creation. They are : *Vibhūtivāda*, *Svapna-sarūpavāda*, *Māyāsarūpavāda*, *Icchāvāda*, *Kālavāda*, *Bhogavāda*, *Krīḍāvāda* or *Līlāvāda* and *Ātmamāyāvāda*. The last theory is maintained by him[14] whereas the earlier theories are briefly but effectively criticized in the second line of the Kārikā I. 9.

"It (the universe) is, however, of the nature of the shining one, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is already secured?"

Of the seven theories meant for criticism the first is held by some theists, the second by Yogācāra Buddhists, the third by Mādhyamika Buddhists, the fourth by some followers of the Upaniṣads, the fifth by astronomers, the

[13] The first three comparisons are drawn by Deussen in the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads pp. 184-185, p. 220 and p. 150 and the last two are drawn by V. Bhattacharya, op. cit. A. S. 1.6 and I.9. The last two views are meant for criticism.

[14] Professor V. Bhattacharya wrongly fathers svapna-māyā-sarūpavāda on Gauḍapāda. See A. S. p. 3. Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri, however, have rightly maintained that this is one of the views held by cosmologists and not by Advaitins. See Śaṅkara's commentary on A. S. I. 27.

सृष्टिचिन्तकानामेवैते विकल्पा इत्याह—स्वप्नमायासरूपेति ।

Ānandagiri in his commentary on A. S. I. 7 says—

जाग्रद्गतानाम् अर्थानामेव स्वप्ने प्रथनात् तस्य सत्यत्वं मायायाश्च मण्यादि-लक्षणायाः सत्यत्वाङ्गीकाराद् अनयोर्विकल्पयोः सिद्धान्ताद् वैषम्यम् उन्नेयम् ।

sixth by Sāṅkhya philosophers and also by some followers of Rāmānuja in later times and the seventh by some theistic Vedāntins.

In the Kārikās II. 19-28 Gauḍapāda further refers to thirtyfive theories on the First Principle of the universe and criticizes each and all of them by saying that they are the mere imaginations, anthropomorphic views of their supporters. According to Ānandagiri's comments on the Kārikās these theorisers include some Upaniṣadic thinkers, Vaiśeṣikas, Lokāyatikas, Sāṅkhyas, Paurāṇikas, Mīmāṁsakas, Dharmaśāstrakāras like Baudhāyana and Dakṣa, Astronomers, Astrologers, Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins, Śaivas, Pātañjala Yogins, Pāśupatas, Grammarians, Bhedābheda-vādins, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhists and others.

In the Kārikā IV. 3 Gauḍapāda refers to Satkāryavāda of Sāṅkhyas and Asatkāryavāda of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. In the fourth or Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa he generally refers to Sarvāstivāda, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhists. It is to be noted that all these theories are critically examined in the fourth chapter.

From these references of the first, second and fourth chapters it is clear that Gauḍapāda utilizes not only the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagawadgīta* or the *Mahābhārata* and the *Brahmasūtra* but also the various developments of Upaniṣadic thoughts in the aphoristic and pre-Gauḍapāda periods of Advaita Vedānta. These developments are explicitly mentioned by those who follow him.

(*b*) *The Sources of Maṇḍana Miśra.*

Fortunately for us the sources of Maṇḍana Miśra are fully worked out by M. M. Kuppūswāmī Śāstrī in his

edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*.[15] These sources can be classified into the following classes—

(*i*) Saṁhitās.

Ṛgveda Saṁhitā and *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*

(*ii*) Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads.

Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad, Chāndogya-upaniṣad, Īśāvāsya-upaniṣad, Kaṭha-upaniṣad, Jābāla-upaniṣad, Taittirīya upaniṣad, Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanī upaniṣad, Praśna-upaniṣad, Brahmabindu upaniṣad, Mahānārāyaṇa upaniṣad, Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad, Muṇḍaka upaniṣad, Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad, Kauṣītaki upaniṣad (in all one Āraṇyaka and 14 *upaniṣads*).

(*iii*) Dharmaśāstra.

Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra, Āpastambīya-ādhyātmapaṭala, Gautama Dharma-sūtra and Manusmṛti.

(*iv*) *Mahābhārata.*

Bhagawadgītā.

(*v*) Purāṇas.

Kūrma-purāṇa and *Viṣṇu-purāṇa.*

(*vi*) Mīmāṁsā.

Mīmāṁsā-sūtra of Jaimini, *Śabarabhāṣya, Ślokavārtika, Tantravārtika and Vidhiviveka.*

(*vii*) Systematic Vedānta.

Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, Sundarapāṇḍya Vārtika and Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda.

(*viii*) Grammatical School.

Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali and *Vākyapadīya* of *Bhartṛhari.*

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[15] By. S. Appendices III and IV.

[16] See Br. S. Introduction p. XLV where the line "Adhyāropāpavādābhyām" quoted by Maṇḍana Miśra in the Br. S. Part I page 26 is attributed to Sundarapāṇḍya. The line also occurs in the *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha* which is attributed, though wrongly, to Śaṅkara.

(*ix*) Other systems.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Yogasūtrabhāṣya of Vyāsa.

(*c*) *The Sources of Śaṅkara.*

Śaṅkara went to the roots of Vedānta, the Upaniṣads, the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Bhagawadgītā* and wrote commentaries upon them. It became his life's work to authoritatively explain what was regarded by his predecessors as the mere source of Vedānta. He had the first-hand information of not only these sources or *Prasthānas* but also their commentaries which are lost for good. His references to these commentaries which we may designate as Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta commentaries are of utmost value in the history of Vedānta. In all likelihood the authors of these commentaries were even older than Gauḍapāda, for though according to Śaṅkara many of them held identical views with Gauḍapāda and himself, he says that Gauḍapāda was the only man who was teaching these views in his (Śaṅkara's) times.[17]

Before coming to inquire into the Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta commentaries we are giving the sources which Śaṅkara quotes in writing his commentaries. Such sources of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* are worked out by Deussen and Thibaut.[18] They can be divided into the following classes :—

(*i*) Saṁhitās.

Atharvaveda Saṁhitā, Maitrāyiṇī Saṁhitā, Ṛgveda Saṁhitā, Taittirīya Saṁhitā and Vājasaneya Saṁhitā.

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[17] Supra. Chapter 1 note 121.

[18] See Deussen's System of Vedānta pp. 479-500 and Thibaut's translation of Vedāntasūtras with Śaṅkara's commentary (S. B. E.) vol. II pp. 421-430.

(*ii*) Brāhmaṇas.

Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, Ārṣeya Brāhmaṇa, Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, Pañcaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa, Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa, Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa.

(*iii*) Āraṇyakas.

Aitareya Āraṇyaka, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.

(*iv*) Upaniṣads.

Aitareya upaniṣad, Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, Chāndogya upaniṣad, Jābāla upaniṣad, Iśa upaniṣad, Kauṣītaki upaniṣad, Maitrāyiṇī upaniṣad, Muṇḍaka upaniṣad, Taittirīya upaniṣad and Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad.

(*v*) Epics.

Mahābhārata including the Bhagawadgītā and Rāmāyaṇa.

(*vi*) Dharmaśāstra.

Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra, Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra, Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra, Manusmṛti.

(*vii*) Purāṇa.

Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa.

(*viii*) Etymology and Grammar.

Nirukta of Yāska and Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.

(*ix*) Philosophical Sūtras.

Nyāyasūtra, Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra. Śāṅkhya-Sūtra (?), Yogasūtra, Jaimini-Sūtra (Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra), Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa.

(*x*) Systematic works of six systems:

Śabarabhāṣya, Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Iśvara Kṛṣṇa, Bṛhatī of Prabhākara, several vṛttis upon the Brahmasūtra.

The following sources which Śaṅkara uses in his commentary upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* upaniṣad, according to Swāmī Mādhawānanda,[19] can be added to the above list:—

Bahvṛca-Brāhmaṇa, Baudhāyana Dharma-Sūtra, Gautama Dharma-Sūtra, Katharudra upaniṣad, Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad, Mahāṇārāyaṇa-upniṣad. Nārada-Parivrājaka upaniṣad, Nṛsiṁha-pūrvatāpanī-upaniṣad, Nṛsiṁhottara-tāpanī-upaniṣad, Śiva-Purāṇa, Vasiṣṭhasmṛti, Vāyu Purāṇa and Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

These sources show the rich and long tradition of scholarship which Śaṅkara has brought to confirm his Advaitic philosophy. But what is more important is the fact that he refers to a number of Pre-Śaṅkara commentaries on Vedānta works. These commentaries are of two kinds (i) Advaitic and (ii) non-Advaitic. Of non-Advaitic commentaries, Bhartṛ-prapañca's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad*, is frequently[20] alluded to in the *Bṛhadāraṇayaka upaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and the *Vārtika* and *Ṭīkā* on it. These allusions are strenuously collected and synthetically interpreted by Professor Hiriyanna.[21] According to his studies, Bhartṛprapañca holds Bhedābhedavāda, Brahmapariṇāmavāda, Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya-mārga and Pramāṇa Samuccayavāda. These views are severely criticized by Śaṅkara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad-bhāṣya*. From this fact it is obvious that Bhartṛprapañca was not an Advaitin of Śaṅkara's tradition. But it is significant that Bhartṛprapañca

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[19] The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad with Śaṅkara's commentary, English Translation, pp. XXI-XXII.

[20] Śaṅkara refers to Bhartṛprapñca twenty times. See "Is the Advaita of Śaṅkara Buddhism in disguise" by G. V. Buddhakar Q. J. M. S. 1933-34 p. 261.

[21] See Bhartṛprapañca: An old Vedāntin, by Prof. M. Hiriyanna Originally contributed to I. A. 1924 and now included in the Indian Philosophical studies Vol. I by M. Hiriyanna, pp. 70-94. Also see Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca by the same author, Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference pp. 440-450.

maintained like Śaṅkara that monism was the ultimate teaching of the Upaniṣads though this monism was of the type of Bhedābheda, identity-in-difference.

Another non-Advaitic though monistic commentator frequently referred to by Śaṅkara is, according to Ānandagiri and Govindānanda, some Vṛttikāra. Both Ānandagiri and Govindānanda further identify the Vṛttikāra with Upavarṣa in their comments on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* III. 3. 53. But this identification has rightly been challenged by Buddhakara,[22] for whereas Śaṅkara, calls[23] Upavarṣa "Bhagawān" and holds identical views with him, he severely criticizes the views of the Vṛttikāra. M. M. Kuppūswāmi Śāstrī makes the identity of the Vṛttikāra more complicated by suggesting that the Vṛttikāra, Upavarṣa and Bodhāyana are one person.[24] His basis is a challengeable opinion of Vedāntadeśika—Vṛttikārasya Bodhāyanasyaiva hi Upavarṣa iti syāt nāma,—which has been discarded as historically impossible by Buddhakara.[25]

Śaṅkara presupposes certain commentaries or *Vṛttis* in almost every commentary of his. In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* he presupposes in *Samanvayādhikaraṇa*[26] and *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* a lengthy commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. The *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda refers to at

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[22] Op. Cit. p. 259.

[23] B. S. B. III. 3.53 and I. 3.28.

[24] "Bodhāyana and Dramiḍācārya, two old Vedāntins presupposed by Rāmānuja," Proceedings of the third Oriental Conference, p. 467.

[25] Op. Cit. p. 262.

[26] अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म तथा प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते ।

B. S. B. I. 1.4.

[27] Commenting on Sūtras I. 1. 12-19 Śaṅkara first gives an explanation which he later recants. This explanation is attributed to the Vṛttikāra by the glossators.

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least two *Vṛttis*,[28] which Śaṅkara is supposed to have criticized. In the *Gītābhāṣya* Śaṅkara refers to several commentaries or *Vṛttis*.[29] In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya* he refers in comments on I. 4. 10 to a view which is attributed to a Vṛttikāra by Ānandagiri.[30] In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣadbhāṣya* he refers to a *Vṛtti* on the work in his comments on II. 23. 1. Ānandagiri attributes this *Vṛtti* also to a Vṛttikāra.[31] Śaṅkara refers to earlier commentaries on the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* in the second introductory verse of the *Taittirīya upaniṣad-bhāṣya*. Ānandagiri refers to a *vṛtti* by some Vṛttikāra in his ṭīkā upon the commentary.[32] This Vṛttikāra might be the same person to whom is attributed the first exposition of the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*, for the view of the Vṛttikāra as given in these places is that *Ānandamaya* is Brahman. But Ānandagiri consistently observes that all the five *Vṛttis* referred to above by Śaṅkara are the works of one and the same Vṛttikāra. If this information be correct, the Vṛttikāra must be credited with the authorship of five *Vṛttis*, each upon the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Bhagawadgītā*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* and the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*. But there is no conclusive evidence in its favour as there is no evidence to the view that the Vṛttikāra was no other person than Upa-

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[28] **Padmapāda refers to two Vṛttis in the Pañcapādikā pp. 58 and 64. Budhakar op. cit. pp. 260 and 262 thinks that he refers to four Pre-Śaṅkara commentaries on the Brahmasūtra. But this is wrong for the presence of two Pre-Śaṅkara Vṛttis is all that is vouchsafed by Padmapāda. The Vṛttis referred to on p. 58 are the same as those on p. 62.**

[29] **तदर्थाविष्करणाय अनेकैर्विवृतपदार्थ–वाक्यार्थ-न्यायमपि अत्यन्तविरुद्धानेकार्थत्वेन लौकिकैर्गृह्यमाणमुपलभ्य। G. B. Introduction.**

[30] **Ānandagiriṭīkā on B. U. B. P. 133 (Vāṇīvilāsa Series edition).**

[31] **Ānandagiriṭīkā on C. U. B. pp. 101-102 (Vāṇīvilāsa series edition).**

[32] **Ānandagiriṭīkā p. 68 (Ānandāśrama series edition).**

varṣa. What is worthy of our note is the fact that the Vṛttikāra or Vṛttikāras are consistently criticized by Śaṅkara. The former, therefore, cannot be the precursor of the latter's Advaita.

The third non-Advaitic commentator generally believed to have preceded Śaṅkara and for that reason Gauḍapāda is Brahmadatta who is referred to by Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi*[33] and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Vārtika*.[34] Brahmadatta like Bhartṛprapañca and the Vṛttikāras is a Jñānakarma—Samuccaya-Vādin. But he holds unlike them a view which is called Dhyānaniyogavāda.[35] He is said to have written a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*.[36] Professor Hiriyanna has shown that "he was a māyāvādin[37] although he holds the peculiar view that "the individual soul originates and perishes."[38] The *Śruti-Prakāśikā* calls Niyogavādins like Brahmadatta as old māyāvādins (jaran-māyāvādins) in contradistinction to immediate māyāvādins (sākṣātmāyāvādins) like Gauḍapāda

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[33] N. S. Sambandhokti to i. 67—

केचित् स्वसम्प्रदायबलावष्टम्भादाहुः etc.

The commentary *Vidyā-Surabhi* observes on the above passage—

केचित् ब्रह्मदत्तादयः सम्प्रदायबलावष्टम्भात् etc.

See N. S. edited by Professor M. Hiriyanna, Introduction, P. XXIII.

[34] Sambandhavārtika verse 797.

नियोगपक्षमाश्रित्य विध्यर्थसम्भवो यथा ।

ऐकात्म्यसिद्धौ यत्नेन तथाऽत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

Ānandagiri in his ṭīkā on the verse says—

इह तु ब्रह्मदत्तादिमतेन ज्ञानाभ्यासे विधिमाशंक्य निरस्यते ।

[35] See "Brahmadatta: An old Vedantin" by Professor M. Hiriyanna. J. O. R. Madras Vol. II. 1928—p. 7.

[36] Ibid. p. 1.

[37] Ibid. p. 7.

[38] Ibid. p. 2.

and Śaṅkara.[39] This view establishes the fact that Brahmadatta was much anterior to both Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda and that Māyāvāda was not an innovation of the latter in Vedānta circles. It seems thus that although Brahmadatta does not belong to the tradition of Advaita Vedānta as he is criticized by Sureśvara, Ānandagiri and others, he most approximately approaches Advaita from the circles of Jñānakarma-samuccayavāda.

The traditions of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita Vedānta refer to many other non-advaitic Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta commentators,[40] but there seems no allusion to them in advaitic literature. The commentaries presupposed by Śaṅkara for his criticism may be attributed to some of these Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins. But there is no proof for identifying them.

Śaṅkara attaches paramount importance to his long tradition of Advaita and goes to the extent of stating that a man who does not know the tradition is to be derided as a fool, howsoever learned he might be in all the sciences.[41] This eulogy of tradition gets confirmation from the fact that in the absence of a tradition philosophy may be nothing but mere speculation of an individual mind. At any rate Śaṅkara refers with profound respects to a few advaita ācāryas and quotes them to confirm his views. These ācāryas are Kāśakṛtsna, Bādarāyaṇa, Upavarṣa, Sundarapāṇḍya, Draviḍācārya, Brahmānandī and Gauḍapāda. It is remarkable that far from criticizing these ācāryas Śaṅkara refers them with approval. We can therefore count

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[39] Ibid. p. 7.

[40] Yāmunācārya enumerates them in the *Siddhitraya*, Rāmānuja in the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* and Madhva in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. See Budhakar. op. cit pp. 261, 262 and 263-264.

[41] असम्प्रदायवित् सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदेव उपेक्षणीयः ।

G. B. III. 2.

them as the precursors of Advaita before Śaṅkara.

The following are the places where he refers to them—

Śaṅkara's works	Advaita-ācāryas referred to
1 (a) *B. S. B.* I. 1.4. Three verses at the end of the catuḥsūtrī.	Sundarapāṇḍya.[42]
1 (b) *G. B.* III. 13.	Sundarapāṇḍya.[43] He is called here as Sampradāyavit.
2 (a) *B. S. B.* I. 3.28	Bhagawān Upavarṣa.
2 (b) *B. S. B.* III. 3.53.	Bhagawān Upavarṣa.
3 *B. S. B.* I. 4.22.	Kāśakṛtsna.
4 (a) *B. S. B.* II. 1.14.	Sūtrakāra Bādarāyaṇa.[44]
4 (b) *B. S. B.* III. 48.	Bhagawān Bādarāyaṇa.
4 (c) *B. S. B.* III. 4.40	Bādarāyaṇa.
4 (d) *B. S. B.* IV. 1.17.	Bādarāyaṇa.
5 (a) *A. S. B.* II. 32.	Āgamavit=Draviḍācārya.[45]
5 (b) *C. B.* III. 10.10.	Ācārya=Draviḍācārya.
5 (c) *B. B.* II. 1.20.	Sampradāyavit = Draviḍācārya.
6 (a) *A. S. B.* Passim.	Gauḍapāda.

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[42] See. Problems of Identity in the Cultural History of Ancient India: Acarya Sundarapāṇḍya by M. M. Kuppūswāmī Śāstrī J. O. R. Madras Vol. I. 1927.

[43] Br. S. Introduction P. XLV.

[44] B. S. B. Passim refers to Bādarāyaṇa as it is a commentary on his work. In B. S. itelf the name of Bādarayaṇa occurs nine times I. 3. 26, I. 3.33, III. 2.41, III. 4.1, III. 4.8. III. 4.19, IV. 3.15. IV. 4.7 and IV. 4.12. The references given here are some important ones.

[45] Śaṅkara does not refer to Draviḍācārya by name but his glossator Ānandagiri takes his remarks like ācārya, āgamavit and Sampradāyavit on the occassions mentioned for reference to Draviḍācārya. There is a Dramiḍācārya referred to in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. MM. Kuppuswami Śāstri has shown that the Draviḍacārya presupposed by Śaṅkara is the same as the Dramiḍācārya of Rāmānuja tradition, op. cit. p. 470. His source is Vedāntadeśika who cannot be reliable on this point.

6 (b) *B. S. B.* 1.4.14. Sampradāyavit = Gauḍapāda.

6 (c) *B. S. B.* II. 1.9. Vedāntārtha sampradāyavit = Gauḍapāda.

6 (d) *C. B.* VII. 12.1. Follower of Prajāpati's order=author of *Prakarṇacatuṣṭaya* = Gauḍapāda.

6 (e) *C. B.* II. 23.1. Smṛtikāra=Gauḍapāda.

Neither Śaṅkara nor his immediate successors refer to Brahmānandī. But Sarvajñātma, the author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* and his commentator Madhusūdana Saraswatī inform us that Draviḍācārya wrote a commentary on Brahmānandī's sūtras of *Chāndogya*.[46] Rightly speaking Brahmānandī is called the *Chāndogya-vākyakāra* and Draviḍācārya, the *Chāndogya-bhāṣyakāra*. Śaṅkara as we have seen, presupposes the *Chāndogya* commentary of Draviḍācārya. The conclusion to which this presupposition leads to is, therefore, the fact that he must have presupposed the original *Chāndogya-vākyas* of Brahmānandī also.

Thus apart from the ancient scriptures and the prasthānas Śaṅkara presupposes the works of seven ācāryas of his own tradition.

II. *The traditional heritage of Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara.*

Out of the Advaitic sources of Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara their Advaitic heritage can perfectly be reconstructed. In the light of these sources there is no exaggeration in saying that there is a continuous growth, and not graft, of Advaitic doctrines from the *Ṛgveda* right

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[46] See Saṅkṣepaśārīraka with Madhusūdana Saraswatī's gloss II. 217-221.

upto Gauḍapāda. The history of this growth has been divided into five periods, the Vedic, the Upaniṣadic, the Epic, the Aphoristic and the Pre-Gauḍapāda period of commentaries.[47] A brief account of this history is given below to understand the Advaitic heritage of Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara.

(a) *The Vedic Advaita.*

Professor Tarapada Chowdhury observes that "monism of the Vedānta with a hint at māyā and liberation through knowledge"[48] is indicated in the several sūktas of the four Vedas.[49] Professor Max Muller has elaborated the development of the vedic thought from polytheism to Henotheism, from Henotheism to Monotheism and finally from Monotheism to Monism.[50] Speaking of this monism professor Deussen rightly maintains that "the Hindus arrive at this Monism", "on a pure philosophical path" "by a method essentially different from that of other countries."[51] What was this method which is the peculiar feature of the vedic monism ? Professor Keith hints at this when he observes that "it is beyond possibility of doubt that in India from the first philosophy is intellectual, not moral, in interest and outlook."[52] It is a patent fact that in the Vedas monism is elaborated through stating cosmological and theosophical riddles. Obviously the method adopted for developing monism is dialectical. It is the transcendental deduction of "that one" (tad ekam) that is presupposed by all gods and all first principles of

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[47] Supra Ist. chapter Ist. section.

[48] History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western by Radhakrishnan and others p. 53.

[49] Ibid. pp. 44-45.

[50] Six Systems, pp. 51-57.

[51] Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 13.

[52] The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads, Vol. II. p. 434.

the universe. When the controversy in theology arose as regards the questions—"who is the Highest deity?" Whom should we offer oblations?"—the solution through a dialectical apprehension was reached that "there is one being (ekam sat) of which the sages speak under various names.[53] The unity of gods was thus arrived at. But when the riddles of creation were posed, it was difficult to maintain this unity as being. The Nāsadīya-Sūkta says that "Then there was neither non-being nor being"[54] and comes to the conclusion that "there was only that one (tad ekam) which breathed by itself without breath."[55] The dialectic inherent in the speculation of the sages developed the concept of the unity from "the one being" (ekam sat) to that of "that one" (tad ekam). The unity of things and gods can be characterized neither as being nor as non-being. But both being and non-being pre-suppose unity (ekam) and for that reason the fundametnal unity of things and gods can be characterized as "that one" (tad ekam) only. "That one" is different from both being and non-being, nonetheless, it is being in non-being according to the same hymn.[56] Dialectic is fully evident here. "That one" is not only transcendence of being and non-being but is also immanent in them. When the unity was thus arrived at, the thought of the sages immediately turned towards the very dialectic which was instrumental in the discovery. The same hymn elaborates this phase of thought. "Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was born this creation? The gods came later than this creation, who then knows whence it arose?"[57] The hymn

53 एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति अग्निर्यम मातरिश्वेति ।

54 नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् ।

55 आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम् ।

56 सतो बन्धुमसति ।

57 को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् कुत आजाता कुत इयं विसृष्टिः ।
अर्वाग्देवा अस्य विसर्जनेन अथा को वेद यत आबभूव ।

thus shows the examination of dogmatism which is implicit in its solution of the antimony of being and non-being. The conclusion arrived at is that knowledge of the unity (tad ekam) is not possible. Even gods cannot know it, to speak nothing of human beings, for all are later than it. But will not this position be universal scepticism ? The hymn guards against it and hence suggests that perhaps the unity (tad ekam) knows its work i.e. creation. But even this may be controverted and an opposite view may be maintained that it does not know its work.[58] The hymn does not solve the antinomy of gnosticism and agnosticism as it does that of being and non-being. This is the work which is taken upon by the Upaniṣads. But it must be noted that this dialectical monism of the Vedas does not originate only the doctrine of the unity of all things and gods but also the dialectic which is the very basis of this monism.[59] Here are then conceived monism and dialectic by the vedic sages who are much anterior to Parmenides and Zeno in the west and the Buddha and Nāgārjuna in India. We have here the origin of that dialectic which was outlined by Plato in Parmenides and the Sophists and was later fully elaborated by Kant in the section of the Transcendental Analytic of the critique of Pure Reason. In Indian thought this dialectic was taken from the Vedas by the Upaniṣadic sages from whom it came domn to later Advaitins.

To the Nāsadīyasūkta is further traced the first germination of the doctrine of Māyā. Professor Gough says

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[58] सो अंग वेद यदि वा न वेद।

[59] Dr. T. R. U. Murti is therefore wrong when he says that "To Buddha then belongs the honour of having suggested the dialectic first, much before Zeno in the west." The Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 9. M. M. V. Bhattacharya very rightly observes in this context that "the theory of the two koṭis or antas originated first in the Veda, and of the Buddha accepted it afterwards," Jha Commemoration volume—"Catuṣkoṭi. p. 91.

that "the Nāsadīya-Sūkta seems then to be the earliest anouncement of the eternal co-existence of a spiritual principle of reality and an unspiritual principle of unreality."[60] Here is the suggestion that "the cosmical illusion neither is nor is not; it is a self-feined fiction, a spurious semblance of being, for it is self alone that is. And yet it is not merely nothing, for then the world of experience would not be here and everywhere, for living souls to pass through."[61] Professor Deussen tracing the origin of the doctrine of māyā holds that the Vedic sages in their attempts to define more closely the unity of things concluded that "it is not plurality that is real, but only unity."[62] In the Skambhasūkta of the *Atharvaveda*[63] the unity, the support of the whole universe, is explicitly said to be concealed by māyā.[64] In the *Ṛgveda*[65] also Indra, with whom the unity of all things has been identified, is said to have assumed big forms through māyā. Thus both the word and the doctrine of māyā are preserved intact in their original form in the Vedas. The doctrine of māyā is, however, not so developed here as in the Upaniṣads. Here māyā first means "the wonderful power of the gods through the operation of which they display a wisdom for transcending our ordinary experience on faculties of comprehension" and "with the idea of the wonderful the idea of the mysterious (power) is combined."[66] But when the unity of gods and things was conceived and found the same as that of the self, as for instance in the

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[60] The Philosophy of the Upanishads p. 241.

[61] Ibid. p. 15.

[62] The Philosophy of the Upanishads p. 229.

[63] 10. 8. 34.

[64] Deussen, Op. Cit. P. 229, Tarapada Chowdhary Op. Cit p. 45, and Gough, op. cit. 46.

[65] VI. 47.18. इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते ।

[66] Urquahart : Vedānta and Modern Thought p. 129.

Ṛgveda 4.26 where Vāmadeva identifies himself with various personages and gods, the conception of māyā was also developed into that of the self-concealing and self-feining power of that unity. The wonderful, the mysterious, the deceptive and the creative are thus combined under the conception of māyā in the vedic thought.

(b) *The Upaniṣadic advaita.*

The Advaita, which is reflected here and there in the Vedas, becomes the dominant trend of the Upaniṣads. Although the vedic sages discovered the support of the whole universe into "That One" (tad ekam), more often than not, they identified that with some personal god. The upaniṣadic sages adhered to the metaphysical insight of their predecessors and refused to identify "That One" with any personal God. They, on the contrary, conceived of the Anantam (the Infinite), the Bhūman, (the plenitude) and the Brahman (the Absolute). In their opinion these conceptions stand for one and the same reality which is "that one." Further they directed their search after reality to psychological processes and concluded that they also imply the same fundamental unity as their support which all the things of the universe and gods do in the Vedas. The main thought of the Upaniṣads thus takes the Vedic equation of That One=ultimate reality and develops it into that of Brahman=Ātman. The process of this development is fully preserved in the Upaniṣads. It involves the following steps :—

(*i*) That One=The Non-dual (Advitīyam).

(*ii*) The Non-dual=the Infinite (Anantam).

(*iii*) The Infinite=The Plenitude (Bhūman).

(*iv*) The Bhūman=The Absolute (Brahman).

(*v*) The Absolute=The pure unity=thatness (tattvam).

(*vi*) Thatness=Self (Ātman).

The Upaniṣadic seers contrasted the manifold of the universe, the *nānā* with That One (tad ekam). If the ultimate reality is One, all other things must then be the Many. Hence the antithesis of the One and the Many. This anthesis, according to the Upaniṣadic dialectic, demands that the ultimate reality can neither be the One nor the Many but the support of both. Hence, it is called as the non-dual, the advitīyam which means that it is neither one nor many though the support of both. But the metaphysical thought in this stage is still allied with the Vedic thought of "That One" and for that reason the non-dual is often combined with the one into the "The only One and non-dual" (Ekam eva advitīyam). But the dialectic in reality demands the rejection of the one and hence in the second stage of the development the one is dropped and reality identified with the Anantam, the Infinite which means neither one nor many but yet something positive. This conception of reality is in perfect accordance with the Upaniṣadic dialectic which is now clearly formulated as not this, not that (neti-neti). The Infinite may imply simply a quantitative or limiting concept. Hence in the next stage it is identified with the Bhūman, the Plentitude, the positive basis of all things. The concepts of the anantam and the bhūman are the products of the double characters of the Upaniṣadic dialectic, the negative and the positive, the not-this-not-that "(neti-neti) and this-is-that" (etad vai tad), which are inseparable from each other. As the metaphisical doctrine is advancing from stage to stage, the corresponding dialectic is also simultaneously improving. The attention of the seers therefore goes to this antithesis of the dialectic and the doctrine. To overreach the difference or antithesis of this kind they, therefore, replace the concept of the Bhūman by that of the Absolute (Brahman). The Absolute or Brahman must be above subject and object. The anantam

and the bhūman imply at best some objective unity as conceptions preceding them really do. The Brahman is neither objective nor subjective. It is simply "that" (tat). Thatness (tattvam) is the only correct designation of Brahman. It implies the exclusion of all characters which are described as what—characters by F. H. Bradley and "Kimartha" by later Advaitins. But there is still the possibility of committing the mistake of identification of thatness with "Some objective unity." Hence in the next stage of the development this thatness is identified with Ātman.

There is no difference between the true subjective and the true objective. In fact the two are the same. This is that (etat vai tad), I am that (so'ham asmi), Thou art that (tat tvam asi), or This self is Brahman (ayam Ātmā Brahma). Here the dialectic is the doctrine. Neither is for the sake of the other. Each is sufficient in itself and is the same as the other. The Upaniṣadic dialectic is thus obviously different from the Mādhyamika where Śūnyatā (dialectic) is for the sake of Prajñā (doctrine).[67] The identification of Ātman and Brahman is the identity of the subjective thing-in-itself and the objective thing-in-itself. In fact it is the only thing-in-itself as T. H. Green maintains[68] in the context of Kant's doctrine. No wonder then if Deussen says that the Upaniṣads anti-

[67] शून्यमिति न वक्तव्यमशून्यमिति वा भवेत्।
उभयं नोभयं चेति प्रज्ञप्त्यर्थं तु कथ्यते।
Mūla Mādhyamika Kārikā.

Dr. T. R. V. Murti op. cit. part two p. 123 says "Like the Kantian dialectic, the Mādhyamika is a critique of all philosophy." Obviously he is misled by the ambiguity of the word "critique." For Kant critique means "constructive thought" whereas for Mādhyamikas, critique means Śūnyatā or rejection of views. For Kant and Advaita therefore critique or criticism or dialectic is philosophy. But for Mādhyamikas Śūnyatā is meant for Prajñā, dialectic is not doctrine in their system. So Dr. Murti is mistaken in holding that for Mādhyamikas dialectic is doctrine.

[68] See Works III. p. 127.

cipate Plato and Kant in the identity of Brahman-Ātman, for in later times Plato arrives at the same concept "as Auto (Ātman) KXQ auto (an sich)[69]" and Kant as.

This dialectic is critically confirmed in the dialogues of Yājñavalkya and his wife, Maitreyī. Who can know by any means that by whom everything is known? Yena idam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijānīyāt? In reality the knower cannot be known—Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt. This recalls comparison with the following remarks of T. H. Green which are the elaboration of the same truth.

> "The existence of a knowable nature implies that of a principle of union which is not itself part of the knowable nature, not one or any number of the relations which constitute it; an unconditioned, in relation to which alone the mutual condition of Phenomena is possible. a consciousness of Laws of nature, or rather a principle of consciousness which in relation to sensibility, yields laws of nature, which is not itself subject to those laws of nature."[70]

The dialectic further develops into the steps of Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana. It is called the path of knowledge (jñānamārga) and is critically distinguished from empiricism and transcendentism in the following statement of the *Kena Upaniṣad*:—

It (self) is even different from what is known (from the manifested universe; if you then say, it must be the unmanifested universe, no) it is also beyond what is not known to the senses, it is beyond the unmanifested universe).

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[69] Deussen Op. Cit. pp. 41.42. and Kant.

[70] Green. Works Vol. II. P. 90 quoted in the Nature of Self by Prof. A. C. Mukerji, p. 72.

Thus we have heard from the former teachers who explained it to us."[71]

The dialectic is clearly suggested in the following three statements of the same Upaniṣad :—

(1) "I do not think, I know him well; but I do not know that I do not know him. Whosoever amongst us knows that (tat=thatness). "I do not know, that I do not know him," knows that (tat=Brahman).

(2) By him (the knower of Brahman) who thinks that Brahman is not comprehended, Brahman is comprehended; he, who (not knowing Brahman) thinks that Brahman is comprehended, does not know him. (Brahman) is unknown to those who (think) to know him (and) known to those who do not (think to) know him.

(3) If he is known to be the nature of every thought, he is comprehended. (Hence, from this knowledge) (a person) gains immortality. (A person) gains power by the soul (by one's own self), (and) by knowledge immortality."[72]

These passages which anticipate not only the Socratic ignorance but also the Kantian Criticism, solve the antithesis of gnosticism and agnosticism and lay down

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71 अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि ।
इति शुश्रुम पूर्वेषां ये नस्तद् व्याचक्षिरे ।

K. U. I. 1.3.

Röer's English Translation: The Twelve Principal Upanisads Vol. I. p. 21.

72 Röer Op. cit. PP. 25-27.

नाहं मन्ये सुवेदेति नो न वेदेति वेद च ।
यो नस्तद्वेद तद्वेद नो न वेदेति वेद च ॥
यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।
अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥
प्रतिबोधविदितं मतममृतत्वं हि विन्दते ।
आत्मना विन्दते वीर्यं विद्यया विन्दतेऽमृतम् ॥

K. U. I. 2. 2-4.

the path of knowledge which is later developed by Śaṅkara. It is strange that in spite of such passages both Deussen[73] and Keith[74] hold that the absolute self is entirely unknown. Their fundamental mistake seems to uncritically identify knowledge with the knowledge of objects and forget the self-evident, self-illuminating (Svayam jyotiḥ) character of self. As Professor Mukerji has shown.

> "The assertion that the Absolute is theoretically incomprehensible would be as absurd as that there can be no theoritical knowledge of space on the ground that all spaces that are ever known are limited spaces."[75]

It is remarkable that during the Upaniṣadic period the school of critical self knowledge as outlined above has passed into an established tradition.[76] This fact, among others, shows that this trend is the dominant feature of the Upaniṣadic thought. Śaṅkara has simply brought the force of this tradition to support his Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, fantastic on the part of Keith to say that Śaṅkara's "attempt is undoubtedly merely a clever tour de force without final validity and its ingenuity is as great but no greater than its improbability."[77]

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[73] Deussen Op. cit. P. 147. "As the final result and main dogma of the Upaniṣad teaching the conclusion is reached, as far as his peculiar and essential being is concerned, Brahman is absolutely unknowable.

[74] Keith Op. cit. P. 516. The Absolute self is unknowable for there is no duality between it and anything else: the individual self is also unknowable because it must be the activity in knowing and cannot be object.

[75] *The Nature of self* p. 311. See also pp. 370-393 for the criticism of Deussen's interpretation of the Upaniṣads.

[76] See I. U. 10 and 13, K. U. I. 1.3.

[77] Keith Op. cit. p. 308.

The Upaniṣads take the doctrine of māyā also from the Vedas and develop it further to a considerable extent. Professor Ranade has admirably examined the ideology of the Upaniṣads in extenso and shown that the doctrine of māyā is fully present there.

> Here "we have the conceptions of a veil, of blind-foldness, of a knot, of ignorance, of not-being, of darkness, of death, of unreality and uncertainty, of untruth, of crookedness and falsehood and illusion, of the power of God, of this power as identical with nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an appearance, and finally, of a word, a mode and a name."[78]

All these conceptions go to constitute the doctrine of māyā. The last conception enumerated by Professor Ranade is of a particular mention in this respect. It refers to the locus classicus of the doctrine and runs as: —

Vācārambhaṇam Vikāro nāmadheyam[79]: —

It is the source of vivartavāda of the later Advaita. To this may further be added the contribution of the *Maitrāyiṇī Upaniṣad* towards the māyā doctrine. According to Professor Deussen the Upaniṣad "explains the propositon that all plurality is mere appearance by the brilliant comparison of the ātman with an alātacakram, a spark which, made to revolve, appears as a fiery circle."[80] Professor Bhattacharya, however, objects to the explanation and holds that the use of the simile of alātacakram (firebrand) in the Upaniṣad is "not for showing any reality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour."[81] The statement of Professor Bhattacharya

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[78] Prof. R. D. Ranade, *The Constructive Survey of the Upanisadic Philosophy* p. 228. For full analysis of the passage see ibid pp. 224-228.

[79] C. U. VI. 1.4.

[80] Op. cit. P. 235.

अलातचक्रमिव स्फुरन्तम् आदित्यवर्णम् ऊर्जस्वन्तम् ब्रह्म तमसः पर्यपश्यत्
Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad VI. 24.

[81] Op. cit. p. 219.

is correct but it does not controvert the explanation of Deussen, for Brahman which is real, is causing the illusion of the universe through its splendour which is just compared with the flashing circle of a firebrand. It must be noted that the simile of the firebrand is an elaboration of the golden vessel which veils the truth according to the Iśa *Upaniṣad*[82] and for that reason it implies the veil of Brahman. This simile with *a doube entendre* implies the reality of Brahman and the unreality of the world and is further developed in these two senses by Gauḍapāda in the alātaśānti-prakaraṇa. Hitherto we have elaborated the tenets of Brahmavidyā or Ātmavidyā which is described in the *Muṇḍaka* Upaniṣad I-1. as the support of all Vidyās (learnings)—Brahmavidyām Sarvavidyām pratiṣṭhām. The Vidyās are many and varied. They are also fully described in the Upaniṣads particularly in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Whereas Brahmavidyā discusses the impersonal unity of all things, these vidyās deal with the identification of the same unity with some concrete or personal being. Brahmavidyā and the Vidyās are characterized in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* as Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā, meta-metaphysics and metaphysics. These Aparāvidyās give birth to several systems of philosophy in later times. A question of very considerable importance is the relation of Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā. The question is not raised at all in the Upaniṣads which unanimously subordinate the latter to the former. But it is searchingly mooted in the *Mahābhārata* and the later Vedānta.

(C) *THE EPIC ADVAITA*

The *Mahābhārata* embodies the many and varied developments of Philosophy out of the Upaniṣads. It

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82 हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।
तत्त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ।।

shows that the Upaniṣads gave birth besides Vedānta to several other schools of thought. These schools are elaborations of the various Aparāvidyās of the Upaniṣads. Brahmavidyā, too, is not unknown to the Epic which contains, among others, the Brahmavidyā tracts of the Sanatsujātīya, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the Mokṣadharma, the *Anugītā* and the Nārāyaṇīya section. Besides, it frankly lauds Ātreya, "as a teacher of unconditioned Brahman.[83]" Professor De has pertinently observed that 'Indeed, the idealistic Absolutism of the Upaniṣad, underlies most of the Epic teaching in its theoretic aspect.[84]" But the main contribution of the Epic to Advaita is the*Bhagavadgītā*.

The *Bhagavadgītā* transforms the metaphysical doctrine of the Upaniṣads into the philosophy of universal ethics and religion. It contributes, among others, the following main doctrines to Advaita.

First, *unity of all Vidyās*. The *Gītā* is "more a reconciliation of existing beliefs and speculations by the living warmth of a dynamic religious feeling than a careless throwing together or haphazard revision of an inconsistent medley.[85]" It removes the conflict of all pathways, jñānamārga, yogamārga, karmamārga and bhaktimārga and maintains that they are in reality one and the same.[86] Dividing all these pathways into two classes, Sāṅkhyamārga and Vogamārga, it establishes the Advaita view that "he who sees Sāṅkhya and Yoga as one, really sees.[87]" This unity of all pathways as explicitly maintained in the *Gītā* is due to the *adhikāribheda* (qualification of the

[83] History of Philosophy eastern and western, Vol. I. ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, p. 87.

[84] Ibid. p. 86.

[85] Ibid. p. 97.

[86] See Bhagavadgītā IV. 11, VII. 21-23, IX. 23.5.

[87] एकं सांख्यं च योगं च यः पश्यति स पश्यति।

—Ibid. V. 5. Also see V. 4.

seeker) a doctrine which is fully developed in later times by the Advaitin Madhusūdana Saraswatī in his *Prasthānabheda*. The unity under the review is of two forms, the unity of alternative stand-points or of the alternative Aparāvidyās and the synthetic unity of Aparāvidyās with Parāvidyā. The first means that all Aparāvidyās stand on the same level and hence any one of them is adequate. The second shows that any or all Aparāvidyās are succeeded by Parāvidyā and hence are meant to result into it.

Secondly, *supremacy of jñānamārga and the synthetic gradation of Aparāvidyās leading to Parāvidyā*. Professor De fairly well appreciates that "The purely intellectualistic position of meditation on the unconditioned Non-manifest is characterized by the *Gītā* as avyakta-upāsanā, which is indeed a way of approach but which involves a long and arduous process of discipline, open only to the few.[88]" But it is illogical on his part to hold that "the method is not commended because of its difficulty and uncertainty of success.[89]" The *Gītā* should either reject the jñānamārga of the Upaniṣads or accept their view that Aparāvidyās are subordinated to or cancelled by it according to jñānamārga. There can be no *via media*. It is acknowledged by the learned Professor that the *Gītā* does not entirely reject the way of knowledge or jñānamārga.[90]" Hence if the jñānamarga is there, the Vyakta upāsanā. the Aparāvidyā, must be accepted to be simply instrumental to it. The *Gītā*, in our opinion, therefore, suggests the synthetic gradation of Aparāvidyā and Parāvidyā, the Karmasamuccaya, which is later developed by Śaṅkara and his disciple Sureśvara.

Thirdly, the *Gītā* develops the doctrine of māyā when it solves "the problem of the transformation of the

[88] Radhakrishnan and other op. cit. p. 102.
[89] Ibid. p. 102.
[90] Ibid. p. 100.

impersonal Absolute into a personal God" "by the supposition that it is due to māyā or cosmic illusion; in other words, it is a mystery" and explains in the same way "the relation of the Absolute to the world.[91]"

(d) *THE APHORISTIC ADVAITA*

(i) *Kāśakṛtsna*

The *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa records the several ācāryas of Vedānta, among whom, besides Bādarāyaṇa himself, Kāśakṛtsna appears in all likelihood to be an Advaitin. It is generally supposed that he is one of the earliest aphorists of Vedānta although his *Brahmasūtra* is lost to us. Bādarāyaṇa refers to his views in one sūtra[92] and both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja elaborate them in their comments. From these sources it is gathered that Kāśkṛtsna is an Advaitic precursor of Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta.

In the aphoristic period the Vedāntins attempt to critically examine the Upaniṣadic equation of Brahman and Ātman. Āśmarathya, although meaning to say that the individual soul is not entirely different from the highest soul (Brahman), yet intimates that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest soul and the individual soul.[93] He understands the identity in terms of casuality. Another ācārya, Auḍulomin, takes the same identity for identity-and-difference and holds that the difference and the non-difference of the individual soul and the highest soul depend respectively on

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[91] Ibid. p. 99.

[92] B. S. I. 4.22.

[93] B. S. I. 4.20.

आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादनन्यत्वम्
अभिप्रेतं तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभि-
धानात् कार्यकारणभावः कियानभिप्रेत इति गम्यते।

B. S. I. 4. 22

the state of bondage and emancipation of the individual soul.[94] In contradistinction to these two opinions the ācārya Kāśakṛtsna maintains the absolute identity between the individual soul and the highest soul.[95] He conceives the identity as pure or absolute and distinguishes it from causality and identity-and-difference. Śaṅkara holds that of these three ācāryas only the opinion of Kāśakṛtsna is in accordance with the Śruti.[96] The conception of identity between Brahman and Ātman is thus clearly differentiated from that of causality and of identity-and-difference by Kāśakṛtsna who in this respect pushes the Upaniṣadic Advaita to a further step which is fully developed by Śaṅkara in later times. Mr. Buddhakara has observed that "many of the Anti-Māyā-vādin commentators, beginning from Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara who came after Śaṅkara down to Vijñānabhikṣu frankly admit that he (Kāśakṛtsna) held the same view which Śaṅkara holds.[97] Dr. Belvalkar has shown on the authority of the *Prakāśa* on Vallabha's *Aṇubhāṣya* that "Kāśakṛtsna attributes the Bheda as due to the avidyā or nescience.[98]"

(*ii*) *BĀDARĀYAṆA*

There is little controversy over the advaitic view of Kāśakṛtsna whose *Brahmasūtra* is lost to us. But there is a lot of controversies over the advaitic view of Bādarā-

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[94] B. S. I. 4.21—
औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते।
B. S. B. I. 4.22.

[95] B. S. I. 4.22.
काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्य अविकृतः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति मतम् ।
B. S. B. I. 4.22.

[96] तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते,
प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थानुसारात् "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः।
Ibid. I. 4.22.

[97] Op. cit. pp. 163, 258.

[98] Vedānta Philosophy p. 167.

yaṇa whose *Brahmasūtra* is available to us. It has been contended by Max Muller,[99] Jacobi,[100] Thibaut,[101] Keith,[102] Urquahart,[103] Bhandarkar,[104] Radhakrishnan[105]

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[99] "It is quite possible that Bodhāyana like Rāmānuja represented a more ancient and more faithful interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras and that Śaṅkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Bādarāyaṇa's."
Six Systems, p. 153.

[100] "I venture to presume that this interpretation (Interpretation of the Vṛttikāra on B. S. II. 2.28-32 as preserved intact in the Śābara-bhāṣya on the Mīmāṁsāsūtras (I. 1.57) comes nearer the meaning of the original, than that given either by Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja, for these commentators living several centuries after the Vṛttikāra did violence to the text because they felt obliged to introduce into their comments the substance ofcontroversies which happened long after the time of the Sūtrakāra." J. A.O.S. Vol. 31 pp. 23-24. The dates of the Philosophical sūtras of the Brāhmanas by Hermann Jacobi. See also J. A. O. S. Vol. 33, Māyāvāda by the same author p. 53. "The Brahmasūtras do not teach the Māyāvāda."

[101] "The system of Bādarāyaṇa had greater affinities with that of the Bhāgawats and Rāmānuja than with the one of which the Śāṅkara-bhāsya is the classical exponent"......... "If so, the philosophy of Śaṅkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upaniṣads than the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Thibaut S. B. E. Vol. 34 Introduction pp. C. and CXXVI.

[102] "The Brahmasūrta itself did not take the view adopted by Śaṅkara; it is now certain, thanks to the efforts of Thibaut, Sukhatankar and Jacobi, among others, that the real view taken by the commentary of Rāmānuja. The view of that Scholar was that the explanation of the world and of the individual souls as mere products of illusion. enveloping the nature of the Brahman, was wholly wrong: on the contrary the two elements, the world and the individual souls, had a definite entity of their own, which was perfectly real." Keith Op. Cit. p. 508.

[103] The Vedānta and Modern Thought p. 47 "Śaṅkara is not a very faithful interpreter of the Sūtras."

[104] "There are two doctrines indicative of the relation of God to the world, the so-called Parināmavāda and the Vivartavāda...... This last is the doctrine of Śaṅkarācārya,......—while the first is that clearly held by the author of the Sūtras" Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, pp. 227-228.

and DasGupta[105] that Bādarāyaṇa is not an Advaitin of Śaṅkara's type. On the other hand Gough,[106] Garbe,[107] Deussen,[108] P. D. Sastri[109] and Buddhakara[110] have maintained that Śaṅkara's Advaita is a natural and legitimate development of Bādarāyaṇa's. M. M. Kavirāja has pointed out on the authority of the *Bhakti-Sūtra* of Śāṇḍilya that Bādarāyaṇa has been passing for an Advaitin from a very ancient time.[111] Buddhakara has discovered from the early Jaina, Buddha and literary sources that they meant the Advaita by the words, Brahmavāda, Aupaniṣada and Vedānta.[122] These external testimonies conclusively establish that Śaṅkara's doctrine is not out of court so far as the Sūtras are concerned.[113]" Śaṅkara,[114] Rāmā-

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[105] Throughout his commentary on the Brahmasūtras, there is ample evidence that he (Śaṅkara) was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upaniṣads partly favoured the Sāṅkhya cosmology of the existence of Prakṛti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the Brahmasūtras is proved by the fact that Śaṅkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty. *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. pp 432-433.

[106] Op. Cit. pp. 248-251.

[107] Garbe holds that "it is Rāmānuja who introduces into Bādarāyaṇa's treatize views which are alien to the true Vedāntic doctrine" Urquahart Op. cit. 47.

[108] "He (Śaṅkara) is nowhere in contradiction to the Sūtras." System of the Vedānta p. 27.

[109] Śaṅkara is "the best and most satisfactory exponent of Bādarāyaṇa's views on the Vedānta problems"—quoted from the Doctrine of Māyā in the Vedānta and Modern Thought by Urquahart p. 47.

[110] Op. cit. 253. "It is, therefore, necessary to see how far Śaṅkara makes the nearest possible approach to the original intention of the Sūtras."

[111] *Acyuta*, Vol. III. No. 4. pp. 7 and note 8. The Bhaktisūtra of Śāṇḍilya under reference is आत्मैकपरां बादरायणः

(Bhaktisūtra, 30).

[112] Op. cit. pp. 5-13.

[113] See. The Vedanta by Dr. V. S. Ghate p. 175 for the opposite view.

[114] सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण तदनन्यत्वमित्याह।
व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु स्याल्लोकवदिति महासमुद्रस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति।
B. S. B. II. 1.13.

nuja[115] and Śivakaṇṭha[116] state that Bādarayāṇa holds identical views with Kāśakṛtsna. Hence, if Kāśakṛtsna is an Advaitic precursor of Śaṅkara's Advaita, there is no reason why Bādarāyaṇa should belong to a different tradition. Dualism (Bhedavāda) and dualism-cum-non-dualism (Bhedavāda) are clearly twice stated in the *Brahmasūtra* in I-4-20-21 and III. 2.27-28 and criticized respectively in I. 4.22 and II. 2.29. Dr. Belvalkar, therefore, rightly asserts that "Monism is the unambiguous teaching of the sūtras, no less than the vast majority of the Upanisads" and further that "we are not required to compromise the sūtrakāra's philosophical position by admitting any vacillating, Bhedābheda" forms of it.[117]" It may be added here that all interpretations of the *Brahmasūtras* based on dualism-cum-non-dualism or qualified non-dualism are as far removed from the original intention of Bādarāyaṇa as the dualistic ones. In fact the former interpretations are nothing but dualism in dis guise. In view of these observations it is difficult for us to agree with Dr. Thibaut that "the system of Bādarāyaṇa had greater affinities with that of the Bhāgawata and Rāmānuja than with those of which the Śaṅkarabhāṣya is the classical exponent", or with Dr. Ghate that the system of Bādarāyaṇa "can be at most the bhedābheda system of Nimbārka, according to which both bheda and abheda are equally real, without any subordination of one to the other[118]", or with the votaries of any other explicitly or implicitly dualistic interpretations of the *Brahmasūtra*.

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115 काशकृत्स्नीयमेवमतंसूत्रकारः स्वीकृतवान्।
Śrībhāṣya I. 4.22.

116 इदमेव मतं सूत्रकारस्य मतद्वयमुपन्यस्य तद्विरोधेनैतद्अभिधानाद् अनन्यस्याभिधानाच्च निश्चीयते।
Brahmamīmāṁsā II. 2.35.

117 Op. cit. pp. 171, 172.

118 Op. cit. p. 183.

F. 26

The main difficulties why some savants discredit Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras* as out of court are that besides absolutism they teach theism and creationism (Pariṇāmavāda) also. These scholars start with the views that Śaṅkara teaches the doctrine of two Brahmans and Vivartavāda as against the doctrine of a personal Brahman and Pariṇāmavāda of the *Brahmasūtras*. As regards the view of the two Brahmans it has been shown very clearly by Dr. R. P. Singh that "there are not two metaphysical principles in Śaṅkara, one to account for the existence of the universe and the other to insure the attainment of the summum bonum of life.[119]" The definition of Brahman given in the *Brahmasūtra* I. 1.2 is thus not, pace Dr. Thibaut, the definition of a principle lower than the highest Ātman; it is the definition of the highest Ātman or Brahman. The *Brahmasūtras* thus open with the definition of Brahman which is perfectly accepted by Śaṅkara. Further as regards the presence of Vivartavāda or Māyāvāda in the *Brahmasūtras* it has been maintained by impartial scholars that the doctrine is explicitly found in the Sūtras II. 1.13, II. 1.28 and III 3.5.[120] and is implicitly involved in II.1. 14..[121] Besides Dr. Belvalkar, commenting on I. 4.20-22, states that "the fullfledged doctrine of Māyā is implicit and can be logically deduced from the premises" although "the Sūtrakāra has not made the deduction.[122]" These observations are sufficient to explode the views of those who first misinterpret Śaṅkara's Advaita and then bring the charge that he is not faithful to Bādarāyaṇa.

The strongest evidence that Bādarāyaṇa belongs to the tradition of Śaṅkara is what he has written in the

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[119] The Vedānta of Śaṅkara p. 296 ff.

[120] Gough Op. cit. 248-251.

[121] Deussen-Philosophy of the Upanisads pp. 184-185.

[122] Op. cit. p. 157 note.

Tarkapāda. Here he has criticized, even according to the critics of Śaṅkara like Dr. Ghate,[123] all sorts of theism, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva and Śākta into which all non-Śaṅkarite interpretations of the Brahmasūtras are divided. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Tarkapāda is the most satisfactory natural and logical inasmuch as he holds that all systems referred to in the pāda are meant for criticism and that they include Śaivism and Pañcarātra, the nucleus of all theistic interpretations. We shall now turn to the main contributions of Bādarāyaṇa to Advaita.

(*i*) He strung together all the metaphysical passages of the Upaniṣads[124] and thus supplied for the first time a comprehensive and systematic account of the teachings of Vedānta at one place. Since the Upaniṣads teach both Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā, the former transcendentally and the latter empirically, the *Brahmasūtras* also embody the same teachings in the same manner.[125] The author of the *Brahmasūtras* is on this account often called as "The arranger" (Vyāsa).

(*ii*) Bādarāyaṇa outdated the earlier attempts of systematizing the metaphysical passages of the Upaniṣads simply because he made his works "Sarvaśākhīya" as Dr. Belvalkar[126] says, or in other words, acceptable to all the schools or Śākhās of the Vedas viz., he incorporated in a synthetic manner the teachings of all the Upaniṣads of all the Śākhās. The earlier *Brahmasūtras* were, in all likeli-

[123] Op. cit. 84-89.

[124] वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम् ।
B. S. S. I. 1.2.

[125] See Supra note 114.

[126] Op. cit. Lecture IV. Dr. Belvalkar has talked of three recensions of the present Brahmasūtra, but this is his mere conjecture. He is not sure about this. See his article "Multiple authorship of the Vedāntasūtras," Indian Philosophical Review Vol. II. No. 2.

hood, only *pratiśākhīya* viz. confined to a particular Vedic school.

(*iii*) He developed dialectics out of the Upaniṣads and criticized the current schools of philosophy of his times. Henceforth Advaita becomes critical par excellence: the Tarkapāda is no less in significance than the catuḥsūtrī. The dialectics used in all sections except the Tarkapāda deal with the principles of exegesis which are adopted from Karmamīmāṁsā.[127] The dialectics of the Tarkapāda, on the other hand, are the rational refutation of the views of the opponents. The critertion of criticism is usually self-consistency.[128] An important "feature of the Sūtrakāra's dialectics is what may be called" the proof by exhaustion," by showing in other words, that everyone of the several alternatives conceivable in the case is untenable as leading to some illogical or unpropitious consequences (aniṣṭaprāpti or prasakti).[129] This is the adoption of the catuṣkoṭic Nyāya which was first originated by Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta as is evident from the *Brahmajāla-sutta*[130] and which was later developed by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva on the one hand and by Vedānta and Sāṅkhya teachers on the other. The formal fallacies of logic, used by the Sūtrakāra, are the absence or the inadequacy of a **dṛṣṭānta**, the negation of the basic premises (Pratijñāhāni), the *regressus ad infinitum* (anavasthā) and Svapakṣadoṣa or inability to solve the same difficulties in one's own system for which the opponent is taken to task.[131]

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[127] See Belvalkar Op. cit. 154. The principles of exegesis are all mentioned in the following verse—

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासाऽपूर्वताफलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिंगं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ।।

[128] Ibid. p. 155.
[129] Ibid. p. 155.
[130] Catuṣkoṭi, Jha Commemoration volume p. 91.
[131] Dr. Belvalkar Op. cit. p. 155.

The logical character of the Sūtras is evidenced from start to finish. They clothe the Upaniṣadic Advaita into a logical garment.

(*iv*) Bādarāyaṇa brings the support of some Smṛtis also to establish his conclusions. This tendency is largely due to his attempt to relate the Smṛtic and the Upaniṣadic developments of Advaita. An important argument with him for rejection of the views of certain Smṛtis and schools of philosophy is the rejection of the same by the cultural people (Śiṣṭaparigraha).

(*v*) Bādarāyaṇa's important contributions to Advaita metaphysics are the definition of Brahman, Janmādyasya yataḥ (I. I.2), the proof for Brahman, Tattu samanvayāt (I. 1.4), ananyatva (Non-otherness=non-difference) as the relation between the world and Brahman II. 1.14 and the suggestion of the stand-points of Paramārtha and Vyavahāra with the help of which monism and pluralism, idealism and realism and transcendentalism and Pantheism are combined in the *Brahmasūtras*. These metaphysical doctrines are further elaborated in the later works of Advaita.

(e) THE PRE-GAUDAPĀDA ADVAITA

The Pre-Gauḍapāda period of Advaita Vedānta is generally supposed to be dark, but we shall see in the sequel that this supposition is exploded.

(*i*) *Upavarṣa*

The first Advaitin who comes after Bādarāyaṇa is Upavarṣa. Śaṅkara, like Śabara Swāmī before him, mentions his name with reverence and informs that he "remarks in the first tantra (Pūra-Mīmāṁsā) where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self—'we will discuss this in the Śārīraka, and

allows the matter to rest there.[132]" From this important reference it is gathered that Upavarṣa has commented on both the Mīmāṁsāsūtra of Jaimini and the Śārīrakasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa and that he has countenanced the view that the doctrine of self (Ātmavāda) is the exclusive monopoly of the latter. The doctrine is therefore only incidentally discussed in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā as its proper place is the Śārīrakasūtra, specially III. 3.53. This view is latterly corroborated by Kumārila also.[133] It initiates the principle that the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā presupposes the Advaitic doctrine of self[134] and that there is no conflict between the two systems.[135]

Śaṅkara further informs that "from hence (from the system of the Śārīrakasūtra) the teacher Śabara-Swāmī has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in the chapter treating the means of right knowledge.[136]" The that portion of the *Śabarabhāṣya* which is celebrated as
that portion of the *Śabarabhāṣya* which is celebrated as
the Vṛttikāragrantha. On the authority of Maṇḍana

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[132] भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्र आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः।

B. S. B. III. 3.53. See Thibaut's translation S. B. E. Vol. 38 p. 268.

[133] इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या। दृढ़त्वमेतद् विषयस्तु बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन।

Ślokavārtika.

In all likelihood Kumārila here refers to Upavarṣa's commentary on the B. S.

[134] B. S. B. III. 3.53. See S. B. E. Vol. 38 p. 268. "If there were no self different from the body, there would be no room for injunctions that have the other world for their result."

[135] जैमिनीये च वैयासे विरुद्धांशो न कश्चन।
श्रुत्वा वेदार्थविज्ञाने श्रुतिपारं गतौ हि तौ।

Quoted in the Advaitabrahmasiddhi (Bibliotheca Indica) p. 54.

[136] इत एव चाकृष्य आचार्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणलक्षणे वर्णितम्।

B. S. B. III. 3.53.

Miśra's Mīmāṁsā Sūtrānukramaṇikā Dr. G. N. Jha has rightly pointed out that the Vṛttikāragrantha "starts with page 7, line 18, and ends with the end of the Bhāṣya[137]" on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra I. 1.5, page 24, line 11 of the Bibliotheca text; it does not end with p. 18, line 6 as was supposed by the editor. It has been further pointed out by Pandit Chattopadhyaya that "Śabara gives only the views of the Vṛttikāra" in his own words.[138] From the reference to the Vṛttikāragrantha in the Śārirakabhāṣya of Śaṅkara it is clear that a large portion of the Vṛttikāragrantha has been taken from a commentary on the Śārirakasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa. The discussion of the existence of soul, called Ātmavāda, in the Vṛttikāragrantha from page 19, line 1 to page 24, line 1 of the Bibliotheca text is thus taken from the comments of the Vṛttikāra on the B. S. III. 3. 53-54, and as Professor Jacobi[139] has pointed out the criticism of Buddhism in the same text from page 8, line 21 to page 10, line 10 is from the comments of the same author on the B.S. II. 2.28-32. The Vṛttikāra is identified with Upavarṣa by Dr. G. N. Jha.[140] This identification is suggested by Śaṅkara who seems to justify the transcription of the Vṛttikāragrantha in the Śabarabhāṣya after the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra I. 1.5 from Upavarṣa's commentary on the Śārīrakasūtra by stating that Upavarṣa postponed the discussion of the existence of self in his comments on the Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra I. 5. to those on the B. S. III. 3.53. It seems that what Upavarṣa postponed in his commentary on the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra

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[137] English Translation of the Śābarabhāṣya p. 9.

[138] Jha Commemoration volume, References to Buddhist Philosophy in the Vṛttikāragrantha of Śābarabhāṣya, p. 117.

[139] J. A. O. S. Vol. 31, p. 23, "We actually find in the passage from the Vṛttikāra the substance of a commentary on the B. S. II. 2. 28-32."

[140] Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā p. 113 and translation of Ślokavārtika, Introduction p. iii.

for his commentary on the Śārīrakasūtra was transcribed from the latter by Śabara-Swāmī in the Vṛttikāragrantha in order to complete the discussion raised in the former as the Vṛttikāragrantha in fact gives the substance of Upavarṣa's both commentaries. But Professor Jacobi thinks that the Vṛttikāra "must be not only different from, but also considerably older than" Upavarṣa "as the Bhagawān Upavarṣa is mentioned in the very passage from the Vṛttikāra[141]" viz. in the Vṛttikāragrantha itself. The objection of the learned professor rests on the belief that the whole Vṛttikāra-grantna is the *ipsissima verba* of the Vṛttikāra. But as we have seen above this belief is hardly correct. It is important to note that Śabara mentions the name of Upavarṣa in connection with the doctrine that letters are the word. Śaṅkara does the same in his comments on the B. S. I. 3.28. Now when Śaṅkara further attributes the Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra-Vṛtti, and the Śārīrakasūtra-Vṛtti to Upavarṣa, it is clear that in his mind the Vṛttikāra of the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra and the Brahmasūtra is Upavarṣa. But this Vṛttikāra should not be confused with the author of any of those Vṛttis on the Brahmasūtra at which Saṅkara attacks.

Śabara, moreover, by mentioning Upavarṣa as Vṛttikāra at the very outset intends to simply refer to his Vṛtti. It shows that Upavarṣa has become celebrated as the Vṛttikāra by that time. It is further remarkable that it is not unlikely in Indian literature to refer to an author sometimes by his work and sometimes by his name. Śaṅkara for example sometimes refers to the author of the Brahmasūtras as simply Sūtrakāra while at others as ācārya Bādarāyaṇa. It is also found that Indian scholars mention their names in the third person in their own works. In the light of these considerations we think, that the mention of the name of Upavarṣa in the Vrtti-

[141] J. A. O. S. Vol. 31 p. 17 Also Śābarabhāṣya p. 13, line 8.

kāragrantha the identification of the Vṛttikāra with Upavarṣa.

Upavarṣa is credited with the earliest commentary on the Brahmasūtra. The following can be taken as his main contributions to Advaita:—

(1) He introduces the intrinsic validity (Svataḥ prāmāṇya) and extrinsic invalidity (Parataḥ aprāmāṇya). "Only that cognition is wrong the means whereof are defective, or, with regard to which there is a sublative cognition that it is wrong,' and no other cognition can be regarded as wrong. And as all cognitions are not wrong......, there can be no need for any examination of the means of cognition in general.[142]

(2) He enumerates for the first time as far as our knowledge goes, the six Pramāṇas, perception (Pratyakṣa), inference (anūmāna), Śāstra (Śabda), analogy (upamāna), Presumption (arthāpatti) and non-apprehension (abhāva).[143]

(3) The self which is imperishable must be something distinct from the cognition which is evanescent.[144]

(4) "The self, the cogniser, is self-cognised. He cannot be perceived by another, how then could he be pointed out to another? Just as, for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour. but he cannot point it out to another who is blind, and yet, simply because the colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist; in the same manner, a person cognises his own self, but cannot point it out to another person, for the simple reason that (like the blind man) this other person does not possess the capacity to perceive the said self (of the former person); and yet this other

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142 Śābara-bhāṣya : English Translation by Dr. G. N. Jha pp. 11-12.

143 Ibid. pp. 15-16.

144 Ibid. p. 29.

person cognises his own self, but not the self of other persons.[145]"

5. "By what means then can one self be explained to another ?... It cannot be asserted that the self has such and such a form;' the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying what the other person regards as self; that is, if the other person regards the Body as the self, he is taught that 'the Body is not the self, is something different from the Body;—where the teaching of self is done by denying the body. Lastly that 'the person (or self) is not different from one who perceives himself' is also inferred from the activities of the person himself. ...... The only means of knowing things is to realise that everything is as it is cognised to be. For instance what is 'white?' It is that in which there is whiteness, i.e. that to which the term, 'white' is applied. To what the term 'white' is applied ? It is applied to that which is cognised (understood) whenever the term 'white' is uttered. From this it will be seen that if we leave aside cognition we cannot indicate anything at all.[146]

It is now clear that Upavarṣa clearly formulates the epistemology of Advaita. It seems that he initiates the view that the only and proper subject matter of Advaita is Self.

(*ii*) *BRAHMANANDIN*

Brahmanandin, the author of Chāndogya Vākya (Chandogya-Vākyakāra) fully anticipates the māyāvāda of Śaṅkara. According to Madhusūdana Saraswatī's comments on the Śaṅkṣepa-Śārīraka of Sarvajñātmā III. 217-220, the views of Brahmanandin are preserved intact therein although his Chāndogya-Vākyas are lost to us.

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145 Ibid. p. 29.
146 Ibid. p. 130,

In the opinion of Brahmanandin all effects or things are merely empirically real (Saṁvyavahāramātram).[147] This means, as Madhusūdana Saraswatī shows, that causality has only empirical meaning. Brahmanandin at first describes the views of real transformation of things (Pariṇāmavāda) and then gradually abandoning this view accepts that all transformation is only apparent (Vivartavāda). Thus he safeguards only Advaita[148] and courts vivartavāda.[149] He suggests that Pariṇāmavāda is the initial Vivartavāda and contrasts the stand point of Saṁvyavahāra with that of the truth or Paramārtha.[150]

(iii) DRAVIḌĀCĀRYA

Draviḍācārya is celebrated for a commentary on the Chāndogya-Vākyas of Brahmanandin. According to the

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147 आत्रेयवाक्यमपि संव्यवहारमात्रम् ।
कार्यं समस्तमिति नः कथयाम्बभूव ॥
Saṅkṣepaśārīraka. III. 217.

Madhusūdana Saraswatī in this context says—
कार्यकारणभावादेः संव्यवहारमात्रत्वं ब्रह्मनन्दिनाप्याचार्येण छान्दोग्यभाष्ये . . . उक्तम् ।

148 पूर्वं विकारमुपवर्ण्य शनैः शनैस्तद्
दृष्टिं विसृज्य निकटं परिगृह्य तस्मात् ।
सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्र-
मद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ॥
Ibid. III. 220.

149 तथा च ब्रह्मनन्दिवर्णिताधिकारिदृष्टचपेक्षया षष्ठेऽध्याये विवर्तमेव विदांचकार ।
Quoted by Buddhakar Op. cit. p. 17.

150 Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka, III. 219.

151 अन्तर्गुणा भगवती परदेवतेति प्रत्यग्गुणेति भगवानपि भाष्यकारः ।
आह स्म यन्तदिह निर्गुणवस्तुवादे संगच्छते न तु पुनः सगुणप्रवादे ।
Ibid. III. 221.

Vide Madhusūdana Saraswatī's comments on the verse. Also "Bodhāyana and Dramiḍācārya, two old Vedāntins presupposed by Rāmānuja by Kuppūswāmī Śāstrī P. O. C. III pp. 496. Draviḍācārya presupposed by Śaṅkara is different form Dramiṇācārya presupposed by Rāmānuja—*Ibid*. p. 470

former the supreme existence of the latter is compatible only with the nirguṇa-Brahman, not with the saguṇa-Brahman.[151]

On the authority of Śaṅkara's references it is presumed that Draviḍācārya had written a commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣad[152] and a Vedāntasūtra,[153] both of which seem to have been lost to us for good. According to Ānandagiri, Draviḍācārya holds the view that cosmological passages in the Upaniṣads are part of the Advaitic passages like "That thou art" (tat tvam asi).[154] This amounts to the doctrine that the cosmologies of the Upaniṣads are handmaidens to Advaita metaphysics which is their only purport. To illustrate the identity between the individual soul and the highest self Draviḍācārya has narrated a story which is described by Sureśvara,[155] Ānandagiri[156] and Mādhavācārya.[157] The story is this—A certain prince was brought up by a huntsman from his very birth. He therefore, forgot that he was the prince and believed himself to be the son of the huntsman. This belief led him to perform the duties of a huntsman. But once it so happened that he met a sage who recognised by his princely signs what he was in reality. Thereupon he was told by the sage, "You are a prince, not a huntsman." The erstwhile huntsman at once remembered that he was a

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[152] MM. Gopīnātha Kavirāja Op. cit. p. 16.

[153] A. S. B. II. 32.

सिद्धं तु निवर्तकत्वात् इत्यागमविदां सूत्रम्।

vide Ānandagiri's gloss on it.

[154] तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमैक्यपरं तच्छेषः सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यमित्युक्तेऽर्थे द्रविडाचार्यसम्मतिमाह।

Ānandagiri on B. B. II. 1.19.

[155] Sambandha-Vārtika, verses 233-234 and B. V. pp. 970 ff. verses 506-527.

[156] Ānandagiri's gloss on B. B. II. 1.19.

[157] Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha ed. by Abhyaṅkar pp. 465-466.

prince giving up his previous calling adopted his real princely conduct. He then experienced "I am the prince." The story very aptly describes how the individual soul is in reality the highest self, how it forgets what it is and assumes a different character, how it is awakened by some enlightened teacher and finally how it forsakes its assumed character and realizes its real identity with the highest self. No wonder then if it has become a classical illustration of the teaching of 'tat tvam asi' and the consequent realization of 'so'ham asmi' in the later Vedānta literature.

In a very succinct aphorism "It (self as pure Identity) is proved on account of its responding to negation." Siddham tu nivartakatvāt,[158] Draviḍācārya tries to relate the double aspects, the positive and the negative, of the Advaita dialectic. The problem is 'what is the relation between 'etad vai tad' (identity between Ātman and Brahman) and 'neti neti' (negation of every view)? Out of the realization of Identity and the negation of duality, which is the cause and which is the effect? Draviḍācārya seems to appreciate the problem when he gives its solution that the negation of duality is the cause of (or prior to) the realization of identity.

(iv) *SUNDARAPANḌYA*

Sundarapāṇḍya, whose Kārikās are quoted by Kumārila, Śaṅkara and Amalānanda, among others, is known to have written a Vārtika on Pūrvottara Mīmāṁsā i.e. on both the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and the Uttara Mīmāṁsā.[159] In all likelihood his Vārtika was an original commentary in verse upon the commentary of Upavarṣa on both the Mīmāṁsāsūtra of Jaimini and the Śārīrakasūtra of Bāda-

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[158] Supra note 153.

[159] Gopīnātha Kavirāja Op. cit. p. 17 ff. and "Some problems of Identity in the Cultural History of Ancient India" By S. Kuppūswāmī Śāstrī J. A. R., Madras, Vol. II. p. 15 ff.

rāyaṇa. The following can be listed as the main contributions of Sundarapāṇḍya to Advaita:—

1. He includes all the six Pramāṇas of Upavarṣa under the class of 'the ordinary sources of knowledge' with which he contrasts the knowledge of self. The ordinary sources of knowledge are valid only until the one self is ascertained.[160] That is the six Pramāṇas (sources of knowledge) cannot reveal self and when self-knowledge is rendered possible, they become not only fallacious but also impossible.[161] Sundarapāṇḍya thus not only conceives in clear terms the distinction between relative knowledge (aśeṣa—jñāna) but also distinguishes clearly the means of the former from that of the latter.

2. As the means of Absolute knowledge he indicates the method of adhyāropa and apavāda.[162] The characterless Brahman can be described by the method of superimposition and consequent sublation *adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate*. Adhyāropa (sperimposition) and apavāda (sublation=negation) are the clear-cut formulations of the erstwhile positive and nega-

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160 अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मन. ।
अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥

B. S. B. I. 1.4.

161 This view has been very beautifully described in a later work 'Sarvasiddhānta-Saṅgraha which is wrongly attributed to Śaṅkara.

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थमशेषाज्ञानबाधकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षानुमानाख्यमुपमानं तथागमः ॥
अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च प्रमाणानि षडेव हि ।
व्यावहारिकनामानि भवन्त्येतानि नात्मनि ॥

Chapter XI. 85-86.

162 We welcome the suggestion of S. Kuppūswāmī Śāstrī that the line adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate is from the Vārtika of Sundarapāṇḍya. See Br. S. Introduction P. XLV.

tive aspects of Advaita dialectic, the aspect of 'etad vai tad' and that of 'neti neti.' This contribution of Sundarapāṇḍya has become the very essence of Advaita dialectic and is still unsurpassed in its field. The absolute knowledge, it seems, according to Sundarapāṇḍya, is neither the process of superimposition nor that of negation; it is a dialectical relation of the two processes.

3. The method of adhyāropa and apavāda ultimately culminates in the realization of the supreme unity of self and of illusory character of the world. "When, owing to the sublation of the conception of body, relatives and the like, the imagination of the figurative and the false self has come to an end, how should then the effect (apparent world with all its distinctions) exist any longer."[163]

(v) *Bhartṛhari*

From the reference in the *Tattvabindu* of Vācaspati Miśra to a Kārikā of the *Vākyapadīya* Professor Pāthaka has inferred that Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, is a Buddhist.[164] Pandit K. Krishna Sharma has cast a doubt on the inference and shown that Vācaspati does not refer to the Brahmādvaitavāda of Bhartṛhari.[165] The Kāśmīrī Śaivites Somānanda and Utpala,[166] regard Bhartṛhari as an Advaitin. V. A. Rama Swami Sastri has

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[163] S. B. E. Vol. 34 p. 45 and

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात्।
सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधिकार्यं कथं भवेत्॥

B. S. B. I. 1.4.

[164] Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society Vol. 18 p. 341 ff. Vācaspati Miśra refers to Bhartṛhari in these words—

परेषामनुपाख्येयमभ्यासादेव जायते।
मणिरूपादिषु ज्ञानं तद्विदामानुमानिकम्।

Tattvabindu.

[165] P. O. Vol. V. No. I Bhartṛhari not A Buddhist, Evidence From Nearer Home p. 4 ff.

[166] Ibid. pp. 1-4.

further noticed that Pratyaksvarūpa, the author of the *Nayanaprasādinī* Ṭīkā on the *Citsukhī*, recognizes Bhartṛhari as a great knower of Brahman i.e. Advaitin.[167] Even the older Advaitin Maṇḍana Miśra quotes Bhartṛhari in order to support his views on the meaning of 'not this, not that' (neti neti).[168] From these external testimonies it is now established that Bhartṛhari is an Advaitin. It is a fact that Vācaspati Miśra regards Sphoṭavāda which Bhartṛhari maintains, as Vedabāhya (nonvaidic) and supports like Upavarṣa, Śabara Swāmī, Kumārila and Śaṅkara, Varṇavāda. But this is not a sufficient reason to exclude Bhartṛhari from the tradition of Advaita as Maṇḍana Miśra will then be alike excluded from the tradition because he also subscribes to the same view. In our opinion, therefore, Sphoṭavāda is not the part and parcel of Advaita and hence it must not be taken as distinctive character of the same.

A study of the *Vākyapadīya* itself reveals that Bhartṛhari is an Advaitin. His Advaita is known as Śabdādvaitavāda, according to which Śabda is the ultimate reality of the world. We can take the following as his main contributions to Advaita:—

(1) There is only one eternal principle, Śabda, Brahman which has neither beginning nor end and which manifests itself in the form of the phenomenal world and

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167 Journal of the Annamalai University Vol. VI. No. 2, 1937, Bhartrhari a Bauddha p. 66.

अत एव धातुसमीक्षायां ब्रह्मवित्प्रकाण्डैः भर्तृहरिभिरभिहितम्—
शुद्धतत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न हेतुरनिवृत्तितः ।
ज्ञानज्ञेयादिरूपस्य मायैव जननी ततः ॥

Nayana-Prasādinī (Nirnaya Sagar) ed. p. 60.

Dhātusamīkṣā is a book written by Bhartṛhari. See K. Madhava Krishna Sarma. A lost work of Bhartṛhari, Annals of Śrī Venketeśvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati Vol. I. pp. 64 ff.

168 Br. S. P. 26—

तथान्यैः—"सत्यमाकृतिसंहारे यदन्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।

Brahman is beyond space and time. It is infinite, pure consciousness.[169]

(2) The world is the vivarta, transfiguration, of Brahman.[170] Brahman is not the cause of the world because it is transcendental. The world is due to māyā, the Kālaśakti of Brahman.

(3) The Vedas and the Smṛtis are the sole authority on dharma which cannot be known by other pramāṇas like perception and inference.[171]

(4) Tarka is unreliable; for "however great might be a man's intellectual attainment, his well-thought out syllogism will in no time be proved fallacious by a greater intellectual giant."[172] Śaṅkara seems to have known these views of Bhartṛhari when he elaborates them in his comments on the B. S. II. 1.11.[173]

(5) Self-realization is the only means of knowing the supreme truth. But this is to be approached from the side of falsehood which may be regarded as the antecham-

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[169] दिक्कालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तचिन्मात्रमूर्तये ।
स्वानुभूत्येकमानाय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ।।
Annals of Śrī Venktesvara Oriental Institute Vol. I. p. 67.

[170] अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ।।
Vākyapadīya II. 9.

Vide Supra note 167.

[171] नागमाद्दृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।
ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ।।
Ibid. I. 30.

[172] यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ।।
Ibid. I. 34.

[173] यद्धि केन चित्तार्किकेणेदमेव सम्यज्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपादितं तदपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते, तेनापि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततोऽपरेण व्युत्थाप्यत इति प्रसिद्धं लोके, कथमेकरूपानवस्थितविषयं तर्कप्रभवं सम्यज्ज्ञानं भवेत् ?

F. 28

ber of truth.[174] This view indicates that Bhartṛhari believes in many provisional truths for knowing the final truth.

(6) Bhartṛhari is such an Advaitin as has "no compromise with religion," for he "does not accept an Īśvara apart from Śabda."[175]

We have now noticed the important contributions of several Pre-Gauḍapāda Advaitins to the fund of knowledge which they inherit from their forbears. They have furthered the development of the Upaniṣadic and aphoristic Advaita and brought it down approximately to the very doors of the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda. The doctrine of nirguṇa Brahman, the identity of Brahman and ātman, the postulate of māyā, the idea of vivarta, the compatibility of Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda, the unity of saguṇa Brahman and nirguṇa Brahman, the stand-points of paramārtha and vyavahāra, the division of knowledge into the absolute and the relative, the doctrine of six pramāṇas with their scope and limits, the double aspects of Advaita dialectics, the relation between adhyāropa and apavāda, the phenomenality or unreality of Īśvara and the provisional approaches for realization of the final truth—all these and many more allied problems are discussed by the Advaitins of the Pre-Gauḍapāda period. The material produced above on these subjects will undoubtedly dispel the false beliefs that there is no ancient tradition of Advaita, that there is a gulf between the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, that the doctrine of māyā is the fabrication of the fertile genuine of Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, and is borrowed from Buddhism, that Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are

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174 उपायः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥

175 P. O. Vol. V. I. Op. cit. p. 4.

crypto-Buddhists, and finally that Śaṅkara is not faithful to Bādarāyaṇa in his interpretation of the Brahmasūtras. Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara, it will be clear, owe to a very ancient tradition to which, as we have seen above, they refer in their works. They start their philosophy with the rich heritage of ideas which have continually been growing from the days of the *Ṛgveda to* their own times. There is no exaggeration, therefore, in saying that from stage to stage Advaita has been growing organically and that there is no graft of any doctrine from any quarters upon the system.

III. *Influence of Buddhsim on Gauḍapāda aand Śaṅkara*

We have traced the development of Advaitic concepts from the days of the *Ṛgveda* down to the times of Gauḍapāda and thus shown that there is no external influence upon Advaita. But from this it should not be inferred that Buddhism or any other system is unknown to early Advaitins. In fact, Advaitins at least from the time of Bādarāyaṇa, clearly display their sound knowledge of several other systems of philosophy and leave no stone unturned in throwing them down. They seem thus to be highly critical of other systems which on this account do not exercise any influence on the positive or constructive aspects of their system.

But both ancients and moderns with different motives have been laying the charge of crypto-Buddhism at the door of Advaita, especially as it is interpreted by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and their followers. If we ignore a pertinent remark of the Śrutaprakāśikā[177] that there were old māyāvādins, possibly referring to some men before Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and their followers, Maṇḍa-

176 Vide Supra note 39.

na Miśra and all the earlier Advaitins are thus exonerated from it. The objects of the charge are the doctrine of māyā, the doctrine of nirguṇa Brahman and the path of knowledge (jñānamārga)—practically the whole of Advaita and hence it must logically be extended to earlier Advaita also as these doctrines are not wanting there. But the critics illogically confine the same to Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and their followers. It is remarkable that these critics are neither Buddhists nor Advaitins; they are a third party with their own motives. The ancient critics are all Hindu theists, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, the author of the *Padmapurāṇa* and Vijñānabhikṣu.[177] The followers of the critics have been continuing the charge to this day. Their motive is to show that Advaita is in toto Buddhism in disguise, that it has not grown from the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the *Mahābhārata* and Smṛtis and the Brahmasūtra and its early commentaries, that it is the Buddhistic wine into the bottle of the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra* and finally that it is to be condemned in no uncertain words. These motives are hardly justified in view of the rich heritage which as laid down above Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have to their credit.

Despite these unholy and baseless motives some ancient critics like Rāmānuja and his followers and Madhvites have seriously attempted to find loopholes in

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[177] (a) महायानिकबौद्धगाथितं मायावादम्।

Bhāskarabhāṣya I. 4.45.

(b) ज्ञानमात्रमेव परमार्थ इति साधयन्तः सर्वलोकोपहासकरणं भवन्ति वेदवादच्छद्मप्रच्छन्नबौद्धनिराकरणे निपुणतरं प्रपञ्चितम्—

(c) यत् शून्यवादिनः शून्यं तदेव ब्रह्ममायिनः।
न हि लक्षणभेदोऽस्ति निर्विशेषस्त्वतस्तयोः।

(d) मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च।
मयैव कथितं देवि! कलौ ब्राह्मणरूपिणा॥

Padmapurāṇa : uttarakhaṇḍa 236.

the metaphysical doctrines of Advaita. They may be said to have honestly offered their philosophical criticism on the system. But philosophical criticism is one thing, while the equation of Advaita with Buddhism is another thing and finally to infer from the equation that Advaita as well as Buddhism are to be despised is a third something. Rāmānuja and Madhva and their followers have so much intermingled these three things that their criticisms have lost their philosophical significance. It is not the place to examine their philosophical criticisms as such. But even if we grant for argument's sake that Advaita is vitiated with several mistakes, it does not follow that it is Buddhism in disguise.

The modern critics have a sublime motive. They are not interested in mud-slinging. Their motive is to find out impartially whether Advaita owes in its historical growth for some of its doctrines to Buddhism or not. They have discovered that the doctrine of nirguṇa Brahman and the equation of Ātman with Brahman are the logical developments out of the Upaniṣads. They further recognize that Advaita and Buddhism are fundamentally opposed to each other. But they avert that the doctrine of māyā is borrowed from Buddhism by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and fitted into the system of Advaita.[178] The history of early Advaita, especially in refernce to the doctrine of māyā, as we have given above, effectively demolishes the theory of the borrowal of the doctrine. Even when this history was not discovered Professor Louis De La Vallee Poussin rightly objected to the borrowal theory

[178] V. A. Sukhtankar and Hermann Jacobi are the first advocates of this view. Jacobi says—"Gaudapāda adopted the Illusionism of the Buddhists to the teachings of the Upaniṣads...... The theory that the Māyāvāda is a Vedantic adaptation of the Śūnyavāda, has been first put forward by V. A. Sukhtankar; I may add that I perfectly agree with him." J. A. O. S. Vol. XXXIII p. 54.

and maintained "autonomous developments"[179] of the doctrine of māyā in Buddhism and Vedānta. But the theory of autonomous developments" is also challengeable as it suggests a genuine similarity between Vedāntic māyāvāda and Buddhist illusionism whereas the truth is that there is nothing common between Buddhism and advaita at this point. The conception of māyā in advaita is entirely different from that in Buddhism; the former means anirvacanīya reality while the latter is nothing but illusion.[180]

Some modern critics, nevertheless, have gone to the extent that Gàuḍapāda "was possibly himelf a Buddhist"[182] and "assmilated all the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings."[182] Jñānendra Majumdāra holds that Gauḍapāda "proceeded in the first three chapters (of the Āgamaśāstra) to elucidate the Brahman principle from the standpoint of ajātivāda quoting the Śruti and Nāgārjuna in the same breath and finished in the last chapter with a systematic summary of the Mahāyānasūtra."[183] Professor Poussin says that "Gauḍapāda maintains ajāti (once anutpatti), and denies uccheda, with the same emphasis as Bhagawat in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāparamitā* or in the *Laṅkāvatāra;* and he supports his thesis by Nāgārjuna's or Buddhapātita's favourite arguments."[184] Over and obove all, Professor Bhatta-

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179 Vedānta and Buddhism, J. R. A. S. 1910 p. 129.

180 See Buadhkar's articles in Q. J. M. S. Vol. XXIV, especially pp. 169-176 where the opposition between Buddhism and Advaita has admirably been drawn.

181 Dasgupta: A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. p. 423.

182 Ibid. p. 429. Radhakrishnan also holds the same view "Gauḍapāda gives a Vedantic adaptation of the Buddhist Śūnyavāda: Indian Philosophy Vol. II.

183 Philosophy of Gauḍapāda (Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa) J. G. N. J. I. Vol. VIII p. 118.

184 Op. Cit. p. 136.

charya who goes to the root of the problem of Buddhist influence upon Gauḍapāda maintains that in the Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa "nothing Vedantic will be found."[185] In his opinion this chapter is entirely Buddhist. It begins with a homage to the Buddha and ends with salutation to Nirvāṇa. It discusses with approval the Buddhist theories of ajātivāda and vijñānavāda and "asks us to learn certain things from the agrayāna (=Mahāyāna)."[186]

Unlike other modern critics both professors Poussin and Bhattacharya do not charge Gauḍapāda with plagiarism or crypto-Buddhism. Both maintain that Buddhism is "Vedantism in disguise."[187] Professor Bhaṭṭacharya remarks that "Gauḍapāda though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist.[188] It is further conceded by him that though Gauḍapāda "advocates the Vijñānavāda, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upaniṣadic source."[189] This all means that similarities that are noticed between Gauḍapāda and Buddhists are largely due to the fact that both draw upon a common source, viz., the Upaniṣads. But Prafessor Bhaṭṭacharya wants to suggest more than this when he shows that Gauḍapāda salutes to the Buddha, and has accepted or approved of Buddhist doctrines throughout the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa.[190]

Now this contention of Professor Bhaṭṭacharya is hardly compatible with his statement that Gauḍapāda maintains his position as a Vedāntist. If the Alātaśānti-

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[185] Op. cit. p. CXLIV.

[186] Ibid. p. CXXVI.

[187] Poussin Op. cit. p. 133. See Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya : Evolution of Vijñānavāda I. H. Q. March 1934, p. I. "As a matter of fact Buddhism owes much of its being to the Upanisads,"

[188] Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda P. CXXXII.

[189] Ibid. P. CXXXII.

[190] Ibid. P. LIV.

Prakaraṇa is entirely Buddhist, the only conclusion at which one is forced to arrive is that Gauḍapāda starts his works with Vedānta and ends with Buddhism and is for that reason a Buddhist. If he is still regarded as a Vedāntist the precise relation between the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa and Buddhism as maintained by Professor Bhattacharya, is nothing but a tour de force on his part. But, it may be objected here, "what is the difficulty in accepting Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist or crypot-Buddhist, especially in the Alātāśānti-Prakaraṇa?

The difficulty is that there is external as well as internal evidence to the effect that he is an Advaitin par excellence. Buddhist writers like Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla quote some Kārikās of the Āgamśāstra and count the work as an Upaniṣad śāstra.[191] Its four chapters separately and jointly have one and the same system of philosophy vic., Advaita. The fourth chapter, Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa, as Dr. Belvalkar says, "does not materially differ from that of the earlier Prakaraṇa."[192] In tht 85th verse of the chapter it is clearly stated that the final aim of life is the non-dual state of Brahmahood (brāhmaṇyam padam advayam). In the 99th verse the decisive line—na etad Buddhena bhāṣitam occurs. This line has been interpreted in four different ways. In order to examine them we shall give the translation of the whole verse according to them.

(1) "The fully enlightened Buddha's jñāna in the Dharmas is not attainable. Similarly, the dharmas all do not attain jñāna (That is, transcendental jñāna is unborn and touchless and so does not depend on anybody or anything for its existence. It is not like the wordly or superwordly jñāna which is relative and exists only in

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[191] Ibid. p. LXXV-LXXVI.
[192] Vedānta Philosophy P. 192.

association with the knower and the known. It is knowledge absolute). This has been said by the Buddha."[193] (Majumdara)

(2) "According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (tāyin), jñāna does not approach the dharmas (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects). But all dharmas as well as jñāna—this has not been said by the Buddha."[194] (Bhaṭṭacharya).

(3) "The Omniscient self that has secured his release possesses no knowledge (that is to say, the ordinary sense knowledge) of the Reality, and therefore has not explained it in words—(as how could he ? "Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tatra itaraḥ itaram paśyati.... abhivadati...... vijānāti)."[195] (Belvalkar).

(4) "Thought in the enlightened whose effulgence is everywhere never relates itself to objects, nor do attributes or knowledge relate themelves to anything. This however is not the same as that which is held by the "Buddhas."[196] (Manilal N. Dvivedi).

The verse[197] under discussion consists of two parts. In the first part a doctrine is laid down and in the second it is said that this doctrine was not taught by the Buddha. Now the doctrine in the first part is described in two clauses. The first clause covers the first two caraṇas of the verse and is interpreted by all almost in one and the same manner. It says that jñāna is not related to objects. The second clause consists of the third caraṇa—sarve dharmās tathā jñānam. It is simply the reverse of the prece-

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[193] J. G. J. R. I. Vol. VI. part I 1948 p. 84.

[194] Op. cit. p. 212.

[195] Op. cit. p. 206.

[196] English Translation of the Gauḍapādakārikās with Śaṅkara's gloss p. 136.

[197] क्रमते नहि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।
सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ।
A. S. IV. 99.

ding clause and states that objects are not related to jñāna. The clause has no verb and adverb of negation which are to be supplied from the preceding clause on account of the grammatical force of the conjunction "tathā" (and in the same way). Majumdara drags the particle 'na' (not) from the fourth caraṇa to the third caraṇa and thus makes the fourth caraṇa appear as—etad buddhena bhāṣitam-this has been said by the Buddha. Now this is the most objectionable interpretation. Neither grammar nor philosophy can approve of it. Grammatically 'na' cannot be split from the fourth carana inasmuch as 'tathā'' alone is sufficient to bring not only the verb but also the particle "na" from the preceeding clause. Philosophically Buddhism does not state that objects are not related to jñāna as the identity of objects and knowledge is the main thesis of Vijñānavāda. Hence Majumdara's interpretation of the verse is philosophically absurd and grammatically unwarranted.

Professor Bhattacharya interprets the first two caraṇas satisfactorily but he does not understand the third caraṇa as is provided for by the presence of the conjunction 'tathā.' He makes the caraṇa an independent sentence having no relation to the preceding caraṇas. This misinterpretation appears to have crept in at the behest of his wish to give an ingenious interpretation of the fourth caraṇa. He rightly understands it as 'this has not been said by the Buddha.' But he adds further that this simply means that "the speech of the Buddha is no speech (avacanam buddhavacanam),"[198] and quotes many parallel passages from Buddhist literature to this effect. In his opinion thus Gauḍapāda supports the statement made in Buddhist literature that the Buddha taught nothing from the night on which he received enlightenment to the night on which he attained parinirvāṇa. This interpretation is

[198] Op. Cit. p. 216.

however not borne out by history, philosophy and the context. Historically speaking Gautama Buddha had given a number of discourses to his disciples. Philosophically speaking he taught undoubtedly some principles by silence. Two interpretations have been given to his teaching by silence, absolutistic and nihilistic. The absolutistic interpretation, as Dr. Mahadevan put in, is that silence is the genuine teaching about the ultimate Reality, because the Absolute is beyond the reach of speech and thought;" while the nihilistic one is that" since nothing is real, the Buddha and what he said are also unreal.[199]" Now both the interpretations are not possible in the present context which deals with the relation of objects and knowledge. If we accept the interpretation of Professor Bhattacharya, Gauḍapāda here states that the Buddha did not teach all dharmas as well as jñāna. This means that according to Gauḍapāda the Buddha taught some dharmas as well as jñāna. Thus there is reference neither to the absolutistic nor to the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddha's silence in the words of Gauḍapāda. Dr. Mahadevan pertinently observes that "he does not say that the Buddha did not declare anything, but only that *this* was not spoken by him."[200] The philosophy of the verse is that objects are not related to jñāna and Gauḍapāda is bold to say that this philosophy was not uttered by the Buddha. Neither Vijñānavāda nor Śūnyavāda can subscribe to this philosophy as their main plan is the identity or relativity of objects with knowledge.

Dr. Belvalkar does not translate the word "buddha" in the sentence "na etad buddhena bhāṣitam" as the Buddha. Like Upaniṣadbrahmayogin, a commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās, he also understands by it the Omniscient or Enlightened Self." But this interpretation is

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199 Gauḍapāda p. 215.
200 Ibid. p. 216.

the least convincing. "The straight meaning of the words," as Professor Purohita observes, "would be that Buddha never taught that the Absolute was the final reality, though such a teaching verging on Advaita conception of the absolute Brahman or Ātman, is ascribed to him by the different Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism."[201] It is patent that the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa discusses the minute problems of Buddhism. An unweary reader may mistake the teaching of the Prakaraṇa for Buddhism. Hence it is not unnatural on the part of Gauḍapāda to preclude the possibility of the misunderstanding by stating towards the end of the Prakaraṇa that "his view is not Buddhism."[202]

The interpretation of the verse under discussion as given by Professor Dvivedi is not very objectionable. Only his translation of the third caraṇa is unconvincing. It should be "nor are objects related to knowledge." The words dharma and jñāna must not mean differently in the second and the third caraṇa. Anyway it is clear that Professor Dvivedi like Professors Radhakrishnan, Purohita and Mahadevan understands aright that Gauḍapāda's philosophy is not maintained in Buddhism.

The Advaita of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is entirely different from Buddhism. To set aside the charge of crypto-Buddhism effectively, therefore, it is necessary to emphasise their differences which have been picked up by Buddhists and Advaitins alike.

1. Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara's māyā is often mistaken for the Buddhist avidyā. But there is a great difference between the two. The former is "both a cosmic and an individual principle of self delusion" while the latter is "not cosmic, but individual."[203]

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201 P. O. C. 1935. "The Gauḍapādakārikās and Buddhism" p. 380.

202 Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy Vol. II. p. 463.

203 Prof. Purohit: Op. cit. p. 372.

(2) As Mr. Majumdara says "in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra the appearance of the phenomenal world is māyā, but it is not said that ignorance, owing to which the world-māyā spreads is also māyā."[204] But according to Gauḍapāda "the appearance of the world is māyā, igno- world-māyā, and its potency is māyā."[205] Thus Gauḍapāda's māyā is different from the Buddhist māyā.

(3) In Buddhism the cause of creation of the external world is Vāsanā which is wrongly identified with the māyā of Advaita. Māyā is connected with Ātman in Advaita while the Buddhists deny this and connect the Vāsanā with the Citta.[206]

(4) In Advaita Ātman is eternal (nitya) and devoid of all transformation (Kūṭastha). But in Buddhist Vijñānavāda Vijñaptimātratā or Ālayavijñāna is momentary and serial. The former is the principle of unity and of being and the latter that of continuity and of becoming. As Mādhavācārya says the principle of Vijñānvādins is infact a manifold while that of Advaitins is a strict unity.[207] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla criticize the Advaita doctrine of unity and eternity of knowledge although they hold in the same breath that Advaitins are to be charged with a little crime.[208] But it is remarkable that the little crime of Advaitins consists in that they regard vijñāna (Ātman) to be one and eternal which no Buddhists can accept. In view of this difference Professor Bhattacharya's remark that "Gauḍapāda's Brahman and the

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[204] J. G. J. R. I. Vol. IX Part I p. 369.

[205] Ibid. p. 370.

[206] Professor V. Bhattacharya: Op. cit. p. CXXXIII.

[207] विज्ञानवादी क्षणिकत्वमेषामंगीचकारापि बहुत्वमेषः।
वेदान्तवादी स्थिरसंविदेकेत्यंगीचकारेति महान् विशेषः॥
Śaṅkaradigvijaya XVI. 78.

See also Dr. Mahadevan Op. cit. p. 201.

[208] See Tattvasaṅgraha with Pañjikā G. O. S. Vol. I pp. 123-125.

citta in Vijñaptimātratā of the Yogācāras are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is nitya the latter is dhruva,[209]" is absolutely unjustified. The philosophical meaning of dhruva is completely different from its commonsense meaning which is the source of the mistaken view of the learned Professor. It is strange that although aware of the difference between the philosophical meanings of nitya and dhruva that the former does not admit of any change, while dhruva does not do so."[210] he has fallen a victim to the linguistic fallacy of equivocation.

(5) The Śūnya of Mādhyamikas is by and large supposed to be the same as the Brahman of Advaitins. Śaṅkara himself is aware of this probable misunderstanding That is why he anticipates and removes it.[211] He finds that Śūnyavāda is self-stultified.[212] Brahman is not to be conceived objectively but as revealing itself within us. Had it not been the same as Ātman, it might have been pure being and for that matter as pure nothing. But since Brahman is Ātman, it is not mere being or mere nothing or Śūnya.[213]

(6) Ajātivāda which is common to both Advaita and Buddhism is not the same in the two systems. In Advaita as Professor Purohit holds it "means both 'non-origination' (Tatpuruṣa) and 'unborn' (Bahuvrīhi).[214] Thus with a double entendre it is at once the negation of creation and assertion of the absolute reality. In Buddhism, however, it simply denotes the negation of creation.

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[209] Op. cit. p. CXLII.

[210] Ibid. p. CXL.

[211] तथा च शून्यवादः प्रसज्येत्।

[212] शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति

B. S. B. II. 3.7.

[213] See Outlines of Indian Philosophy by M. Hiriyanna p. 375 note 3.

[214] Op. cit. p. 353.

In view of these and other allied differences it is not possible to hold that Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are crypto-Buddhists. But while this conclusion is accepted by many savants there seems a prevalent belief that Mādhyamikas and Advaitavādins agree "in methods."[215] Even Dr. Mahādevan who denounces the charge of crypto-Buddhism in no uncertain words, appears to believe that "Buddhist phraseology and dialectic are used by Gauḍapāda in the Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa.[216]" If we ponder over the difference between Advaita and Mādhyamika dialectics it will be clear that the two are entirely different from each other.

There are two aspects of advaita dialectic positive and negative, etad vai tad (or tat tvam asi) and neti-neti. The former aspect is called by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara as Advaita or ananyatva. In contradistinction to this double pronged dialectic the Mādhyamika dialectic is simply the rejection of all views and is as such simply the negative aspct of the Advaita dialectic. The distinction between the two dialectics has beautifully been drawn by Śrī Harṣa.

"This is the difference between Buddhism and Advaita: The former exposes the falsehood of everything and the latter notices the non-difference of everything from Brahman."[217]

It is true that Advaitins also use the negative form of the dialectic. But there is an important difference between Advaitic and the Buddhist use of the same. Negation or rejection for Advaitins is grounded into non-difference or

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[215] Mr. Faddegon quoted in the "Gauḍapāda" by Dr. Mahadevan p. 202.

[216] Ibid. p. 212.

[217] सुगतब्रह्मवादिनो विशेषः यदादिमः।
सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूते द्वितीयस्तदनन्यताम्।

Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya.

identity of Brahman,[218] while it is baseless for the Buddhists. As Professor Hiriyanna puts in "negation is only a preliminary to affirmation," for "the negative statement is not to be understood in isolation, but along with positive ones like tat tvam asi."[219] The Mādhyamika dialectic which has nothing positive to fall back upon is a logical impossibility like the son of a barren woman. Gauḍapāda has simply brought home to the Mādhyamikas that their dialectic needs the logical support of identity of all things or views else it is not possible. If he agrees with the Buddhists on any preliminary issues it is due to the positive aspect of his dialectic which compels him to persuade the Buddhists to be *an rapport* with him. The Buddhists at least in India never used this dialectic else they would have given up their metaphysical beliefs or would not have attacked at Advaita.

It must now be clear that Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are not indebted to the Buddhists for their doctrine, as well as dialectics. They were certainly not Buddhists or even Vedāntin with Buddhist predilections. They were on the contrary staunch Advaitins and critics of Buddhism.

As critics of Buddhism both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara display their sound knowledge of Buddhist doctrines. They freely use Buddhist phraseology. But the use of the phraseology does not mean that they accept Buddhism. Further as Buddhists are a divided house they have great controversies among themselves. Gauḍapāda is acquainted with these controversies and utilizes them in his own favour. He uses first the idealist arguments of the Mahāyāna schools to refute the views of the realists (Sarvāstivādins) and others.[220] When this is accomplished he sub-

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[218] कंचिद्धि परमार्थमालम्ब्य अपरमार्थः प्रतिषिध्यते ।

B. S. B. III. 2.22.

[219] Op. cit. 375.

[220] A. S. IV. 25-27.

jects the idealist schools of Mahāyāna to scathing criticism and discards them.[221] As Dr. Mahadevan has pointed out "the procedure followed by Gauḍapāda is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute idealists in the West in their criticism of the Realistic doctrines.[222] The adoption of the arguments of subjectivism as a procedural or provisional device does not mean that Absolutism is identical to subjectivism or Advaita is the same as Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

The Buddhist influence on Gauḍapāda is confined only to the use of Buddhist phraseology, the adoption of the Idealist arguments as a provisional device and finally to a persuasive attitude of commending Advaita to the Buddhists. He does not make obeisance to the Buddha as Professor Bhaṭṭacharya and Majumdara maintain but to the best of bipeds who is the Nārāyaṇa of the Mahābhārata fame or the teacher of Gauḍapāda himelf as Dr. Mahadevan suggests.[223]

The tradition of Gauḍapāda is carried to its logical conclusion by his spiritual grandson Śaṅkarācārya who not merely criticizes the Realist, Idealist and Nihilist schools of Buddhism but also represents one of the main forces of uprooting Buddhism from the soil of its birth. It is strange that this greatest foe of Buddhism is charged with Crypto-Buddhism. The makers of the charge commit two great blunders, the linguistic fallacy of equivocation and the metaphysical fallacy of Identity mistake. The first fallacy means that the critics do not understand the philosophical distinctions of the use of certain common words between Buddhism and Advaita as for instance the word māyā. The second fallacy has two aspects. The first aspect consists in ignoring or mistaking the

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[221] Ibid. IV. 28.

[222] Op. cit. 198.

[223] Op. cit. p. 214.

metaphysical principle of Identity of consciousness which is the ground of everything or which is the indwelling principle of all things. The second aspect consists in ignoring or mistaking the presence of the same principle in each and every idea or view. Mādhyamikas themselves commit Identity mistake when they do not see that there is an identical principle in all the views of reality which they reject. The critics of Advaita commit this fallacy when they state that Advaita dialectic is not different from Mādhyamika dialectic or that Brahman is indistinguishable from the Vijñāna of Yogācāras or the Śūnya of Mādhyamikas.

OUR SPEECH-COUSINS ARE THEY REALLY BREATHREN UNDER THE SKIN

By Dr. Bhabes Chandra Chaudhuri, Ph.D., F.R.A.S.

Scholars have long pondered over striking but queer similarities of words in different languages—the world over !

Amusing cartoons are therefore, available in some or other country...ridiculing the otherwise hopeless attempts to speak a foreign tongue with like sound but quite unlike sense ! There's, for instance, the story about a Scott, who made a laughing stock of himself by trying to make out the sense of : *"J'AIME LA LANGUE FRANCAISE"* after his own lingo of the national counterpart thereof by : "I LOVE THE TALL FRENCH GIRL !" Or, again, the proverbial German, who said in great indignation to the waiter in a London restaurant., "I AM HERE SINCE TEN MINUTES...WHEN DO I BECOME A SAUSAGE!"...forgetting that "BEKOMEN" in ENGLISH means..."is to get," while the ENGLISH "become" is in GERMAN, "WERDEN" !

Doesn't, similarity in sound then, make a lot of quite interesting non-sense, when two foreign passengers travelling in a same train, e.g., say, a *German* and an *Englishman* mutters same words. as below, only to be shocked in utter bewilderment at the different—odd sense, their mutually misshapen tongues make, viz :—

* Babupara, misra lodge, P.o. Jalpaiguri (W. Bengal)

Word	*English Sense*	*German Sense*
AN	a	to
ARM	Upper limb of human body	Poor
ATMEN (Cf. ATMAN, Sanskrit Word)	Soul	Breathe
BAD	Opposite of 'good'	Bath
BOOT	Outer foot-covering of leather	Boat
FAST	Abstaining from "food" on religious grounds as a rule	Nearly
HELL	Abode of the dead	Light
HUT	Small mean-house	hat
KIND	Race of animal	Child
LADEN	Burdened	Shop
LAUFEN (Cf : LAMPHA : Sanskrit)	Leap	Run
LIED	Telling a lie	Song
MAN	Human kind	One
RED	A colour e.g. blood or rose	Ripe
ROT	Decay	Red
SEE	Look at	Sea
SONNE	Son (?)	Sun
STARK	Rigid	Strong
STOCK	Stump	Stick
WAND	Slender rod as symbol of authority	Wall

Again, when one hears in *Dutch*, '*VADER*;' in Latin, 'PATER;' in Swedish, 'FADER;' in *German*, 'VATER;' in *Irish*, 'ATHIR;' in Persian, 'PIDAR;' in Sanskrit, 'PITR'...and the like.. dont't these words of

like sound and sense, unmistakably mean the same thing—FATHER, in English, altogether?

How could it happen then, that widely apart, even—antipodal people speak such intimately related words of similar sense or sound? Towards the end of the 17th century it was presumed by scholars that since man is a Homo Sapiens, having common physical and mental attributes or qualities—despite the difference in each individual sub-species of him, in colour, culture, intelligence and standard of living...... So also, those words stemming from diverse linguistic sources of different racial groups, may as well contain some basically common roots—thus, proving justifiably, too, that "all men are brethren under the skin!" At long last, philologists like Jacob Grimm and other scholars hit upon a formula or "Law" of language transformation! Their researches verily revealed the fact, viz, that the transformation or changes which take place—during the "life" of a language, are quite regular and consistent enough to permit comparisons between languages and to reconstruct the earlier metamorphic stages of languges!

On this finding scholars now had little or no difficulty whatsoever to see that many words for "father" : all point back to an originally common "PATER;" that "WATER" in English, "WASSER" in German; "HYDOR" in Greek; "VODA" in Russian (*Vodka* is 'little water); "UDAK" in Sanskrit; and even "WATER" in the language of King David's General, Uriah the Hittite—all could have come only from an original "WODOR"! Using the same "Law"...scholars could thus trace the origin of various...countless words : e.g., they "grouped" the same as "*Indo-European*" because it had both Indian and European interlinks. There also, is the "Latin"—Group or Branch, from which sprang Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Romanian. There's a German

branch including English, German, Danish, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian; the Celtic branch including Welsh, Irish. Breton; the Slavonic branch including Russian, Polish, Czech. Bulgar, Serb. The Indo-European group or branch, also, includes Lithuanian, Persian, Greek, Armenian and a score of dialects in India, which have stemmed from the parent loins of Sanskrit!

It is quite interesting, however, that philologists have, so far, been able to collate, sort and interlink Indo-European "words" on a co-equal parity of linguistic affinity such as underlies the basic principle of a palaeontologist's building up of a super-structure of long extinct reptile out of a jumbled heap of stray bones...collected in a sample box ! Thus, to the philologist, it appears that "DAUGHTER" and "BROTHER" in English are quite congenitally akin to "DUHITṚ" and "BHRĀTṚ" in Sanskrit respectively, while "SISTER" is phonetically, almost, in affinity with "SWASṚ" (Cf. "Swasṛ" in Sanskrit means sister!). The English "DAUGHTER" has, also, other "cousins," viz. "DOTTIR" in Icelandic. "DOCHE" in Russian, "DUKHTAR" in distant Persian...all stemming from... "DHUGHATER"... a variant of Sanskrit, "DUHITṚ !"-Alike, "WAHR" (True) in German almost phonetically, sounds with "ṚTA" (Truth) of Sanskrit!

Similarly, from Sanskrit, "GAU" which gives milk (MELG) stems "COW" and from this strain evolved the breeding "OXEN" (UKSEN) which are usually harnessed to a "Yoke" ("YUG" or "YUJ' in Sanskrit). The English, "EWE" (sheep) similarly, is supposed to come from "OWA," its "FLEECE" from "PLEUS:" "WOOL" from "WLANA" and these were employed to "WEAVE" (WEB) into cloth and then "SEW" (SIW' or 'SIV' in Sanskrit is equivalent in sense) into garment.

The prehistoric word for *DOG* was "KUN" (Cf.

Sanskrit, 'Svāna) which the scholars trace as having sprung into English as "HOUND," into Latin as "CANIS," then crossed back into English as "CANINE."

The word, "CAT" came from "QITT," the Arabian word and, Turkish, "KEDI," whence the popular word, "KITTY"—although its endearing vocative synonym, "PUSSY" bears affinity with "VEDIC" counter-part, albeit in symphony—"PUṢAN" [SUN-GOD] ! The "SOW" and "HORSE" appear respectively to originate from "SU" and "EKWO"—Latin, "EQUUS;" the English, "EQUESTRIAN" still carries on its Latin descent !

The essential food crop of Asia, viz, "RICE" comes from Greek, "OURZA," which is also, a variant word for Sanskrit, "ŪRJAS" [Cf: The Sanskrit text, "ŪRJAM" in the "PINḌA-MANTRAM" (Vide: "PURAHITA-DARPAN") i.e. Funeral oblation— offered to the Manes in dollop ('dollop' is again equivalent in sense and sound of Bengali dialect. 'dōlā' !)—of boiled rice. The text of "PINḌA-MANTRA" is this: "OM 'URJAM' BAHANTAM—SVADHA TARPAYATU PITṚN... "...that is: 'may my oblations unto the 'manes' be, carried forward to the realm of the 'Reality'—for release of the soul from bondage of the cycle of birth-cum-death !)

Similarly, "WHEAT" and 'WHITE,' both seem to be the descendant of the old Germanic ..."HWEIT" and "KWEIT") Cf: Sanskrit, "ŚVETA") respectively !

One may also, collect...albeit...having the least pretension to even a 'bibliophile'—some sundry....stock words in current usages of everyday life for a comparative study : to trace their close and interesting—philological nexus in ONE bond of the "Family of World Languages," e.g. :—

Sanskrit	*Latin*	*Greek*
AGNI	AGNUS	×
AIYU	×	AEOS; AER
AṆIMĀ (a yoga word)	ANIMA (Spirit)	×
ĀLO-KA	AUTO ATAVUS	ATOMO
VĀYU	×	BAROS
DANTA	DENS	×
DHAM	DOM	×
EKO (one)	×	EGO
GOLA	GEO	GI
GOU (God)		
JIVA	GENES GERM	EGO ×
JÑA	×	GNO
YUVAN	JUVENS	×
KALI	×	KALA
KUA (KŪPA)	AQUA	×
MANAS	MENOS	×
MĀRA	MORI	×
MUI (dialect)	MEUS	×
MUṆḌA	MUNDI	×
NAMA	NOMOS	×
PADA	×	PEDA, or PODA
PARA	PĀRA	×
RAJA	REA REGO	×
SNEHA (Fat)	×	SAHNE (German)
SOMA	SOMNUS	×
TVAC	TANGO	×
TVAM	TUUS (yu)	×
USHA	×	EOS
RITA	×	×

Likewise, don't we find even to date...how the Indo-European system in particular of Numerical Notation still remains almost unchanged...all these thousand years of Man's evolutionary changes in this world, e.g. :—

1. OINOS;
2. DUO;
3. TREIES;
4. QETWER;
5. PENQE;
6. SWEKS;
7. SEPTIN;
8. OKTO;
9. NEWN;
10. DEKM?

While each modern language appears to suffer some change, however, at least a major portion of these "cardinals" must have been, to be sure, understood by a Greek, a German, a French, a Dutch, an Italian, an Egyptian, an Englishman, Indian, Burman—and even a 'Moscow'er!

Where did, so the philologists query, then, the forefathers of the Indo-European languages possibly dwell by?

Since, all Indo-European languages lack a common word for such fauna, e.g., lion, tiger, elephant, camel, and the like or such flora e.g., potato, palm, orange, banana, peach and the like, they inferred, viz, that the home-land of theirs could not have been far South, as such!

Their old word, 'SNEIGHW' (English); Russian, "SNEIG;" German, "NIPH;" Welsh, "NYF;" Latin, "NIX," French, "NEIGH"...and so on, might have, so they conceded, even, pushed that homeland...far northward!

Of the fauna, we know now—possibly they did know some kinds e.g., "SNAKE" (Sanskrit, SARPA); the BEAVER (Sanskrit, VIVARA); the BEAR, the SWAN, the RABBIT and the like!

They had, no doubt, a word for small streams—"STREW," equivalent to Sanskrit: "SROTA" (Bengali Śota); a word for "ATLAS" akin to Sanskrit,

"ATALA;" "MARINE" for Sanskrit, "VARIN;' "BAUM" (tree) for Sanskrit, "DRüM !"

Biologist, however, may suggest that all these things are natives of the geographically isothermal zones of the earth...possibly "Central Europe" but gradually pushed by pressure of "over population" or invaders the Indo-European Stock began to "thaw" in and out! Their wanderings or "outflow" lasted thousands of years and led them, as per expert opinion, far far away to distant countries, viz, "one-branch" pushing "SLAVIC" upto the Polar sea, another bringing "LATIN" down to the Mediterranean, while STILL others carrying "CELTIC" into what is, to-day BRITAIN and FRANCE, and "GERMANIC" down to the right bank of the Rhine and up into Scandinavia"*

There are, lastly, the English words, "GOD," "THEIST" and "DEIST!"

"GOD" comes, as one knows, from an ancient "GHUTAM" comparable to Sanskrit variant, "BHUTAM" (Spirits); "THEIST" and "DEIST"... from "THEI" akin to Sanskrit, STHĀ [e.g., 'ASTI'] while, "DEIST" from "DEI," which tunes in almost with Sanskrit : "DIVI!" Again, the syllable : "SAC," meaning 'holy,' e.g., SACRED, may also, to some agreeable extent find similarity with Sanskrit variant, "SACHH" (Cf : SAT in Sanskrit)!

Finally, doesn't "PREK" (to pray) down through LATIN, "PRECARI" (to pray) synchronize in phonetic tune with that of the Sanskrit root, "PṚ" (e.g., "PṚNOTI" in Sanskrit confirm the possible inference, viz, that almost all "speech-cousins" are really "brethren under the skin"—in as much as while the EAST pro-

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* Vide : "The Tribe That Gave Us Words" by : W. L. White" (1950), New York.

claims "ŚABDA EVA BRAHMA" (VEDA is the 'word' of "GOD"), the WEST recognizes, also, that the "BIBLE" is the "LOGOS" and the "WORD" of GOD on a reciprocal theistic faith in one ULTIMATE REALITY?

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(i) "A Brief History of English Languages" by J. Hadley, LL.D.

(ii) "The Making of English" by H. Bradley (London).

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DUALISM-CUM-MONISM (BHEDĀBHEDAVĀDA)

By Dr. K.C. Pandey *

Antiquity, Continuity and Contemporaneity of the Dualistic-cum-Monistic Tradition.

The tradition of Dualism-cum-Monism goes back to the Vedic time. The pre-Bādarāyaṇa thinkers, like Āśmarathya and Auḍulomi, offered the dualistic-cum-monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic passages and are referred to as such in the *Brahma-Sūtra*. The Lakulīśa-pāśupata, a well known dualistic-cum-monistic system, propounded by Lakulīśa in the first half of the Second century A.D., according to the inscriptional evidence of Mathura Pillar and of stone slab of Somanātha, is based upon the five Vedic Mantras "*Sadyojātam*" etc. And Kāśakṛtsna, who is interpreted by Śaṅkara, as an exponent of the identity of the individual self and the Universal, is interpreted by Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa as an upholder of ' identity in difference" (Bhedābheda) view in this regard. In fact he has been interpreted by each commentator as supporting his view, be it monistic, dualistic, dualistic-cum-monistic or qualified monistic, as is clear from the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Madhva, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha, Rāmānuja etc.

Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa, in interpreting the *Vedānta-Sūtra* from the Dualistic-cum-Monistic point of view, presents the tradition, maintained by a sect of Sannyāsin, known as Tridandin. For, he refers to his view as Tridaṇḍī-pakṣa.[1] To this sect both Manu and Yājñavalkya refer.[2]

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* U.G.C. Professor of Sanskrit, Lucknow Univereśity.

[1] *Bh. Bh.*, 208.

[2] *M. S.*, XII, 10 or Y. V., III, 4, 58.

They also refer to the characteristic features of Dualism-cum-Monism, such as the rise of the innumerable individual selves from the Universal, like sparks from fire [3]; and the world as the effect of the Ultimate cause, the Universal self.[4]

The Śaivāgamas, on which the various Śaiva systems, dualistic, dualistic-cum-monistic and monistic, are based, are divided into three groups; ten propounding dualism, eighteen dualism-cum-monism and sixty four monism. And they are regarded as the voice of God, like the Vedas.

Dualism-cum-Monism continues to be the basis of living religious sects, both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava. The Śaiva ascetics, who live naked (Nāgās) follow the instruction, given in the *Pāśupata Sūtra*, in regard to the use of ashes and seem to accept the Bhedābhedavāda. The Vaiṣṇava sects, the followers of Nimbārka and Caitanya, avowedly follow Dualim-cum-Monism.

Limitations.

Leaving aside the dualistic-cum-monistic thinkers, from Auḍulomi to Bhartṛprapañca, who are known from references only, this paper confines itself to a brief discussion of the following important features of the Dualistic-cum-Monistic system as presented by Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa, whose commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtra is available, who belonged to the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A.D.; because he is referred to by Udayanācārya (984 A.D.) in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*; is stated to have been awarded the title of "Vidyāpati" by king Bhoja of Dhārā, (11th century A.D.) in a Copper plate, discovered by Bhāudājī, and was a younger contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra (976 A.D.) from whose *Sāṅkhya Tattvakaumdī* he very often quotes :—

[3] *Ibid.*, 15. or 67

[4] *Ibid.*, 119: or 69.

(i) His defence of Dualism-cum-Monism
(ii) His Brahma-Pariṇāma-Vāda
(iii) His application of Dualistic-cum-Monistic view to the Brahman, the individual soul and the world.
(iv) His conception of liberation
(v) His differences from Śaṅkara
(vi) A critical appraisal of his Dualism-cum Monism.

The Reason for his Undertaking to comment on the Brahma Sūtra.

It appears that Śaṅkara's view—that "true knoweldge" (Jñāna) consequent on the clear grasp of the meanings of *that* and *thou* in "That thou art" (*Tattvamasi*) destroys the wrong knowledge of duality: that world, which is merely an illusion, disappears at the dawn of true knowledge, much as silver does when the mother of pearl is known as such : that all action including even that which is enjoined on the persons in the fourth stage of life in Smṛtis, has to be given up by one who has got at the full meaning of "Tattvamasi": that the Ultimate Reality is pure Cit (Self-shining) and is without any attribute—had led to the abandonment of the practice of Yoga by his followers and there were Sannyāsins during the life time of Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa, who, like ordinary men, quenched their thirst, fed themselves with the food that they got by begging from door to door, attended to the calls of nature and yet claimed to have got true knowledge by means of a clear grasp of the meanings of "that" and "thou" and, therefore, to have realised the non-duality and accordingly did not do any action. He felt such a life and the claim of such persons to have attained liberation in life inconsistent with the type of life that

they lived to be a social evil. For, if there be realisation of non-duality, there can be no action of any kind. And if there be action, there can be no realisation of non-duality; because action presupposes consciousness of duality. Therefore, the position of those who assert to have realised oneness and to have renounced action, and yet go about begging and attend to the calls of nature is ridiculous. He asks how can thirst, hunger and calls of nature be felt by one for whom duality has completely disappeared. He therefore dubs such persons as hypocrites.

Accordingly he undertook the task of propounding the traditional philosophy of Tridaṇḍin in his commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtra, He asserts* that Śaṅkara's philosophy is not the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa :—

Sūtrābhiprāyasaṁvṛtyā svābhiprāyaprakāśanāt
Vyākhyātaṁ yairidaṁ śāstram
vyākhyeyam tannivṛttaye.

Bhāskara's defence of Dualism-cum-Monism.

Dualism-cum-Monism is a synthesis of the common sense and the mystic points of view. The former, represented by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, maintains the pluralistic view of the real. The latter, presented in the monistic Vedānta, expounded by Śaṅkara, declares all plurality to be mere illusion and asserts the monistic view of the real. Dualism-cum-Monism conceives the Ultimate to be of the nature of cause, which necessarily 'evolves' (Pariṇamate) into multiplicity of effects, much as a seed does into multiplicity of leaves, branches, flowers, fruits etc. From the common sense point of view the latter are no less real than the former. Hence the Ultimate as the cause is one and as effects, which are essentially non-different from it, it is many. The oneness and plurality refer to different

states of the same Reality and therefore, are real. The arguments in support of this view are as follows :—

There is no experience, which is not unity in multiplicity. There is nothing which is absolutely one or many. For, everything as being, as an object of knowledge, is one. That is, every object of experience is a conglomeration of the universal and particular. The Universal is grasped by the same sense as that which perceives the particular. Therefore, it is one when it is viewed as 'being' as 'this' and as such is non-different from others. But it is many when viewed as individual, consisting of parts and as such is distinct from others. Thus every thing is non-different from others in its universal aspect and different in its individual : aspect is one as Universal and many as individual. Therefore, monism-cum-dualism is based on facts of experience and, therefore, is irrefutable.[5]

But are not unity and multiplicity or identity and difference opposed to each other like hot and cold or sun and shade, which cannot coexist and therefore, cannot be asserted in regard to a thing at the same time ? The reply is, the type of opposition referred to above, is not there between cause and effect or the Brahman and the world: because the world is admitted to arise from Brahman, to have its being in it, and ultimately to merge back into it. In case the opposition, like that of hot and cold, be accepted between cause and effect, the said assertion, namely, that the world arises from Brahman, cannot be made. And it is a fact of experience that the cause, the unity, is present in the effect, the multiplicity e.g. clay is there in jar, plate, dish etc. or gold in ring, necklace etc. But in the case of hot and cold there is neither the relation of cause and effect nor that of substratum and

[5] Bh. Bh., 17.

the thing resting on it. Therefore, the analogy is not correct.

Nor can it be said that plurality is a mere illusion. For, the consciousness of effect is necessarily the consciousness of the cause also, the object of perception of the effect is the same as that of the cause. The former does not destroy, is not the negation of, the latter. Nor is the effect found at a separate place or time from that of the cause.

Nor can the unreality and reality of the world be maintained to be relative to the individual. That is, it is unreal to one who attempts to realize the Ultimate or has realized it; but real to the ordinary man. For, such an assertion is of the same type as saying that colour is unreal to the blind but real to others. The reality or otherwise of the object does not depend upon the perceiving individual, so that one or the other can be asserted about it, according to the nature and constitution of the mind of the perceiving individual. The object exists independently of the knowing subject. Further, the assertion that the world is unreal to one who has grasped the meaning of "*Tattvamasi*", but real to the other would mean that it is both simultaneously i.e. it is of two contrary natures.[6] But if the unreality of the world be maintained on the basis of the scriptural statements, let it be declared to be such for all, like the two moons seen by a person of defective vision. But the scriptural passages, on the basis of which the unreality of the world is asserted, admit of different interpretations. Hence the view that the Brahman as cause is one but as effect is many is perfectly logical and, therefore, Dualism-cum-Monism is a sound philosophcal view.

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[6] Bh. Bh. 18

If it be said that pluarlity appears because of the cause, the *Avidyā*, it would mean that all that is grasped by those who have *Avidyā* is false, therefore, the non-duality of the Brahman also, that is grasped by the aspirant for liberation is false, because he also has *avidyā*. For, if he does not have it, hearing, contemplation, and concentration are useless.

This leads us to the discussion of the question :—What is "*Avidyā*"? Is it mere consciousness of duality or something different from it? If the former; it should be explained why is it regarded to be *Avidyā*? Is it because it is different from *Vidyā* or because it is the negation of *Vidyā*? The latter position cannot be maintained, because the plurality is directly perceived. Undoubtedly there is this distinction between the two, namely, that one is higher and the other is lower. But the one cannot be spoken of as the negation of the other; because one cannot be subsumed under a different category from that of the other: one is as much knowledge as the other.[7] If it be said that one is the opposite of the other, then it has to be made clear as to whom does it belong? It cannot be said to belong to Brahman. For, Brahman is pure being, pure self-luminosity and pure bliss. It cannot be said to belong to Jīva either, because it is non-different from Brahman: it is not a separate entity. But if the Jīva be admitted to be a mere reflection it would mean that *Avidyā* has no substratum. And to admit it as such is illogical.

Therefore, it is not right to maintain that *Avidyā* is mere consciousness of duality. Hence it follows that it is a lower type of knowledge. It does not belong to Brahman but to Jīva, who is real. It consists in taking the not-self, the body etc. to be the self and not realising

[7] Bh. Bh., 19

that they are essentially Brahman. This is removed by the knowledge that arises from hearing and contemplation on "*that thou art.*" The true knowledge does not destroy the world, because it is the effect of Brahman and, therefore, real. For, our admission is that the world is nothing but Brahman as effect.[8] It is another state of the Brahman. It exists independently of the knowing subject.

His Brahmapariṇāmavāda.

Bhāskara holds that Brahman assumes different forms because to do so is its essential nature. It does so independently of any external aid, because it is omniscient and omnipotent, according to the scripture. The Brahman may be said to create the world just as a Yogin does.[9]

OBJECTION:—The view that the Brahman evolves cannot stand: because the Brahman cannot be admitted to be either as having parts or partless. For, the former admission is inconsistent with the scriptural texts, and the latter position would mean that the Brahman gets completely transformed into the world and therefore, is perceptible as such. Hence the talk of Brahman in the scripture would become useless.

REPLY:—Evolution, (Pariṇāma) according to Bhāskara, consists, not in the transformation of one thing into another, as that of milk into curd according to the Sāṅkhya, but in the discharge of the respective functions by the recognised powers. Bhāskara recognises two powers in the Brahman, the subjective and the objective. The former, called *Bhoktṛśakti*, is the sentient power and is

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[8] Bh. Bh., 16—20

[9] Bh. Bh., 104.

[10] Ibid., 104.

responsible for uniting different individual souls with the necessary limiting conditions such as body, mind, intellect etc, according to the accumulated effect of the deeds of each Karma. The latter is called *Bhogyaśakti* and is responsible for the being of the insentient objective things such as ether etc.

The partless cause, the Īśvara, does not undergo any change, while creating the world, exactly as the limited self does not while creating the objects of dream.[11]

It is interesting to note that the later Vedāntins also admit the two powers of *Ajñāna* (i) *Āvaraṇa* and (ii) *Vikṣepa*, the one being responsible for the appearance of the limited subject and the other for the limited objects.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins also admit the two, sentient (Cetana) and insentient in the Brahman as its attributes, though not as powers.

His application of the dualistic-cum-monistic theory to the Brahman, the Individual self and the world.

Bhāskara upholds the dualistic-cum-monistic view in regard to the three important subjects, common to all systems of thought, (i) the Ultimate Reality or Brahman, (ii) the individual self or Jīva and (iii) the world.

(i) He holds the Brahman to be the cause of the world on the basis of the scriptural authority as well as on that of the etymological meaning of the word "Brahman". The Brahman is so called because it grows 'evolves' into world of common objectivity, because there is nothing greater than the Brahman, because it is the ultimate cause of the universe.

It is both unity and diversity. It is former in the causal state and latter in the state of effects, much as gold is one as material cause and many as ornaments, the effects

[11] Bh. Bh., 105.

It is true being, consciousness, endless, undiluted bliss; omnipotent and omniscient.[12] It possesses the attributes and is not without them (Nirviśeṣa).[13] Bhāskara holds that when Brahman is spoken of as true being, conscious and endless (*Satyaṁ Jñānam anantam Brahma*) the last two are the attributes of the first. For, if every one be admitted to stand for a substance, the multiplicity of Brahman would follow. The first states the substance, to which the attributes belong. For, there can be no attributes of that which is not 'being.' The attributes are non-different from that to which they are attributed. For, the two, one of which is never found without the other, are identical Recognition of difference, between substance and attribute in a thing does not mean recognition of difference as the essential nature of it. For, in that case there can never be the experience of oneness, because the substance is never without quality and vice versa.

The soundness of the view that the Brahman has qualities is demonstrated by the fact that there is no experience of the substance without any attribute. If we eliminate the attribute, substance ceases to be what it factually is e.g. fire, with heat eliminated from it, ceases to be fire. Nor can an attribute be an attribute if isolated from substance. Experience tells us that everything is a combination of the two. The Brahman is no less so; because it is very frequently spoken of as *Ānanda*. If it be nothing more than '*Cit*' the presentation of it as *Ānanda* would be useless. The objection that the admission of qualities in the Brahman would mean the denial of its absolute non-duality is no objection against one who holds everything, not excluding the Brahman, to be unity in multiplicity (Bhedābhedarūpa).

[12] Bh. Bh., 24. [13] Ibid., 27.

There is no doubt about it that the Brahman admits of being grasped as free from attributes. But that is due to the elimination of attributes by those who attempt to concentrate on it as such. Thus Saguṇa itself appears as Nirguṇa. Hence there is no basic difference between the two.[14]

In the highest concentration, the Brahman is not grasped objectively. On the contrary, the individual self, because of the removal of the limiting conditions, becomes non-different from the Brahman, much as the ether within a jar, though affected by the limiting conditions, becomes One with Universal ether as soon as the jar is broken. The realisation of the Brahman is possible through the practice of the highest concentration only,[15] but not by mere intellectual grasp of the meaning of "*That thou art.*"

(ii) Jīvas, the individul selves, are the limbs, parts, of the Brahman and are innumerable. They are not created. They are essentially identical with the Brahman, much as sparks are with fire. Though a passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says that the individual selves arise from the Brahman much as sparks do from fire and, therefore, seems to refer to the souls as products of the Barhman : yet in consonance with other passages, which talk of Jīva as immortal, unborn and unchanging, the passage under reference has to be interpreted to mean that their separate appearance is due to conditions exactly as that of sparks is due to the splitting of the wood.[16]

It is said to be atomic in size, because the manas (Mind), through which it can be known, is so. But it is so only so long as the limiting conditions persist. Free

[14] Bh. Bh., 56.

[15] Ibid., 170.

[16] Bh. Bh., 134.

from them it is all pervasive. The limiting conditions are admitted to account for the rise of the objective knowledge at one and not at another time.

It is doer of action, but only so long as it is conditioned. For, in case of the acceptance of the agential nature as natural to it, freedom from circle of births and deaths would be impossible, because it would always be active and, therefore, enjoyer of fruits of action, pleasure and pain.

It is spoken of as a part of the Brahman, on account of the limiting conditions, much as ether within the cavity of the ear is spoken of as part of the universal ether, because of its discharging a separate function of hearing. The conditions are real, because they are responsible for the discharge of a distinctive function.

The reference to the similarity of the individual soul with the reflection of the sun in a sheet of water, simply points out that it acts and has its being in conformity with the limiting conditions. It does not mean that it is a reflection of the Brahman. The four Sūtras 2-5 of the second Pāda of the first Chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtra* establish the distinction of the individual soul from the Universal and the texts like "*That thou art*" speak of the identity of the two. Therfore, Jīva has to be admitted to be essentially identical with Brahman, but different on account of the limiting conditions which are real because they are effective.

(iii) The world is not mere illusion. It is real. It is the object of common experience and scientific investigation. The Brahman is admitted to be the material as well the efficient cause of the world (Prakṛtiśca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt). And it is a matter of common experience that the product of a material cause,

comes into being, not by destroying its cause, but by having it as the basis of its own existence. The cause and the effect exist together. There is no such opposition between the two as there is between light and darkness. both of which cannot exist together at the same place. The consciousness of the effect has the same thing as its object as the consciousness of the cause. Cause and effect exist together at the same time and place. Truth and falsity are opposed to each other. They cannot have the same objective reference and cannot be asserted about the same object at the same time and place. Therefore, to assert the falsity of the objective world, the material cause of which is the Brahman, is, to assert truth and falsity in regard to the same object at the same time. Hence such an assertion is untenable.[17]

Not is the view that the world is illusion to those who aspire for liberation and true to the rest, is sound. For, such a view is no better than that the colour has no reality in relation to the blind, but is real to those who can see it. The objeects have their being independently of the perceiving subject. They do not change in conformity with the nature of the precipient so as to justify the above assertion. Further the statement that the world is false to the aspirants for liberation and real to others means the assertion of truth and falsity at the same time. If the falsity be accepted on the basis of the text, stick to it. The assertion of its truth in relation to the practical man, is like cutting a hen with the object of eating one half of it and preserving the other for laying the eggs.[18] The falsity and truth or being and not-being of the objective world cannot be accepted to be relative to the individual, enlightened or otherwise. For, they are percipients only :

[17] Bh. Bh., 17.

[18] Bh. Bh., 19.

and their perceptions depend on so many conditions. Therefore, they perceive when the conditions are there, but do not in their absence.[19]

His Conception of Liberation (*Mukti*)

Liberation consists in the dissolution of the limiting conditions of the individual subject in the Brahman, just like that of a lump of salt in the sea, and thus in the oneness of the individual with the universal.[20] It is of two types (i) immediate and (ii) through successive stages. Those who concentrate on the Brahman get liberated immediately: but those who practice concentration on *Hiraṇyagarbha* get it through successive stages: concentration on symbol, however, does not lead to it.[21]

It is of two types from another point of view also. True knowledge destroys not only the accumulated effect of sins but also of the pious deeds. Mukti, which is consequent on this is of two types, (i) here and (ii) hereafter. The former consists in freedom from attachment, aversion, and ignorance and what is involved in them: and the latter is perfect freedom from all limitations and consequent emergence (Abhivyakti) of omnipotence and omniscience and identity with the Supreme.[22]

The liberation, according to Bhāskara, is perfect consciousness. (Sasambodho mokṣaḥ) but not negation of consciousness (Asambodho mokṣaḥ). He holds that it is attainable, not by mere knowledge of the meaning of "That Thou art" but hard practice of the highest form of Yoga: not by true knowledge alone, but by true knowledge coupled with selfless and motiveless action: that true knowledge does not mean complete disappearance of the cons-

[19] Bh. Bh., 84.
[20] Bh. Bh., 239.
[21] Ibid., 240.
[22] Ibid, 224.

ciousness of duality in life time; because duality cannot disappear so long as one lives, senses function, feelings of thirst and hunger persist, calls of nature are felt and there is the necessary action to satisfy and attend to them. Accordingly he declares that those who claim to have realised oneness with the Brahman and still go about begging are hypocrites.

His Basic Differences from Śaṅkara

(i) He holds the Ultimate Reality to be dynamic but not static as does Śaṅkara. He asserts that the Brahman evolves. He is *Brahmapariṇāmavādin;* and not *Kūṭasthabrahmavādin* in the sense in which Śaṅkara uses the word Kūṭastha. According to him, the word "Kūṭastha" does not mean unchanging but simply indestructible. He uses the word "*Pariṇāma*" in a sense different from that of Sāṅkhya.

(ii) He maintains that unity and multiplicity both are real, much as clay and jar etc., which are made up of it, are; and refutes the view that multiplicity is a mere illusion.

(iii) He is a *satkāryavādin* and admits that the effects have their being in the power of 'the cause' before they come into being separately and criticises the Māyāvāda.

(iv) He regards knowledge combined with action (Jñānakarmasamuccaya) to be the means to the final emancipation and maintains that knowledge alone cannot lead to it.

(v) In regard to the conception of Mokṣa he asserts that it consists in complete freedom from all the limiting conditions and consequent identity with Brahman and manifestion of the Universal powers, omnipotence etc.

(vi) Individual self, according to him, is identical with Universal in essence but differs from the latter on

account of conditions of limitations, which are real much as the ether in a jar differs from the universal because of the limitation only.

(vii) His differences from Śaṅkara arise from the basic difference in the conception of 'being' (Sat). He holds that *being* is that which is responsible for common knowledge (Pratipatti) that remains uncontradicted during the whole of life and can be used for practical purposes. But Śaṅkara admits that alone to *be Sat*, which is eternal and is always uncontradicted whether in life time or after death or at dawn of true knowledge.

A Critical Appraisal of Dualism-cum-Monism of Bhāskara.

Bhākara's Dualism-cum-Monism is an important contribution to Indian thought. It points out the basic defects in the Monism, as propounded by Śaṅkara and his followers. It directs special attention to the social evils to which Śaṅkara's monism had led during his time. It led the way to the development of the Qualified Monism in the hands of Śrīkaṇṭha from the Śaiva point of view, and in those of Rāmānuja from the Vaiṣṇava view point; in so far as it advocated the theory of the Ultimate Reality as possessed of the attributes (Saguṇa-Brahma-Vāda) and anticipated the basic view of both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja that the two, one of which is never found without the other, are identical and one and, therefore, there is non-difference between the Brahman and its attributes, because one is never found without the other: This view was accepted by Śrīkaṇṭha who maintained that non-difference is nothing but having no existence in isolation from one another (Apṛthaksiddhirevābhedaḥ) and admitted internal difference (Antargaṇikabheda) in the Brahman: and also by Rāmānuja in the form of the relation

of those which do not exist in isolation from one another (Apṛthaksiddhi-sambandha) to justify his qualified monism in spite of admitting the presence of the sentient and the insentient (*Cit* and *Acit*) in the Brahman.

But the theory of causation in the context of metaphysics has been rejected by thinkers in both, the East and the West.

According to Kant time and space are the forms of our sensibility and the "necessity" (Causality), in terms of which we conceive things in apodictic judgement, is one of the categories of understanding. We can apply the category of causality to the world of sense only, to what is given to sensibility; it can be employed only in the field of actual or possible experience: only in the phenomenal world: its use not valid outside the phenomenal: it cannot be applied to the supersensuous, the things-in themselves. And monistic thinkers of Kashmir like Utpalācārya and Abhinavagupta also admit (i) Kāla (time) to be one of the limiting conditions of the human mind, a faculty of the human mind that perceives every thing in temporal order only: and (ii) Niyati another limiting condition of the human mind, on account of which it perceives the causal order. Therefore like Kant they also admit that causality as a way of organising limited experiences by the mind, that is delimited by limiting conditions, does not persist at a level at which the limiting conditions fall off. And, therefore, it is not right to hold the Ultimate reality, that is without limitations and is realizable only when the limiting conditions are transcended, to be of the nature of cause.

Hegel also held that causality explains nothing and that the causal explanation is pure dogmatism. For, the absoluteness of the causal law cannot be maintained in the first cause itself is an inexplicable mystery. And the

context of the major systems of Indian Philosophy. For, they recognise the creation by Yogins, which is in violation of the causal law. Therefore, the only alternative is the Svātantryavāda as propounded by Kashmir thinkers in three systems, the Pratyabhijñā, the Krama, and the Kula, which have been fully discussed elsewhere.[23]

[23] Second Edition of *Abhinavagupta*: An Historical and Philosophical Study.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Studies in Social History (Modern India) Edited by Śrī O. P. Bhatnagar, Directar of Summer School on Modern Indian Social History, held at Kodaikanal, published by the Uuiversity Grants' Commission, New Delhi and History Department University of Allahabad. Price Rs. 7·50 paise.

Like American Universities, Indian Universities have also started holding Summer Schools for the benefit of scholars and students alike. The object of the present school was "to focus the attention of scholars on the necessity of making a political study of India's social life." Social history is an extensive subject and deals with political, economic and cultural developments and their impact on the period, which they relate. In short, social history is very much the history of common man and mirrors all such trends, which have an impact on the contemporary life. Discussions in the school were divided into :

1. Racial factor in Indian Social life, 2. Effect of religion, 3. Advent of Islam and its impact, 4. Growth of Indian Feudalism, 5. The advent of the Westerners. This volume is a collection of 17 papers put up for discussion in this Summer School.

Dr. P. E. Dustoor, in his inaugural address touches on the very pertinent question-Literature vis-a-vis history. Dr. Robert I. Grane of the Duke University Durham, North Carolina discusses the technique and methods in social history. Other contributors to the volume are :

1. Dr. (Mrs.) Irawati Karve. Deccan Research Institute, Poona.
2. Dr. G. C. Pandey. Rajasthan University, Jaipur.

3.	Dr. Robert I. Grane.	Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
4.	Dr. K. K. Pillay.	Madras University, Madras.
5.	Prof. P. Saran.	Retired Reader in History, Delhi University.
6.	Dr. Tapan Roy Chaudhari.	Delhi School of Eco., Uni. of Delhi.
7.	Dr. N. K. Sinha.	University of Calcutta, Calcutta.

Indian society is on the brink of a social revolution. The concepts of life fostered by a common man for over two millenium have with the impact of western materialistic development put askance his time-honoured faith and concept of life. Factors, together with political standards, instead of helping him have added to his worries. Before completely going in for the imported ideals, the culture and civilisation of this land, howsoever scantily preserved do loom large on the common inhabitant It is in the context of such a backgraund that the present volume present at one place, learned articles by qualified scholars.

Of necessity certain discussions have become sketchy. Similarly some of the historical facts may also be disputed, but the importance of the volume cannot be belittled by these factors. It can be recommended to the common reader as well as to the serious students of history. For the former it provides not only interesting reading but also informations which he would like to preserve; for the later it opens a new vista of research and serious reading. The utility of the volume has further been enhanced by the addition of list of books and index.

—R. K. Mishra

Ekvimśati : A collection of Twentyone stories of Rabindranath Tagore in Bengali language in Devnagri script, published by the Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 643 Price Rs. 16/-

On the occasion of Rabindranath's centenary celebrations the Sahitya Akademi decided to print 9 volumes of his select works in Devnagari script. The present volume is the third volume of this project—certainly a most laudatory attempt to make people conversant with the great poets greater works. Besides transliterations in Devnagari, idiomatic expressions have been explanied by suitable foot notes. The present collection contains famous works like Kabuliwala, Nastaneeda, Postmaster, Rasmanir Chhele, Haldar Gosthi, Megh O Raudra etc. The utility of the present volume has been enhanced by the addition of a scholarly note by eminent philologist Dr. S. K. Chatterji and eminent Hindi writer Dr. Hazari Prasad Dwivedi. There is also a scheme to translate these works in Indian languages. It would be advisable to have these volumes translated in all languages of India, and not only few as proposed.

GORA : (A novel) by Rabindranath Tagore, translated into Hindi by Shri I. H. Vatsyayana, Agñeya, Pp. 451 Price Rs. 8.

YOGAYOG : Rabindranatha Tagore : translated into Hindi by Ilachandra Joshi, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi Pp. 248 Price Rs. 5 only.

On the event of Rabindra centenary celebrations Sahitya Akademi has decided to publish translations of Rabindranatha's selected works in Hindi and other Indian languages. The proposed project in Hindi consists of eight volumes. These two novels form part of this project. It is indeed creditable and its value is enhanced by the fact that the translators of both these volumes are themselves novelists of no mean order in Hindi. While

the standard publication is to be acclaimed one would only wish that there was some scheme for cheap editions of Rabindra's works. Hindi has by far the largest readership of any Indian language and the absence of cheap editions of standard authors is in itself a desideratum. In these days of official language controversy, popularisation of acclaimed authors' works in all major Indian languages would be a laudable project. The price factor in a poverty striken country like ours is necessarily to be thought off and suitably arranged.

OTHELLO : William Shakespeare translated into Hindi by late Diwakar Prasad Vidyarthi, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, Pp.130 Price Rs. Three only :

This translation of Othello has been published with the assistance of Unesco as part of Unesco's major project for furthering mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values. There is an introduction by J. Dover Wilson. The translation has been fairly beautifully done.

VAIŚṄAVA-PADĀVALI : Collections of devotional songs of Vaiṣṇava poets in Bengali by Shri Sukumar Sen, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi Pp. 9+99 Price Rs. 2/-

After Jayadeva's phenomenal success as a lyricist, later Vaiṣṇava poets also took to lyric poetry and started composing *Padas* in Bhāṣā. This collection by the learned author of History of Bengali Literature is a collection of such *Padas* written in Bengali from the fifteenth century upto the present day. There are 108 such *Padas* in this volume and at the end short notes about the composers have been added, which enhance the merit of this publication.

A HISTORY OF ASSAMESE LITERATUE : Dr. B. K. Barua, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, Pp. 203 Price Rs. 8.

The present volume is the fifth in the series of Histories of Literature, which the Sahitya Akademi has sponsored for publication. As given in the flap, the famous words of Nehru, "It was a happy idea of the Sahitya Akademi to organise the publication of historical studies of the literatures of our various languages in India," explain the project. But whether these publication in English would achieve the object mentioned in the second part of the late Prime Minister's words, "One of the principal functions of the Sahitya Akademi is to encourage all these great languages of India and to bring them cloesr to each other" is yet to be seen. One may veritably question the propriety of such publications. Similar publications were tried, almost successfully, by the Indian of the language concerned. There are standard histories of these languages already extant in the English language. But how can these bring closer all the major great languages when these are printed again in English. This would mean that the Sahitya Akademi is banking on the English medium for taking the best and the choicest information to the masses living in villages and suburban towns. One would feel such a project as a negation of the aim set forth. Histories in English exist and if Sahitya Akademi is interested in bringing short condensed histories no useful purpose is likely to be served. As a matter of fact dependence on English should go and regional languages be encouraged to know more of each other by taking up studies of each other, for our eventual get together. The projected translations of such works as promised in publisher's foreward have not as yet appeared and it is those volumes which should be hurried.

The author of the present work was an established master of Assamese Literature and it is unfortunate that he died during the publication of the work. The history has been well written and quite uptodate.

GENJI-KI-KAHĀNI: (A novel) Murasaki-Shikabu, translated by Shri Chabinath Pandeya, Published for Sahitya Akademi by Gyanmandal Limited, Varanasi, Pp. 310, Price Rs. 4.50.

This novel written by Lady Murasaki was written almost one thousand years ago and portrays the life of one chieftain Lord Hikaru-Genji and out of 54 volumes into which this novel runs, as many as 51 are devoted to one chieftain. Love affairs, family fights and get together, court intrigues, human pathos and natural descriptions are the main theme of this novel, claimed to be the best work in Japanese literature. It is indeed a matter of pleasure that the novel shall be translated in all principal languages of India. The project under which this work has been taken has not been explained by the publishers. The book has a fine preface by the Japanese Ambassador.

—R. K. Mishra

The Brahmasūtras of Bādarayana with the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Edited by S. N. Gajendragadkar, pp. xiv 174. Published by the University of Bombay, Price Rs. 5/-.

The book under review is the second pāda of the second adhyāya of the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa (Vyāsa) with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya. The Vedānta Sūtras represent the highest stage of metaphysical thought of the Indian philosophers and the portion selected for study by S. N. Gajendragadkar in this book is the most brilliant being the refutation of the toughest of the rival systems viz. Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Bauddha. The book is intended to be a text book for students of philosophy and in order to give

them proper guidance the editor has furnished brief impressive summaries of the principal tenets of different systems, exhaustive and instructive notes drawing attention to and elucidating important points in the commentary and a literal English translation of the sūtras as well as the commentary couched in simple lucid language which reflect the editors clear grasp of the dārśanic literature. We strongly recommend this book to the students of philosophy in particular for whom it is meant and also to others who are interested in the subject. We congratulate the University of Bombay for publishing this useful book.

—V. Hanumanthachar

Devatādhyāya—Saṁhitopaniṣad—Vaṁśa Brahmanas. Edited by Dr. B. Ramachandra Sharma. Published by Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha: 1965 Price Rs. 12/-.

Dr. B. Ramachandra Śarma who has been carrying research work on the Brāhmaṇas of the Sāma-Veda has already brought out a critical edition of the Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa with the commentaries of Sāyaṇa and Bharatasvāmin. He has now placed before the scholars three more Brāhmaṇas i.e. Devatādhyāya Brāhmaṇa on the deities of the Sāmagas, the Saṁhitopaniṣad Brāhmaṇa on the secret meaning of the Saṁhitā and the Vaṁśa. Brāhmaṇa on lineage of Ṛṣis of the Sāma-Veda critically edited in one volume under review. The editor has noted the earlier editions of these Brāhmaṇas by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgra. Ramanath Dikshitar and A. C. Burnell, A. Weber and Satyavrata Sāmashramī and drawing attention to several mistakes and wrong readings in these editions, he has tried to produce as far as possible a reliable edition. His vast critical study of the Brāhmanic litera

ture is well in evidence in his copious foot-notes and scholarly introduction wherein he has discussed in detail about the texts of the Brāhmaṇas and their commentaries in all their aspects. The scholarly world would feel much indebted to Dr. Sharma for his contribution to this neglected section of the Vedic literature.

—V. Hanumanthachar

Kavi-Kaumudi of Kalya Lakṣminṛsiṃha. Edited by Dr. K. Krishnamūrthy: 64 pp. Published by the Karnataka University. Dharwar 1965: Price Rs. 1·50.

The book under review is an anthology in Anyokti style. *Anyokti* is an allegorical or indirect way of alluding to and describing an object, by personifying beasts, birds, trees, sun, moon, ocean etc. and attributing to them the characterists of the object actually meant. This book is exclusively devoted to descriptions of this kind. The first canto contains 101 verses and has 46 verses the second canto (incomplete). The ideas expressed in these verses are highly imaginative and appealing set forth in a language which would clearly bring out what the poet actually intended to convey. In all his descriptions the author has well maintained poetic conventions which add beauty to the descriptions. Dr. Krishnamurthy has rightly pitched upon this book as worthy of publication. In his brief introduction he has furnished available details about the author, his place and parentage on the basis of the author's other works as well and has given a literary estimate of this book. His rendering of the Sanskrit ślokas in English verse though not literal, would go a long way to help the reader to grasp the sense of the Sanskrit version. This book is a good contribution by the editor to the Sanskrit literature.

शुकान्योक्तयः for शुनकान्योक्तयः (P. 36) and रत्ननि for रत्नानि (P. 50 verse 26) are some of the misprints that are noticed. We congratulate the Karnataka University for the encouragement it is giving to researches in Sanskrit.

—V. Hanumanthachar

Pāñcarātraprāsādaprasādhanam. Edited by H. Daniel Smith Syracuse University (U.S.A.) Published by the editor. pp. XXVIII: 200 Available at K. K. A. Venkatachari 43. T. P. Koil Street Triplicane. Madras Price Rs. 3/-.

According to Hindu ideals the span of life is conceived under three aspects, namely, ethical, religious and spiritual. They of course, overlap one another and influence one another in the realisation of the ultimate goal and every Hindu has to conform to certain rules pertaining to each aspect of life. The ethical aspect is concerned chiefly with the duties of a person to himself and to others as a social being and is guided by the rules laid down in Dharmaśātras of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Āpastambia etc. The religious aspect is a step higher and recognises the existence of a supreme being who is the all powerful dispensator of our destinies and is concerned in addition with the duties of a person to this highest being. This aspect is regulated by the principles set forth and explained in various Āgamas and Purāṇas. The spiritual aspect is concerned with the correct understanding and realisation of the relationship between the individual soul and the supreme being and is guided by the findings of Ṛṣis as recorded in Vedas and Upaniṣads. Āgamas which are concerned with the religious aspect of life are believed to have divine origin and deal with

the method of worship of the supreme being in the form of either Viṣṇu, Śiva or Śakti. They are therefore designated as Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, or Śākta according to the form of the supreme being worshipped. Pāñcarātra Āgama deals with the worship of Viṣṇu and the present text under review belongs to this school. It consists of the first ten chapters of the Kriyāpāda of the *Padmasamhitā* and deals in minute detail with the principles for the constrution of a temple for worshipping Viṣṇu. In his foreword the editor has drawn attention to the difference between Āgama works on temple construction and works on Śilpa Śāstra which deal also with temple, building etc. What is most striking in this edition is the foot notes which are very informative and reveal the editor's extensive critical study of this branch of literature. They are almost a substitute to a commenttry containing copious references and extracts from other Āgama works with elaborate explanations which bring out clearly by comparison the meaning of the text. The editor has brought out a valuable book well edited. We wish he has some more works in store.

—V. Hanumathachar

Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa with Vedārthaprakāśa of Sāyaṇa and Padārthamātravṛtti of Bharatasvāmin. Edited by Dr. B. R. Sharma. Published by Kendrīya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha. Tirupati PP. 26: 316. Price Rs. 15/-.

This is one of the nine Bṛāhmaṇas belonging to the *Sāmaveda* and what it deals with is hinted in text itself in 1. 1. 17. It prescribes the recital Sāmans as means for deriving certain benefits, heavenly and mundane, as a substitute for performing vedic rituals which involve considerable time and labour and explains which Sāman is capable of bestowing which benefit. Hence the title of the Brāhmaṇa.

Dr. Raghavan in his foreword draws attention to some points of general interest in the text and the editor in his critical introduction brings out prominently the special features of this Brāhmaṇa and the two commentaries and gives an account of Bharatasvāmin whose commentary *Padārthamātravṛtti* is published for the first time in this edition. The text is also endowed with critical notes, an alphabetical index of verses quoted in this Brāhmaṇa, technical names of the *Sāma-gānas,* quotations from other works, glossary of technical words and index of words. The earlier two editions by Burnell and Satyavrata Sāmasramin having run out of print, the credit for bringing this rare work again to light with an additional commentary of Bharatasvāmin, which was not known till now goes to Dr. B. R. Sharma, whom we heartily congratulate for the acheivements. He has taken care to utilise all the available manuscripts of this Brāhmaṇa to make the edition as accurate as possible.

According to the Brāhmaṇa text 1—1—15 Devas approached Prajāpati and requested him how they could attain svarga. For them Prajāpati prescribed certain sacrifices by performing which they could go to the heaven. Next ये चापूता ये च कामेप्सवः (1—1—17) approached Prajāpati. For them Prajāpati prescribed Tapas and Svādhyāyādhyayana as means for attaining svarga. In the text 1—2—1 the three varities of Tapas, namely *kṛcchra, Atikṛcchra* and *Kṛcchrātikṛcchra* meant for the sake of ... ये चापूता ... are explained. In his statement अथ का चापूता इत्युक्तं परामृश्यते made in the last line of the commentary on 1—2—1. Bharatasvāmī was obviously referring to ये चापूता etc: mentioned in the 2nd line of 1—1—17. Therefore the reading in the Bharatasvāmi's commentary is correct as it is and needs no correction like अथ वाचा अपूता इत्युक्तं etc. as suggested by Dr. Raghavan in his foreword page 2 para 2 as no such reading occurs before to which reference could be made. The get up of the book

could have been more attractive with better binding. This is the first publication in the series of Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha and we hope further publications will follow soon.

—V. Hanumanthachar

The Kauṭilya Arthaśātra. Part III. A study, by R. P. Kangle PP. 6: 302. Published by the University of Bombay. Price Rs. 16/-.

This is the third and the concluding part of the author's study of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, the other two parts being the critical edition of the Sanskrit text of Arthaśāstra in part I and the translation of the text into English in part II which have already come out. This part is devoted exclusively to an inquiry in detail about the scope and origin of the Arthaśāstra, its contents and sources, its author and his date and a critical presentation of the state in Kauṭilya, condition of society and social life, state economy, mode of state administration, law and administration of justice, internal security defence external affairs etc. as depicted in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. The treatment is thorough and leaves very little to be said about Kauṭilya and his work. The copious references to writers and their works on this science from the earliest to the present time point to the vast field of study covered by the author to produce this work. This is a valuable contribution to the history of the cultural heritage of India for which the author has earned the gratitude of scholars. We congratulate the University of Bombay for publshing it soon after the two earlier parts.

—V. Hanumanthachar

Kṛdantarūpamālā (A concordance of Verbal Derivatives) by Pandit S. Ramasubbashastri. Published by the Sanskrit Education Society, Madras. PP. xviii: 248. Price Rs. 10/-.

It is admitted by all that the Sanskrit grammar comprising the sūtras of Pāṇini and their commentaries is the most perfect and scientific explaining in minute detail each and every grammatical point. But this very perfection has necessarily made the Sanskrit grammar a most complex and toughest subject of study for the students. To arrive at a particular form of word for instance, one has to bring in several sūtras and their interpretation which only a few can do. This may be one of the reasons for the lack of interest for Sanskrit among students. In order to overcome this difficulty and to simplify matters by giving a finished and ready made form of wrds derived from their roots, books such as *Śabdaratnāvalī, Sabdamañjarī. Dhāturūpāvalī* etc. have been compiled by pandits and are in use in schools. The book under review is a similar one being a concordance of Kṛdanta words. Pt. S. Ramasubbashastri, the author is not only a pandit of the traditional type but also a teacher for modern students. In this volume he has given the Kṛdanta derivatives for 250 roots quoting the relevant sūtras and explanations in the footnotes wherever necessary. He has thus covered a vast ground and has made matters much easy to students of Sanskrit grammar. This will not only be an inseparable guide to students but also a very useful book of reference to scholars. Srī Shāstri's work is commendable. We congratulate the Sanskrit Education Society, Madras for publishing this work and await the publication of the next volume.

—V. Hanumanthachar

The Teaching of Sanskrit by Prof. K. Rama Varma Raja Published by The Sanskrit Education Society. Madras 4: pp. xiv: 133 Price Rs. 5/-.

From time immemorial Sanskrit is being taught and learnt according to what is called the traditional method. This method no doubt, produced eminent scholars in every branch of Sanskrit learning. But the conditions at the present time are not the same as of old and so also the aims and objects of learning. Knowledge which was once an end in itself is now looked upon as a means to some other object. All this has necessitated a remodelling of the courses of study and chalking out suitable and affective methods of teaching consistent with the present needs. This book under review is therefore a welcome treatise on the method of teaching Sanskrit by Prof. K. Rama Varma Raja who has the triple advantage of being a profound scholar of Sanskrit equipped with the highest degree in the modern methods of teaching and of being himself a teacher throughout. At the out set the author traces the special phonological characteristics of Sanskrit language and the cultural value of the study of Sanskrit followed by a description of the different methods of teaching, e.g. direct method, traditional method, translation method and substitution method and indicates their advantages and limitations. Next he deals with composition oral and written, translation, transcription and dictation indicating their place and usefulness in the modern method of teaching. Attention is then drawn to different types of prose and poetry and the procedure for teaching them e.g. preparation, presentation and conclusion. Methods of teaching grammar are next explained. In this connection the author points out how classical languages are taught in western countries and refers to the views of scholars regarding the place of grammar in the course of study, its syllabus and the methods of teaching to be adopted. He

discusses the advantages and limitations of deductive and inductive methods of teaching grammar. Finally the author deals with different types of examination and its usefulness and observes that the text book should be the centre of instructions. It will thus be seen that the author has critically tackled in detail every aspect ooff teaching Sanskdit. Coming from the pen of a prominent educationist with long practical experience, this book will be of much use not only to the teachers of Sanskrit but also to all the teachers in general. We congratulate the Sanskrit Education Society, Madras for publishing this book.

—V. Hanumanthachar

The Indian Spirit by Satchidananda Murthy. Published by the Special Officer, Andhra University Press, Waltair PP. XIV: 296. Prices Rs. 10/-.

The Indian mode of living and thinking has flown in such diverse channels with apparently different shades that it has some times given rise to disputes and controversies even among Indian scholars. It is not surprising, therefore, if some western critics have failed to understand the true mentality of Indians underlying their civilisation and made observations from their own point of view. This book under notice is in some measure a rejoinder to the criticisms of western critics presenting the Indian view in its correct form. As against the remark that the Indians were spiritualistic and were opposed to worldly progress and happiness the author points out on the textual authority of ancient and modern writers that Indians were never against worldly pleasures; they, on the other hand, prayed for universal longivity of life and unbroken happiness. Mīmāṁsā he points out is a system which advocated action for achieving happiness not only in

this world but in the world hereafter. He refers to *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa, *Mahāvaṁśa* and *Mañjuśīmūla Kalpa* to substantiate that Indians were not indifferent to writing histories and states that Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is not only a text book on politics but also a cultural history of Indians. The author throws fresh light on how the caste system came into vogue and tries to dispell the misunderstanding that Brāhmaṇas dominated over other sections and that opportunities were denied to others to rise to positions of eminance. Chapter IV on "The Greek Image of Indian Philosophy" traces the connection between Greece and India from the earliest times and shows how the Greeks appreciated Indian philosophy. In Chapter V on the "Philosophical Thought in India" the author describes some of the distinguishing characteristics of Indian philosophy and points out that Indian philosophy is traditional and interpretative while the other philosophies are constructive evolving something new on the old foundations. In Chapter VI on "Experience, Reason and Transcendental Materialism in Indian Philosophy' the author draws pointed attention to the views of Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan that Advaita of Śaṅkara is not quite in conformity with the Vedantic authorities, the Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtrts and the Gītā and quotes Tagore, Debendranath, Bankimchandra, Tilak, Gandhi etc. who hold the view that Theism of Rāmānuja is the faith of Hinduism. The authors discussion on the place of Experience, Reason and Scripture as means of Brahman-knowledge and his exposition of the Satkāryavāda and the justification of Madhva's Jīvatraividhyavāda are scholarly and impressive. Chapter VII on "Religion and Ethical Pdactices, the Hindu view" contains an interesting explanation of the concept of Dharma (Ethics) and how it controls and shapes the destinies of jīvas through the working of the law of karma. Chapter VIII on "Ethics and politics in Hindu Culture" gives

an idea of how in Hindu Culture politics are influenced by ethics. It may be noted that in all his references to the criticisms of Western critics the author points out that the Western countries and their philosophies are not immune from the very same criticisms which are made with reference to Indians. This book reflecting the author's penetrative and analytical study of wide range of philosophical literature of India as well as of other countries is a laudable contribution to the study of Indian cultural history for which we congratulate the author. We congratulate also the Andhra University for publishing it nicely.

—V. Hanumanthachar

Veda—The Eye Eternal by Bangali Baba PP. 1—66 (English edition) and Veda Cakṣuḥ Sanātanam PP. 1—42 (Hindi Edition) Published by Hari Singh, Hari Surgical Works, Delhi--9.

This is an elementary book on the subject in order to quench the thirst of a beginner. The book attempts to tackle the subject from the modern point of view and to satisfy the needs of those who are under the influence of modern western industrial civilisation and culture. The book can be said to be a composite abridged edition of the author's works, "Pātañjalī yogasūtra, the Śrīmad-Bhagavadgītā and the fundamentals of Human consciousness." The author wants to make the readers understand the Vedic way of life with practical criticism of modern Indian life as well as to teach the foreign readers as to how to look to the concept of Vedic life in the modern age.

—Om Prakash

A Bilingual Graeco-Aramaic Edit by Asoka—The first Greek Inscription discovered in Afghanistan, Text, Translation and notes by G. Pugliese Carratelli and G. Garbini, Foreword by G. Tucci, Introduction by U. Scerrato PP. i–xi+62.

This XXIX volume of the Serie Orientale Rome is itself a proof of pursuit of scholars of the Instituto Italiano Per *II* Medico Ed Estremo Orient, Roma in the studies of ancient history and gaining oriental knowledge. The inscription, a find of Afghanistan kept in Kabul Museum was certainly a coveted study for the scholars. Being the first Greek inscription it was even more valuable. The foreword by the prominent scholar G. Tucci and the other three articles on the inscription are great pieces of learning. These are informative and very interesting. They have added a new feather to the ancient glory of India by bringing the inscription to the knowledge of the world attempting to explain the two sides in detail and making every effort for the nearest correct interpretation. A deep study of all the articles published in the book makes Indians feel proud of their culture in the past and their efforts to spread a religion for humanity a literature for the conduct of the span of life in the times when imperialism was the talk of the day and the people were left to the mercy of the imperialists, oppressive tendencies.

The scholars in India are certainly thankful to all the four scholars who have contributed to this publication. It is hoped that scholars will take interest in studying these contributions. We congratulate the Italian Institute for such publications.

—Om Prakash

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3. The Institute shall consist of

(1) **Donors**, who shall be of four categories:—

(i) *Patrons* shall be persons donating Rupees Twenty-five thousand or more, in cash or kind. (ii) *Vice-Patrons* shall be persons donating Rupees Five thousand or more, in cash or kind, but less than Rupees Twenty-five thousand. (iii) *Benefactors* shall be

persons donating Rupees One thousand or more, in cash or kind, but less than Rupees Five thousand. (iv) *Associates* shall be those persons, who make gift of books, manuscripts or other articles and approved by the Executive Committee.

(2) Members, who shall be of four categories:–

(i) *Honorary Members,* who shall be elected from amongst distinguished scholars, by at least two-third majority of votes of the Executive Committee after being duly proposed and seconded by two members, provided that the number of such members shall not at any time be more than twenty-five.

(iv) *Ordinary Members* shall be those who pay an annual subscription of Rs. 15 a year, payable on the first day of January every year, which may be compounded by payment of Rupees One Hundred and thirty-five within the course of a year, and thus become Life-Members. *Provided* that persons desirous of becoming an Ordinary Member shall be nominated by one member and seconded by another, the nominating member shall address the Secretary in writing and give the candidate's name and address, occupation or status. The nomination will be considered by the Executive Committee and the election shall be by a majority of votes.

4. The Donors and Members shall be entitled:–

(1) to attend all meetings of the General Council and to propose, second, and vote for any resolution consistent with the objects of the Institute,

(2) to propose and second candidates for Ordinary membership,

(3) to introduce visitors at the ordinary meetings of the General Council,

(4) to get copies of the Journal of the Institute free of charge,

(5) to get other publications of the Institute at such concession rates as may be fixed by the Executive Committee,

(6) to use the Library and Reading-room of the Institute on such conditions as the Executive Committee may lay down.

All communications should be addressed to–

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA

DR. UMESHA MISHRA, M.A., D.LITT.

Hon. Secretary, Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad